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This publication was created as part of a research project entitled “In Search 
of a Model for the Legal Protection of a Whistleblower in the Workplace,” 
Reg. No. 2017/25/N/HS5/00563, financed by the National Science Centre 
(Poland). The work attempts to propose legal solutions in the field of whis-
tleblower protection that could be applied in the Polish legal order. The 
postulated assumptions seek to enable whistleblowers report perceived 
irregularities in the workplace without fear of negative consequences for 
their actions. The postulates result from the analysis of the literature, case 
law, and selected existing legal acts around the world in the field of whis-
tleblower protection.
In Chapter I, I scrutinize the regulations on whistleblowing in the United 
States of America, the United Kingdom, Romania, Slovenia, Ireland, Italy, 
France, and other selected countries. The reflections contained in this part 
also apply to the Directive on the protection of persons who report breaches 
of union law adopted on October 7, 2019, by the Council of the European 
Union. Member States are required to implement its provisions within their 
national legal order within two years. Moreover, I also discuss the legacy 
of the European Court of Human Rights. ECHR jurisprudence shapes the 
way human rights are understood in Poland, which may help people who 
report irregularities in the workplace, because it is binding in Polish courts 
and failure to comply exposes the state to liability for damages.
Whereas Chapter II analyzes in detail Polish legal regulations on the pro-
tection of persons who report irregularities. Finally, Chapter III overviews 
planned regulations – at the time of this book’s preparation – which refer 
to whistleblowing and the protection of whistleblowers. This chapter 
also presents the doctrinal proposal of a model for the legal protection 
of whistleblowers in workplace. The Conclusion summarizes the study 
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Despite the fact that the world has paid more and more attention to the 
activities falling within the category described as “whistleblowing,” there 
is no single common and universally accepted definition of this phenom-
enon. Individual international organizations and doctrine representatives 
often take different positions, e.g. when it comes to the limits of permitted 
activities or the subjective scope of people who may provide information on 
irregularities. Moreover, in individual countries, we may observe different 
attitudes toward the very essence of whistleblowing. Its evaluation depends, 
among others, on historical, cultural, and social conditions.1 For example, 
American society, post-Soviet countries, including the period of German 
occupation during the Second World War have all completely different 
historical experiences. The informants were then clearly perceived nega-
tively, as “rats” or “snitches.”2 Therefore, in some countries, the distinction 
between an ethical informant and a negative informant is often blurred.
The concept of whistleblowing is derived from the English expression 
“to blow the whistle” and was related to alerting police officers and pass-
ersby about the escape of a perpetrator from the crime scene.3 Literature 
offers also another interpretation, according to which the above term can 
be associated with the world of sport, where it is necessary for a referee to 
intervene when players break the rules of the game.4 Generally speaking, the 
 1 M. Kutera, “Whisteblowing jako narzędzie wykrywania oszustw gospodarczych,” 
Studia i Prace Kolegium Zarządzania i Finansów 152/2016, Szkoła Główna 
Handlowa, Warszawa, p. 126.
 2 Ł. Kobroń, “Whistleblower  – strażnik wartości czy donosiciel?,” 
Palestra 11–12/2013, Naczelna Rada Adwokacka, Warszawa, p. 296.
 3 M. Kleinhempel, “Whistleblowing Not an Easy Thing to Do,” Effective 
Executive 7/2011, p. 44, https://www.iupindia.in/1107/Effective%20Executive/
Effective_Executive.asp, access: 10.09.2019.
 4 R. Swedberg, “Civil Courage: The Case of Knut Wicksell,” Theory and Society 
28.4/1999, Springer Netherlands, pp.  501–528; qtd. after A.  Kobylińska, 
M. Folta, Sygnaliści – ludzie, którzy nie potrafią milczeć. Doświadczenia osób 
ujawniających nieprawidłowości w instytucjach i firmach w Polsce, Fundacja 












essence of whistleblowing is to communicate information about irregulari-
ties, e.g. in the workplace, to persons or entities capable of taking effective 
action to stop such practices. The 1985 definition of whistleblowing by 
Janet P. Near and Marcia P. Miceli reads, “the disclosure by organization 
members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices 
under the control of their employer, to persons or organizations that may 
be able to effect action.”5 According to another definition, whistleblowing 
is an act of an employee or senior executive of any institution, whether 
that it is profit or not, private or public, which means public disclosure 
of an instruction to perform an act that could harm a third party, violates 
human rights, or is inconsistent with the stated purpose of the organiza-
tion.6 It is also worth mentioning the definition of the International Labour 
Organisation, according to which whistleblowing is: “the reporting by 
employees or former employees of illegal, irregular, dangerous or uneth-
ical practices by employers.”7 Transparency International, a leading NGO 
working to prevent corruption uses yet another definition. According to 
it the phenomenon in question relates to: “the disclosure or reporting of 
wrongdoing, which includes corruption, criminal offences, breaches of legal 
obligation, miscarriages of justice, specific dangers to public health, safety 
or the environment, abuse of authority, unauthorised use of public funds 
or property, gross waste or mismanagement, conflict of interest, and acts 
to cover up any of the aforementioned.”8
There are also a number of other definitions of whistleblowers. 
Whistleblowers may be defined as, “people who draw attention to corpo-
rate wrong doing either by reporting to superiors or even going outside the 
 5 J. P. Near, M. P. Miceli, “Organizational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-
blowing,” Journal of Business Ethics 4/1985, Springer, Berlin, p. 4.
 6 N. E. Bowie, R. F. Duska, Business Ethics, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs New 
Jersey, 1990, p. 73.
 7 OECD, G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan: Protection of Whistleblowers: Study 
on Whistleblower Protection Frameworks, Compendium of Best Practices and 
Guiding Principles for Legislation, 2011, p. 7, https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/
anti-corruption/48972967.pdf, access: 16.07.2019.
 8 M. Worth, Whistleblowing in Europe. Legal Protections for Whistlebowers in 










organisation.”9 On the other hand, the Article 33 of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption10 stipulates that a reporting person is 
someone “who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the 
competent authorities any facts concerning offences established in accor-
dance with this Convention.” In the opinion of Transparency International, 
a whistleblower can be any worker of public or private sector or a different 
person,11 who knows about any wrongdoing and is at risk of retribution.12
Disclosed information may involve various types of abuse. As it stands 
in the results of research,13 the activity of whistleblowers is one of the 
most effective instruments for detecting irregularities in organizations. Early 
report on irregularities can often prevent or reduce damage. The activity of 
whistleblowers may be the only chance to detect unwanted incidents, such 
as corruption, financial fraud, mismanagement or violation of employee 
rights. From the point of view of this study, the latter aspect is of great 
importance. It may involve e.g. violation of occupational health and safety 
regulations thus affect the life or health of employees.
The interest in whistleblowing and recognition of its benefits led many 
countries to the adoption of specific provisions regulating the rules of re-
porting irregularities.14 However, in many legal systems, including the Polish 
one, there are still no regulations enabling whistleblowers to act without 
fear of negative consequences. There is no doubt that due to the speci-
ficity of the undertaken activities and the very nature of whistleblowing, 
whistleblowers are exposed to various forms of retaliation by entities at 
 9 R. Patterson, Compendium of Banking Terms in English and Polish, 
trans. Ewa Kieres, Warszawa 2015, p.  1168, https://phavi.umcs.pl/at/
attachments/2015/1211/084950-accounting-pol-eng.pdf, access: 10.08.2019.
 10 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The United Nations Convention 
against Corruption, adopted by the UN General Assembly on October 23, 2003.
 11 Different persons may refer to consultants, interns, volunteers, suppliers, and 
previous employers.
 12 Worth, “Whistleblowing” p. 6.
 13 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Report to the Nations: 2018 Global 
Study on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, https://www.acfe.com/report-to-the-
nations/2018, access: 12.04.2019.













whose disadvantage they act.15 In the case of employer-employee relation-
ship, we can distinguish among dismissal, harassment, and discrimination. 
There is also a risk of liability for violation of personal rights and disclosure 
of confidential information. Due to the lack of legal protection, many people 
resign from taking action for fear of conflict with their employer. Moreover, 
it is very significant that despite the benefits of whistleblowing for society 
and organizations, the opinions on whistleblowers are still very divided 
and their activities are subject to different reactions in the environment.16
In order to illustrate the significance of the discussed issue, it is necessary 
to present a few cases of whistleblowers’ activity. One of the most famous 
examples is related to the collapse of the Enron Corporation.17 Before the 
bankruptcy, the company employed about 22 000 people and its turnover in 
2000 was about 100 billion USD.18 Moreover, the general public perceived 
it positively, as evidenced by a number of awards it received.19 In August 
2001, Enron Vice President Sherron Watkins submitted to the President a 
six-pages-long note on irregularities in the management and accounting of 
the entity, believing that the President would solve the problem.20 However, 
the message was completely ignored. After the opening of an investigation, 
the note written by Sherron Watkins was one of the most important evi-
dence. The literature stresses that her actions could not save the company, 
but she nevertheless became a symbol of “heroic courage.”21 Noteworthy, 
 15 R. Szymczykiewicz, Miejsce tzw. sygnalistów w polskim systemie prawnym, 
Instytut Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości, Warszawa 2018, p. 6.
 16 Kobylińska, Folta, Sygnaliści, p. 17.
 17 See also P.  Bondarenko, Enron scandal, https://www.britannica.com/event/
Enron-scandal, 2016, access: 14.05.2019.
 18 A. Burczyc, “Ustawa Sarbanesa-Oxleya i jej następstwa dla działalności 
audytorów oraz zarządów spółek,” Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu 
Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu 268/2012, Wydawnictwo  Uniwersytetu 
Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław, p. 44.
 19 “America’s Most Innovative Company” was Fortune’s prize awarded to Enron 
between 1996 and 2001. Enron was also on the list of “100 Best Companies to 
Work For” in the USA, published by Fortune in 2000. Harvard Business Review 
assessed it as an innovative company.
 20 Kobroń, “Whistleblower,” p. 299.
 21 L. Yuhao, “The Case Analysis of the Scandal of Enron,” International Journal 
of Business and Management 5.10/2010, Canadian Center of Science and 
















Time magazine honored three American whistleblowers, including Sherron 
Watkins, with the title of “Person of the Year 2002.”22 In this case, we 
should note that Enron had a sixty-four-pages-long code of ethics. However, 
the mere creation of legal and moral guidelines, without adequate pro-
tection for whistleblowers and educating employees in this area, was not 
enough to prevent the company’s collapse.23
With regard to the activities of European whistleblowers, it is worth 
mentioning the case of an employee of the Romanian Prosecutor General’s 
Office, who shared information on the activities of politicians trying to 
influence the course of the investigation. Jacob Guja provided one of the 
newspapers with two letters received by the office. They contained evidence 
of pressure in a police fraud case. One of letters called on the Prosecutor 
General to engage personally in the case and to deal with it in accordance 
with the law.24 Later, the newspaper published an article on the fight against 
corruption. Moreover, the article contained information on abuses com-
mitted by public authorities in Moldavia in this sphere.25 As an example, 
the newspaper presented the content of two letters sent by Jacob Guja. The 
whistleblower admitted that he was the one who had given the letters to 
the newspaper, because he wanted to follow the president’s anti-corruption 
policy26 and protect the good reputation of the office.27 As a result, he had 
to face dismissal. The reason for this decision was that the whistleblower 
had not previously consulted other prosecutors and had disclosed classified 
documents.28
 22 The two other whistleblowers were FBI agent Coleen Rowley and WorldCom 
accountant Cynthia Cooper.
 23 M. Konkel, Dziurawa ustawa nie obroni sygnalisty, 2018, https://www.pb.pl/
dziurawa-ustawa-nie-obroni-sygnalisty-907980, access: 14.05.2019.
 24 A. Ploszka, “Ochrona demaskatorów (whistleblowers) w orzecznictwie 
Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka,” Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 
4/2014, Wolters Kluwer Polska, Warszawa, p. 14.
 25 M. A. Nowicki, Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka. Wybór orzeczeń 2011, 
Wolters Kluwer Polska, Warszawa 2012, p. 391.
 26 In 2003, in a widely reported speech, the President of Moldavia emphasized the 
need to fight corruption and called upon law enforcement agencies not to give 
in to pressure from bureaucrats.
 27 Ploszka, “Ochrona,” p. 15.















Appeals against the dismissal before the national courts have failed Jacob 
Guja. The courts decided that Guja’s action was an abuse of his post and 
could not be regarded as a legitimate exercise of his freedom of speech.29 
The whistleblower brought an action before the European Court of Human 
Rights,30 which ruled that his release violated the freedom of expression, 
in particular the freedom of information and communication guaranteed 
by the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court indicated that 
Jacob Guja acted in good faith and had no other effective means of drawing 
attention to the abuses. Moreover, the Court noted that the public interest 
in the discussed case outweighed the office’s reputation loss caused by the 
disclosure of information. As a result of the ruling, the Moldavian State 
was obliged to pay the applicant €10,000 to compensate for material 
and non-material damage and more than €8,000 to reimburse costs and 
expenses. The whistleblower was subsequently reinstated, but after ten 
days the company fired him again. After using all possible national legal 
paths, once again, the case went to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
In his complaint, the man indicated that his reinstatement was an illusion 
and that the actions of the office continued previous sanctions imposed on 
him for his signaling activity. Some indicators of such situation appeared 
in the fact that his bosses assigned him no tasks and he did not even have 
access to the office. The ECJ held that – despite the alleged implementation 
of the previous ruling – the company never actually intended to reinstate 
Guja. Another dismissal was a further retaliatory measure for the whistle-
blowing activity undertaken in 2003. Thus, the Court found that Article 
10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms had again been infringed.31 This time, the Court 
obliged Moldavia to pay the applicant €10,000 for the damage suffered 
and €1,500 as reimbursement of costs and expenses.
 29 Ploszka, “Ochrona” p. 15.
 30 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
drew up by the Council of Europe and signed on November 4, 1950; Dziennik 
Ustaw 61.284/1993.








In the literature, we can also find examples on the activity of Polish 
whistleblowers.32 The publication Wiem i powiem. Ochrona sygnalistów i 
dziennikarskich źródeł informacji (I Know and Will Tell: The Protection of 
Whistleblowers and Journalistic Sources of Information) published by the 
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights describes one of such examples.33 
The publication concerns a gynecologist who disclosed information on the 
fixing of a competition for the position of the gynecological ward head at 
one of the hospitals. After winning the competition, this person was to open 
a gynecological-oncological ward in the hospital, even though the facility 
was not adapted for this purpose. The whistleblower shared his information 
with the hospital authorities, the proper Medical Chamber, and during the 
session of the County Council. Despite the above, the person concerned 
won the competition.34 However, the person was dismissed after a series of 
neglects that led to negative consequences for the health of patients. The 
whistleblower lost his job and was sued for defamation. Eventually, the 
court disputes ended favorably for him and, among other things, he was 
reinstated.
However, as evidenced by the results of the research35 conducted in this 
field, it is difficult to consider this end of the case as representative of all 
the whistleblower cases in Poland. Further part of this study elaborates on 
that matter.
 32 Kobylińska, Folta, Sygnaliści; R. Hryniewicz, K. Krak, Sygnaliści w organizacji. 
Jak skutecznie wdrożyć system sygnalizowania nieprawidłowości?, Must Read 
Media, Warszawa 2019; D. Głowacka, A. Ploszka, M. Sczaniecki, Wiem i 
powiem. Ochrona sygnalistów i dziennikarskich źródeł informacji, Helsińska 
Fundacja Praw Człowieka, Warszawa 2016; Ł. Kobroń, “Czy Polskę czeka era 
‘etycznych donosów?’ Społeczno-prawne aspekty działania whistleblowera,” 
Zeszyty Naukowe Towarzystwa Doktorantów UJ. Nauki Społeczne, 10/2015, 
Towarzystwo Doktorantów UJ, Kraków, pp. 81–92.
 33 Głowacka, Ploszka, Sczaniecki, Wiem, p. 9.
 34 Głowacka, Ploszka, Sczaniecki, Wiem, p. 9
 35 A. Wojciechowska-Nowak, Ochrona sygnalistów w doświadczeniu sędziów 










Chapter I  Whistleblower Protection in 
Selected Legislatures
1.1  Preliminary Remarks
Currently, there are many legal regulations in the world that are com-
prehensively or at least in part relate to the protection of whistleblowers. 
More and more countries have recently adopted special legislation to pro-
tect whistleblowers, example being Italy or France. We can observe a dif-
ferent approach to the issue in each country. Among other things, this is 
due to the historical experience of individual countries. Many European 
countries have experienced totalitarian regimes in the past, so it is not sur-
prising that their citizens still feel uncomfortable with any form of disclo-
sure.36 These countries include Poland, whose legislation on the protection 
of whistleblowers is discussed later in this paper. Not without significance 
are also cultural factors that occur in individual countries. The literature 
indicates that all forms of “snitching” are negatively perceived, for instance, 
in Italy.37
The following analysis covers the legal regulations concerning the pro-
tection of whistleblowers in selected countries around the world, i.e. the 
USA, the United Kingdom, Romania, Slovenia, Ireland, Italy, and France. 
Moreover, the analysis presents the general assumptions of legal protection 
in this field adopted in several other countries.
 36 C. Speckbacher, Ochrona whistleblowerów w świetle prac GRECO, 2009, 
p. 15, http://www.batory.org.pl/doc/Whistleblowing_mechanisms_REV2_for_
Batory_POL.pdf, access: 20.12.2018.
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1.2  Whistleblower Protection in Selected 
Legislatures around the World
1.2.1  The United States of America
In the United States of America, there is an elaborate system of legal protec-
tion for people who report irregularities.38 As the crime rate in accounting 
and corporate governance increased, the US government tended more to 
ensure the protection of whistleblowers. The issues of entities such as Enron 
and WorldCom generated interest in whistleblowers’ activities among 
the public and, consequently, among politicians. However, the literature 
indicates that despite the benefits whistleblowers bring to society, their 
protection in the USA remains an “inconsistent legislative patchwork.”39 
Let us note that there are many state and federal laws about reporting 
irregularities, which vary significantly.40 However, laws in this field often 
interact with each other and overlap at the state and federal levels.41 There 
is no single act that comprehensively covers all whistleblowers’ activities 
throughout the country, in both public and private sectors regardless of 
the sector in which they operate. Among the most important acts that pro-
tect whistleblowers in the USA are The False Claims Act42 (1863) and the 
 38 Kutera, “Whisteblowing,” p. 130; M. Andrzejewski, “Whistleblowing, czyli 
demaskacja pracownicza w zarządzaniu zasobami ludzkimi,” Acta Universitatis 
Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica 288/2013, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Łódzkiego, Łódź, p. 284; Kobroń, “Whistleblower,” p. 296.
 39 S. M. Boyne, “Financial Incentives and Truth-Telling: The Growth of Whistle-
Blowing Legislation in the United States,” in: Whistleblowing: A Comparative 
Study, Ius Comparatum  – Global Studies in Comparative Law 16, eds. 
G. Thusing, G. Forst, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2016, p. 280.
 40 T. M. Dworkin, “US Whistleblowing: a Decade of Progress?” in: A Global 
Approach to Public Interest Disclosure. What Can We Learn from Existing 
Whistleblowing Legislation and Research?, ed. David B. Lewis, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 2010, p. 36.
 41 C. Henkel, “Whistleblower Rights and Protection under U.S. Law in the 
Private Sector,” 2017, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317449281_
Whistleblower_Rights_and_Protection_Under_US_Law_in_the_Private_Sector, 
access: 12.12.2018.
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Whisteblower Protection Act43 (1989), which mainly refers to the public 
sector, along with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act44 (2002) and the Dodd-Frank 
Act45 (2010), which refer to the private sector.46
Besides strictly jurisdictional solutions, institutions also conduct 
activities47 that result, for instance, in the establishment of the National 
Whistleblowing Center in 1988. It operates in the whole USA and seeks 
public support and legal aid for people reporting violations.48 Moreover, 
there is the Office of Special Counsel,49 which assists whistleblowers who 
work in state agencies.50
Due to the highly complex system of protection for whistleblowers in the 
USA, it would be impossible to analyze all the legislation in this area. For 
the purposes of this study, the following chapter contains only a general 
overview of the most important legal regulations in this field.
1.2.1.1  The False Claims Act
The starting point for the development of whistleblower protection in the 
USA is the False Claims Act, adopted by Congress on March 2, 1863. It is 
also known as the Lincoln Law. It is a federal law that encourages disclo-
sure of irregularities.51 This regulation is considered to have had recently the 
greatest impact on the protection of whistleblowers in the USA.52 Originally, 
the law was a response to speculations of military contractors during the 
Civil War who tried to deceive the government, for example by sending 
 43 Whistleblower Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16. https://www.
usda.gov/oig/webdocs/whistle1989.pdf, access: 12.12.2018.
 44 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). https://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/hr3763/text, access: 12.12.2018.
 45 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Publ. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-
111hr4173enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr4173enr.pdf, access: 12.12.2018.
 46 Kutera, “Whisteblowing,” p. 130.
 47 R. Dąbrowski, “Demaskacja jako narzędzie do walki z korupcją,” Kwartalnik 
Policyjny, 3/2011, Centrum Szkolenia Policji, Legionowo, p. 42.
 48 Information from: https://www.whistleblowers.org/, access: 20.06.2019.
 49 Office’s website: https://osc.gov/.
 50 Dąbrowski, “Demaskacja,” p. 42.
 51 Dworkin, “US Whistleblowing,” p. 43.
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boxes of sawdust instead of weapons or repeatedly selling the same horse 
to the cavalry of the armed forces.53 The Act authorized the citizens aware 
of such practices to take measures against such deceivers. The provisions 
of the Act underwent several modifications since 1863. Significant changes 
appeared in 1986 under the False Claims Reform Act of 1986.54 Among 
others, the provisions aimed at facilitating cash recovery procedures for 
whistleblowers and, thus, encouraging more frequent reporting of fraudu-
lent irregularities committed by government contractors.55 It is worth noting 
that once the government recognized the success of the federal law, many 
states enacted similar regulations to combat local government fraud and 
reward whistleblowers.
The False Claims Act allows anyone aware of fraud against the govern-
ment to file a lawsuit on their behalf. A claim brought under this Act by 
an individual whistleblower – also referred to as a relator56 – is known as 
a qui tam claim. The concept of the qui tam dates back to the Middle Ages 
and comes from the Latin phrase “Qui tam pro domino rege quam pro 
seipse,” which means “the one who sues in this case for both the king and 
himself.”57 Under this concept, government supports and protects citizens to 
 53 Ł. Kobroń-Gąsiorowska, “Whistleblower w prawie europejskim – ochrona 
whistleblowera czy informacji,” Roczniki Administracji i Prawa 2/2018, Wyższa 
Szkoła Humanitas, Sosnowiec, p. 132; Becker's Hospital Review, “11 Things to 
Know About the False Claims Act,“ 2010, https://www.beckershospitalreview.
com/news-analysis/eleven-things-to-know-about-the-false-claims-act.html, 
access: 19.08.2019.
 54 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1986).
 55 Dworkin, “US Whistleblowing,” p. 43.
 56 “The term “relator” is another word for whistleblowers. It originated in 
the False Claims Act whistleblower reward law signed by President Abraham 
Lincoln on March 2, 1863, during the Civil War. The term “whistleblower” 
was not in use in 1863. Consequently, in modern whistleblower reward laws, 
the term “relator” is often used by the Courts and parties to signify a whis-
tleblower,” https://www.whistleblowers.org/faq/false-claims-act-qui-tam/, 
access: 24.06.2019.
 57 S. M.  Kohn, The Whistleblower`s Handbook:  A Step-by-Step Guide to 
Doing What’s Right and Protecting Yourself, Lyons Press, Guilford, 2011; 
S. Mukherjee, Protection of Whistleblowers in United States of America, LAP 
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help enforce the law the behalf of the state.58 Consequently, the private indi-
vidual is the one who initiates the proceedings. The government is legally 
obliged to examine the allegations made by the individual.59 After consid-
ering all the circumstances, the Department of Justice decides whether to 
join the proceedings.60 According to 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(3), if the govern-
ment decides not to proceed with the action, the initiator has the right to 
conduct it. However, if the Government decides to join the proceedings, it 
bears the main responsibility for prosecution and is not bound by the act of 
the person bringing the action.61 Still, a private individual has the right to 
continue the proceedings as a party.62 Before the expiration of the sixty-day 
period or any extension under the Act, the government should proceed with 
the action – in such case the action is taken by the government – or notify 
the court that it refuses to take over the action, in which case the person 
bringing the action has the right to take over the action.63 The whistleblower 
acts anonymously for at least sixty days. This period may be extended by 
the court.64 It follows from the above that the identity of the whistleblower 
is initially protected, yet it is disclosed at a later stage in the proceedings.
In § 3729(a), the False Claims Act indicates the liability for certain acts.65 
For instance, § 3729(a)(1)(A) & (B) makes liable anyone who knowingly 
made a false claim, or caused someone else to make a false claim, or know-
ingly made a false record or statement, in order to induce the government 
to pay a false claim. On the other hand, § 3729(a)(1)(G) is known as a 
section of reverse false claim.66 In this case, liability arises when action is 
taken to avoid the obligation to pay money to the government.67 Moreover, 
 58 Mukherjee, Protection, p. 13.
 59 Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 287.
 60 Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 287.
 61 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(1).
 62 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(1).
 63 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b)(4) (A) & (B).
 64 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b)(3).
 65 The Department of Justice, The False Claims Act: A Primer, 2011. https://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.
pdf, access: 14.06.2019.
 66 The False Claims Act.
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according to § 3729(a)(1)(C), liability arises also in the case of conspirators 
plotting the infringement of provisions. Fraud against the government can 
take many forms. For example, it could be overcharging, a failure to provide 
a service, a supply of a smaller quantity, or a poorer quality of products 
or services.68 A request for payment from the government in the cases 
above makes the request false or fraudulent, hence the name of the False 
Claims Act.
In 1986, the Congress increased the penalties for fraud against the gov-
ernment. Currently, if the defendant is found liable for fraud, the courts can 
order him to pay three times the damage suffered by the government, plus 
civil penalties between $5,000 and $10,000 for each false claim.69
The Act defines the terms “knowing” and “knowingly.” According to 
§ 3729(b)(1)(A) these words mean that a person, with respect to information:
 (1) has actual knowledge of the information;
 (2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or
 (3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.70
However, according to § 3729(b)(1)(B), these terms require no proof of 
specific intent to defraud.
The False Claims Act provides for financial incentives for whistleblowers 
to encourage disclosure. Namely, they may receive between 15 % and 30 % 
of the total capital recovered.71 The financial award depends on whether or 
not the government joins the action and on the contribution made by the 
whistleblower to the prosecution of the act.72 If the government joins the 
action, the person reporting the fraud may receive at least 15 %, but no 
more than 25 % of the amount awarded by the defendant or the settlement 
 68 Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne, “Program nagradzania demaskatorów,” 
http://www.antykorupcja.gov.pl/ak/czy-wiesz-ze/9129,Program-nagradzania-
demaskatorow.html, access: 12.07.2019.
 69 According to the Civil Monetary Penalty Annual Inflation Adjustment from 
1990, 28 U.S.C. 2461 note; Public Law 104–410.
 70 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A).
 71 Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 287.
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amount.73 If the government does not intervene, then the whistleblower 
acting as a party in the proceedings may receive no less than 25 % and no 
more than 30 % of the recovered amount.74 According to the provisions of 
the False Claims Act, each whistleblower shall also receive an amount for 
reasonable expenses, which the court deems necessary to incur, plus rea-
sonable professional fees and legal fees.75 All such expenses, fees, and costs 
shall be awarded against the defendant.76 We should indicate that in order 
to receive the award, it is not sufficient to simply inform the government 
of irregularities. It is necessary to file a quid tam claim and win the court 
proceedings in the form of a ruling that awards a certain amount of money 
or concludes a settlement with the defendant. The literature indicates that 
the possibility of a whistleblower receiving a high reward, which depends 
on the amount received from the defendant, may be the greatest protection 
for the whistleblower, because it enables them to cope with the loss of job 
or the impediment to professional career.77
Noteworthy, the defendant also benefits from certain protection in the 
event of actions against him by a whistleblower when the actions are con-
trary to the provisions of the Act. Namely, if the government does not join 
the proceeding and the whistleblower brings an action, the court may award 
reasonable lawyer fees and costs to the defendant, if the defendant wins the 
case and the court finds that the claim of the plaintiff was clearly frivolous, 
clearly vexatious, or was brought primarily for the purpose of harassment.78
Employees who filed a lawsuit against the government due to apparent 
irregularities benefit from employment protection. Under § 3730(h), any 
employee who has been dismissed, demoted, harassed or otherwise dis-
criminated because of their lawful conduct is entitled by law to reinstate 
them, receive double back pay, compensation for other damages, including 
litigation costs, and reasonable attorney fees. As it follows from the above, 
 73 M. Arszułowicz, “Whistleblowing, czyli ujawnianie w dobrej wierze,” 
Prakseologia, 147/2007, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk 
/ Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego, Warszawa, p. 103.
 74 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (d)(2).
 75 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (d)(1).
 76 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (d)(1).
 77 Dworkin, “US Whistleblowing,” p. 44.
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the provisions of the Act prohibit employers from taking any discrimina-
tory action. An employee who experiences such proceedings may bring a 
lawsuit before a court. A whistleblower seeking to sue his employer for 
retaliatory action against him must prove that he was engaged in activities 
protected by the False Claims Act and that the employer took retaliatory 
action due to knowledge of the qui tam action.79 The identity of the whis-
tleblower is disclosed by the court when the proceedings go beyond the 
investigation stage. However, we should remember that an employer may 
deduce the identity of a person disclosing information earlier, on the basis 
of its content.80
The civil action referred to the above may not be brought before court 
more than three years after the date of the retaliation’s occurrence.81 
However, under § 3731(b), a whistleblower may not bring a fraud suit 
against the government after six years from the date of the violation or after 
three years from the date when the facts relevant to the right of action are 
known or should have been known to a US official entrusted with respon-
sibility for action.82 Under no circumstances may a claim be brought more 
than ten years after the date of infringement.83
1.2.1.2  The Whistleblower Protection Act
The US government passed the Whistleblower Protection Act in 1989.84 
This Act protects federal employees in the United States from retaliation 
resulting from disclosing information about fraudulent or illegal activities 
taking place within the federal administration. This Act, like the False 
Claims Act, is one of the most important US regulations for the protection 
of whistleblowers.
The law provides statutory protection for individuals who engage in whis-
tleblowing, which means the disclosure of evidence of illegal or improper 
 79 Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 288.
 80 Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 288.
 81 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (h)(3).
 82 31 U.S.C. § 3731 (b), Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 289.
 83 31 U.S.C. § 3731 (b).
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government action.85 Protection is extended to most current and former 
employees of the federal administration and listed state-owned enterprises, 
as well as to those, who apply for certain positions.86 However, certain per-
sons are excluded from the protection of this Act. These include, but are not 
limited to, employees of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National 
Security Agency (NSA), or individuals in positions legally excluded from the 
competitive federal service, because of their “confidential, policy-making, 
policy-shaping, or policy-supporting character.”87
The Act provides protection from personnel action against certain persons 
or the lack of such action for the purpose of making a protected disclosure of 
information, i.e. informing about irregularities.88 This includes a wide range 
of activities that have a negative impact on the employee. In accordance with 
U.S.C. 5. § 2302(a)(2)(A), prohibited human resources activities may include, 
but are not limited to promotion, transfer, reassignment, and any disciplinary 
action or decisions regarding compensation. People are protected from nega-
tive personnel actions, if they legally disclose information, about which they 
have a reasonable belief that they have evidence for:
 – violation of any provision of law, rule, or regulation;
 – gross mismanagement;89
 – gross waste of funds;90
 85 L. P.  Whitaker, The Whistleblower Protection Act:  An Overview. CRS 
Report for Congress, 2007, p. 1, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33918.pdf, 
access: 24.07.2019.
 86 M. Waszak, “Status osób ujawniających nieprawidłowości w miejscu pracy w 
Republice Słowackiej i jego ewolucja z perspektywy przepisów ustawy z dnia 
16 października 2014 r.,” Zarządzanie Publiczne 4(40)/2017, Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków, p. 554.
 87 5 U.S.C. §  2302(a)(2)(B); 5 U.S.C. §  2302(a)(2)(C), Boyne, “Financial 
Incentives,” pp. 303–304.
 88 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B), Whitaker, “The Whistleblower,” p. 2.
 89 Gross mismanagement is “a management action or inaction which creates a 
substantial risk of significant adverse impact upon the agency’s ability to accom-
plish its mission.” See Kavanagh v. M.S.P.B., 176 F. App’x 133, 135 (Fed. Cir. 
Apr. 10, 2006).
 90 Gross waste of funds is a “more than debatable expenditure that is significantly 
out of proportion to the benefit reasonably expected to accrue to the govern-
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 – an abuse of authority;91 or
 – a serious and particular threat to public health or safety.92
However, the disclosure of information may not be explicitly prohibited by 
law93 and may not be covered by secrecy for reasons of national defense or 
foreign affairs.94 As indicated above, a person who discloses certain infor-
mation must have a reasonable belief that the information is true. Whether 
or not the information ultimately proves to be true is irrelevant to the pos-
sibility of receiving protection, if the actions are taken in accordance with 
the provisions of the Act. The employee must only prove that the person 
in their place can reasonably believe – given the information available to 
them – that the information disclosed is indicative of one of the statutory 
types of misconduct.95 If this condition is met, the burden of proof is shifted 
to the employer, who must prove with clear and convincing evidence that 
he would have taken the same action against the employee, even if the 
latter had not disclosed the information.96 The Act also applies to the dis-
closure of irregularities to the Special Counsel,97 the General Inspector of 
the agency or any other employee designated by the head of the agency to 
handle such disclosures.98
The whistleblower may seek legal protection under one of the fol-
lowing procedures: complaint due to an agency’s negative action against 
 91 An abuse of authority is an “arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a fed-
eral official or employee” that harms the rights of any person or that personally 
benefits the official/employee or their preferred associates. See Elkassir v. Gen. 
Servs. Admin., 257 F. App’x 326, 329 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 10, 2007).
 92 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(8)(A).
 93 To be “specifically prohibited by law” the information disclosed must be explic-
itly barred by a statute, as opposed to merely an agency rule or regulation. See 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 921 (2015).
 94 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).
 95 See Webb v. Dep’t of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, 251 (2015); Lachance 
v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
 96 5 U.S.C. 1214(b)(4)(B)(ii).
 97 The Office of Special Counsel is an investigative and prosecutorial office that 
works to end government and political corruption and to protect government 
employees and whistleblowers; https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/office-of-
special-counsel, access: 24.07.2019.
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an employee to the Merit Systems Protection Board; action brought by the 
Office of Special Counsel; individually maintained right to lodge a com-
plaint to the Merit Systems Protection Board; and, complaint brought by 
an employee under negotiated grievance procedures.99
Moreover, we should mention that in November 2012 Congress amended 
the Whistleblower Protection Act by adopting the Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act.100 The new version strengthened the protection of fed-
eral workers who disclose evidence of waste, fraud, or abuse.101 The aim of 
WEPA was to close the gaps in the WPA that were exploited by managers 
and supervisors.102 Among others, literature mentions the abolition of the 
Federal Circuit Court monopoly on appeals,103 the extension of protection 
to Transportation Safety Administration staff and the obligation for the 
Inspectors General Offices to appoint an Ombudsman for the protection of 
whistleblowers in order to educate staff in the field of whistleblower pro-
tection.104 The role of the Whistleblower Ombudsman is to educate agency 
staff about prohibited retaliation for disclosures, and about their rights and 
remedies in the event of retaliation for reporting irregularities.105 Moreover, 
the Office of Special Counsel has been granted the right to act as a “friend 
of the court” amicus curiae at the appeal stage, if the whistleblower lost 
the administrative hearing stage.106
 99 Whitaker, “The Whistleblower.”
 100 Pub. L. Nr 112–199, 126 Stat. 1465 (2012). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/PLAW-112publ199/pdf/PLAW-112publ199.pdf, access: 24.07.2019. Later 
referred to as: WEPA.
 101 https://www.justice.gov/pardon/whistleblower-protection-enhancement-act, 
access: 12.07.2019.
 102 Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 305.
 103 Information from:  https://www.whistleblower.org/uncategorized/
whistleblower-protection-enhancement-act-wpea/, access: 15.07.2019.
 104 Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 305.
 105 Information from: U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, “Whistleblower 
Protections,” https://www.cpsc.gov/About-CPSC/Inspector-General/
Whistleblower-Protection-Act-WPA, access: 15.07.2019.
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1.2.1.3  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The United States has a number of laws that regulate the protection of 
whistleblowers in the private sector.107 The most important is the Public 
Company Accounting Reform and the Investor Protection Act from 
2002,108 also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley (Sarbox or SOX) Act.109 On 
July 30, 2002, President George Bush Jr., when signing the bill, described 
it as “the most far-reaching reform of American business practices since 
the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”110 This revolutionary act on the 
American market became a response to the stock market collapse at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century and to the decline in investors’ trust 
in enterprises.111 It has been recognized as one of the greatest reforms of 
US securities law and a breakthrough in the protection of the rights of 
whistleblowers.112 Legislation strengthening corporate governance also 
includes provisions on the protection of whistleblowers that aim to help 
breaking the code of corporate silence and encouraging more people to 
report corporate malpractice.113 These rules treat whistleblowers’ disclo-
sure as a tool to control companies’ activity.114 The financial scandals that 
happened in the USA during this period clearly revealed that employees can 
play a key role in detecting fraud in companies.115 It was the whistleblowers 
 107 OECD (2016), Committing to Effective Whistleblower Protection, OECD 
Publishing, Paris, p. 109.
 108 An Act to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corpo-
rate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act), Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
 109 The act is named after two politicians involved in its preparation, Senator Paul 
Sarbanes and Congressman Mike Oxley.
 110 Information from: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “The Laws 
That Govern the Securities Industry,” https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-
lawsshtml.html#sox2002, access: 21.08.2019.
 111 A. Burczyc, “Ustawa Sarbanesa-Oxleya,” p. 43.
 112 A. Wojciechowska-Nowak, Jak zdemaskować szwindel? Czyli krótki 
przewodnik po whistle-blowingu, Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, Warszawa 
2008, p. 32.
 113 Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 290.
 114 Wojciechowska-Nowak, Jak zdemaskować szwindel?, p. 31.
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who raised public awareness about the abuses committed in entities such 
as Enron or WorldCom.
The provisions of the Act oblige issuers, i.e. persons or firms who issue 
securities, to ensure the protection of whistleblowers and, pursuant to sec-
tion 10A, extend such protection to auditors.116 This is reflected, among 
other things, in the obligation to establish a code of ethics and develop 
procedures that enable internal and anonymous reporting of detected irreg-
ularities.117 Under section 301 SOX, audit committees of listed companies 
must establish internal procedures that regulate issues such as:
 a) receiving, retaining, and handling complaints received by the issuer 
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing 
matters; and
 b) the confidential, anonymous submission of concerns regarding ques-
tionable accounting or auditing matters by employees of the issuer.
In this way, a company creates an opportunity for its employees to react 
to detected irregularities on an internal forum.118 This solution encourages 
whistleblowers to provide information about the problems noticed in the 
workplace. It should be noted that SOX does not specify any particular 
method for submitting complaints.119 As a result, employers may establish 
different procedures in this area, e.g. by telephone, post, fax or e-mail. The 
condition is to guarantee at least one confidential, anonymous method of 
submitting complaints.
The provisions of the Act protect employees of companies listed on 
public stock exchanges or companies required to report to the Securities 
 116 OECD (2016), Committing, p. 109.
 117 Dworkin, “US Whistleblowing,” p. 36.
 118 Wojciechowska-Nowak, Jak zdemaskować szwindel?, p. 37.
 119 Although the SEC has refused to require universal reporting procedures for 
all listed companies, these internal procedures typically take the form of a free 
hotline for whistleblowers or an online filing form and they are often operated 
by an external supplier to preserve both the confidentiality of the filing and the 
anonymity of the whistleblower, J. Westerman, New Study Confirms Efficacy 
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and Exchange Commission (SEC).120 Pursuant to section 806 of the SOX, 
the protection applies to employees who have a reasonable suspicion that 
they report activities that violate:
 – any federal criminal law provisions prohibiting postal fraud, bank transfer 
or bank fraud;
 – any rules or regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC); or
 – any federal laws related to shareholder fraud.121
A whistleblower must be guided in their actions by a reasonable belief that 
their employer has committed fraud. In order to satisfy the requirement to 
act with a reasonable belief, a whistleblower must genuinely believe that 
the conduct he has noticed constitutes an infringement, and that a reason-
able person in their position and with the same education would consider 
that the conduct in question constitutes an infringement. The case law has 
pointed out in this context that, “[a] belief that an activity was illegal may 
be reasonable even when subsequent investigation proves a complainant was 
entirely wrong. The accuracy or falsity of the allegations is immaterial; the 
plain language of the regulations only requires an objectively reasonable belief 
that shareholders were being defrauded to trigger the Act’s protections.”122 
However, whistleblower’s mere raising of general doubts as to the regularity of 
a particular transaction without indicating any specific reasons for concern is 
insufficient.123 This implies a requirement that the information disclosed must 
meet a certain minimum degree of concreteness.
For instance, a whistleblower may provide evidence of fraud to a super-
visor, another employee, “who has the authority to investigate, discover, or 
terminate misconduct,” federal regulatory or law enforcement authority, 
 120 In 2010, protection was extended to employees of a subsidiary, if its finances 
are included in the parent company’s financial statement.
 121 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002); Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 290.
 122 Halloum v.  Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7, (ALJ March 4, 2004); qtd. after 
G. R. Watchman, Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers: Avoiding the Nightmare 
Scenario, 2008, p. 10, http://media01.commpartners.com/acc_webcast_docs/
SOX_paper.pdf, access: 12.05.2019.
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a member of Congress, or any congressional committee.124 As can be seen 
from the above, the Act gives whistleblowers a relatively large amount of 
freedom to choose the addressee of the disclosure.
SOX prohibits any retaliation against whistleblowers resulting from their 
disclosure activities and it grants them special protection.125 Anyone who 
knowingly takes any action harmful to a whistleblower with intent to retal-
iate risks increased civil and criminal liability.126 The Act broadly covers 
retaliatory measures, which include127 dismissal, demotion, suspension, 
threatening, harassment, or any other form of discrimination against an 
employee connected with employment conditions due to the reporting of 
misconduct under the Act. The case law indicates that one of the actions not 
prohibited by the Act is the negative periodic assessment of an employee, 
if it does not contribute to the deterioration of the employee’s employment 
conditions.128 The provisions of the Act that prohibit retaliation against 
whistleblowers cover both legal persons and natural persons associated 
with the employer.129 The prohibition applies to companies, but also to 
their officers, other employees, contractors, subcontractors, and agents of 
such companies.130
The Act provides that a whistleblower who suffered negative consequences 
for their actions may file a written complaint to the Secretary of Labor not 
later than ninety days later. Under the terms of the Dodd-Frank Act from 
2010, this period was extended to 180 days. The period commences on the 
date on which retaliation happens or on the date on which the employee 
becomes aware of the retaliation.131 If the Secretary of Labor did not make 
a final decision within 180 days of the date of the complaint and “there 
 124 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002).
 125 SOX, Section 806 Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies 
Who Provide Evidence of Fraud, Section 1107 Retaliation Against Informants.
 126 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (e). The law provides for high fines and prison sentences of 
up to ten years., M. Kutera, “Whisteblowing,” p. 131.
 127 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (a).
 128 Dolan v. EMC Corp., 2004-SOX-1 (ALJ March 24, 2004).
 129 W. Rogowski, “Whistleblowing: bohaterstwo, zdrada czy interes?,” Przegląd 
Corporate Governance 1/2007, Fundacja Polski Instytut Dyrektorów, p. 34.
 130 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (a).
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is no showing that such delay is due to the bad faith of the claimant,” 
the employee may file a lawsuit with the appropriate federal court.132 The 
court shall then deal with the case irrespective of the value of the matter at 
issue.133 The literature stresses that making it possible for whistleblowers 
to exercise their rights in this way was an innovative solution.134
If the Secretary makes a decision in favor of an employee, the latter 
shall be entitled to all necessary remedies to protect them.135 The remedies 
include:
 a) reinstatement to work with the same length of service as the employee 
would have had he not been retaliated against;
 b) payment of outstanding remuneration with interest; and
 c) compensation for any damage suffered as a result of discrimination, 
including legal costs, fees of experts, and lawyer fees.136
However, practice shows that proceedings rarely end at this point, as parties 
to a dispute have a wide range of appeal possibilities against a decision of 
the Secretary.137
1.2.1.4  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act138 
signed by President Barack Obama on July 21, 2010, was a response to 
the 2008 financial crisis.139 It aimed to transform the US regulatory system 
in a number of areas, including, but not limited to, consumer protection, 
trade restrictions, credit ratings, financial product regulation, corporate 
 132 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (b)(1)(b).
 133 Wojciechowska-Nowak, Jak zdemaskować szwindel?, p. 36.
 134 Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 36.
 135 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1).
 136 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2).
 137 For more, see Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 292.
 138 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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governance, disclosure, and transparency.140 The adoption of the law 
was also a further significant step towards enhancing the protection of 
whistleblowers in the United States. Although the Act primarily regulated 
functioning of financial markets and protection of consumer interests, 
it also contained protection measures and a number of incentives for 
whistleblowers.141 Pursuant to section 922, a new section 21F was added to 
the Securities Trading Act of 1934. The Act gave whistleblowers increased 
protection against employer retaliation, guaranteed confidentiality, and 
provided the opportunity to receive a financial award.142
Section 15 U.S.C. §  78u-6(a)(6) of the Dodd-Frank Act  defines the 
term “whistleblower” as one or more individuals acting jointly, who pro-
vide information about a violation of securities laws to the Commission 
[SEC]143 in a way determined by rule or regulation of the Commission.144 
Furthermore, according to the regulations issued by the SEC after the adop-
tion of this law, a whistleblower must have a “reasonable belief” that the 
aforementioned regulations have been infringed.145 Only natural persons 
may report infringements.
The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits retaliatory measures against 
whistleblowers, who disclose information of violations in accordance 
with procedures. Whistleblowers who experience such retaliation have the 
right to be reinstated with the length of service they would have enjoyed 
had they not disclosed the information, double the amount of outstanding 
wages with interest, along with compensation for legal fees, litigation costs, 
 140 Information from the website: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “The 
Laws That Govern the Securities Industry,” https://www.sec.gov/answers/
about-lawsshtml.html#sox2002, access: 12.07.2019.
 141 P. Chmiel, “Sygnalizowanie nieprawidłowości (whistleblowing),” Przegląd 
Antykorupcyjny 7/2016, Wydawnictwo Centrum Szkolenia Policji w 
Legionowie, Warszawa, p. 41.
 142 OECD (2016), Committing, p.  109; Ł. Cichy, Whistleblowing w 
bankach, Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego, Warszawa 2017, p. 10, Kutera, 
“Whisteblowing,” p. 132.
 143 Securities and Exchange Commission, further referred to as: SEC.
 144 National Whistleblower Center, “SEC Whistleblower/Dodd-Frank Act Reward 
Law,” https://www.whistleblowers.org/faq/sec-whistleblower-dodd-frank-act/, 
access: 15.08.2019.
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and court fees.146 The protection against retaliation covers whistleblowers 
regardless of whether they have reported violations internally within the 
company or directly to the SEC.147
A particularly effective way of encouraging whistleblowers to act was 
to create the possibility of receiving financial incentive for the actions.148 
Providing important and previously unknown information to SEC by an 
authorized whistleblower – which leads to the imposition of sanctions on 
the entity infringing the law in a specified manner – entitles the person who 
reports the irregularities to receive a reward of 10–30 % of the funds, which 
the entity will be forced to pay for its infringements.149 Whistleblowers may 
receive a financial award if their information leads to effective securities 
law enforcement actions.150 The Act authorized the Commission to grant 
financial awards to eligible individuals if the sanctions imposed exceed one 
million dollars.151 A high level of potential reward that a whistleblower may 
receive is intended to secure the existence of such a person in the event of 
loss of job, breakdown of professional career or even the need to change 
the place of residence.152 SEC may exercise its freedom in determining the 
appropriate percentage of the award and take into account a number of 
factors in relation to the specific facts and circumstances of each reported 
case. Factors that may increase the amount of the prize include:
 – the importance of provided information;
 – the assistance given by the whistleblower;
 – the interest of law enforcement authorities; and
 – the participation in internal compliance systems.153
 146 OECD (2016), Committing, p. 110.
 147 The Securities and Exchange Commission, Interpretation of the SEC`s 
Whistleblower Rules under Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2015/34-75592.pdf, access:  17.08.2019, 
OECD (2016), Committing, p. 110.
 148 Kutera, “Whisteblowing,” p. 132.
 149 OECD (2016), Committing, p. 110.
 150 Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 301.
 151 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 748, 922.
 152 Chmiel, “Sygnalizowanie,” p. 42.
 153 Art. 21F-6(a) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
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On the other hand, factors that may reduce the amount of a whistleblower’s 
award are:
 – their guilt;
 – unjustified delay in reporting a violation;
 – violation of internal compliance and reporting systems by the 
whistleblower.154
The order of the above criteria does not determine their validity. It should 
be noted that some whistleblowers are excluded from the possibility to 
receive an award.155 Among others, these are:156
 – certain US law enforcement officers;
 – employees of foreign governments;
 – people convicted in criminal actions related to the information provided 
to the SEC; and
 – certain auditors, including those who would violate Sections 10A of the 
Exchange Act by reporting information to the commission in order to 
obtain a whistleblower reward.
Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act provides a possibility of anonymous trans-
mission of information to the SEC by a counsel.157 However, prior to pay-
ment of the award, the whistleblower discloses their identity and other 
information that SEC may request, either directly or by their counsel.158
It should be noted that the Dodd-Frank Act has strengthened and 
extended the regulation of whistleblowers’ activities under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. This includes, for example, the protection of employees of a 
subsidiary under the SOX rules if its finances are included in the financial 
statements of the parent company. Moreover, a whistleblower who accuses 
a company of retaliatory action resulting from a SOX-protected report 
receives the opportunity to sue directly in a federal court without exhausting 
 154 Art. 21F-6(b) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, “Regulation 21F,” https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-
21f.pdf. The order of the indicated criteria does not determine their importance.
 155 Art. 21F-8 Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
 156 OECD (2016), Committing, p. 110.
 157 OECD (2016), Committing, p. 110.
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administrative resources.159 Another change is the extension of the period 
from ninety to 180 days after the detection of an infringement during which 
whistleblowers have the right to lodge a claim.
Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act strengthened the provisions of the False 
Claims Act, among other things, by amending section 3730(h) by ensuring 
the protection of whistleblower’s colleagues.160
1.2.2  The United Kingdom
The protection of people who disclose perceived wrongdoings in the United 
Kingdom is universally considered to be one of the most developed in 
Europe.161 The regulations in this respect were included above all in three 
legal acts:162 the Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998,163 the Employment 
Rights Act of 1996,164 and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act of 
2013.165 The United Kingdom was the first European state which introduced 
a regulation strictly related to the protection of whistleblowers,166 that is 
 159 Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 302.
 160 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (h), Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 301.
 161 M. Waszak, “Związki zawodowe i organizacje pracodawców a ustawy o 
ochronie sygnalistów. Przykłady europejskie,” in: Sygnaliści w Polsce okiem 
pracodawców i związków zawodowych, eds. G. Makowski, M. Waszak, 
Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, Warszawa 2016, p. 40; J. J. Wojciechowicz, 
“Sytuacja sygnalistów w kontekście międzynarodowym,” in: Systemy zgłaszania 
nieprawidłowości. Założenia do ustawy o ochronie sygnalistów, p. 12, https://
ungc.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Za%C5%82o%C5%BCenia-do-
ustawy-o-oschronie-sygnalist%C3%B3w.pdf, access: 16.08.2019.
 162 Kutera, “Whisteblowing,” p. 137.
 163 Online access to the text of the Act:  https://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1998/23/introduction. Later referred to as: PIDA.
 164 Online access to the text of the Act:  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1996/18/contents. Later referred to as: the Act of 1996.
 165 Online access to the text of the Act:  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2013/24/contents.
 166 L. Rossi,  J.   McGuinn, M. Fernandes, Estimating the Economic Benefits 
of Whistleblower Protection in Public Procurement. Final Report  – 
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the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA).167 Its objective was to protect 
public interest by quickly discovering and stopping wrongdoings in pri-
vate enterprises or public institutions; similarly to American regulations.168 
The PIDA fits into the British legislation on employment. Pursuant to its 
provisions, the Employment Rights Act of 1996 was amended.169 Moreover, 
it was significantly amended on June 25, 2013, as the result of the Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform Act. Among the most important introduced changes 
at that time was the introduction of “a public interest test,” that is the obli-
gation of an employee to demonstrate their belief that they disclose infor-
mation in public interest, and the abolition of the criterion of good faith 
that was previously in force, whose application was limited by the above 
amendment only to the purposes of determining the amount of compensa-
tion for whistleblowers.170
The definition of an employee who is protected under the Public Interest 
Disclosures Act is broader than the definition in the Act of 1996 and covers 
people employed in all sectors, except for self-employed, volunteers, and 
employees of armed forces and intelligence service.171 Below, within the scope 
of the term “an employee” or “a whistleblower,” this text always includes 
all protected groups, regardless of the legal basis of their employment.
In the discussed Act, there are terms of protected disclosure and qualifying 
disclosure. Protected disclosure means a qualifying disclosure (in accor-
dance with the definition included in Article 43B) made by an employee in 
accordance with the requirements specified in Articles 43C–43H of the Act. 
These requirements concern the making of disclosure to particular entities 
 167 The Act entered into force on July 2, 1999, in the United Kingdom and then 
a similar form of protection was implemented in the Northern Ireland on 
October 31, 1999.
 168 A. Wojciechowska-Nowak, Jak zdemaskować szwindel? Czyli krótki 
przewodnik po whistle-blowingu, Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, Warszawa 
2008, p. 38; R. Dąbrowski, “Demaskacja jako narzędzie do walki z korupcją,” 
Kwartalnik Policyjny 3/2011, Centrum Szkolenia Policji, Legionowo, p. 42.
 169 Blueprint for Free Speech, “United Kingdom – Whistleblowing Protection,” 
2014, https://blueprintforfreespeech.net/document/united-kingdom, 
access: 13.07.2019.
 170 Waszak, “Związki zawodowe”, p. 43.
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and the fulfilment of certain conditions. The provisions of the Act provide 
a number of people to whom wrongdoings may be disclosed, depending 
on the circumstances.
In accordance with Article 43B of the Act of 1996, “qualifying disclo-
sure” means the disclosure of information which – following the reasonable 
belief of an employee who makes the disclosure in public interest – will 
prove one or several of the following circumstances:
 1. an offence was committed, is committed, or presumably will be 
committed;
 2. a person failed, fails, or presumably will fail to comply with any legal 
obligation that he is subject to;
 3. there occurred, occurs, or may occur a miscarriage of justice;
 4. the health or security of any person was, is, or may be at risk;
 5. the environment was, is, or may be damaged; or
 6. information that any issue which falls within the scope of any of the 
above points was, is, or may be deliberately concealed.
In accordance with the above, the disclosed information may turn out to 
not be true. In order to grant protection to whistleblowers, only a rea-
sonable belief of the wrongdoing occurrence is required. Moreover, we 
should emphasize that an offence may take place outside of the United 
Kingdom. It does not matter if other than British law is applied in a case 
of a wrongdoing.172
The protection will not apply if, while disclosing, a whistleblower 
commits an offence in the form of breaking the Official Secrets Act of 
1989173 or the regulations in force in the public office.174
Moreover, the disclosure of information, in which the claim for keeping 
the legal professional privilege may be sustained in legal proceedings, does 
not constitute qualifying disclosure, if it is made by a person who disclosed 
such information as a result of receiving legal advice.175 Whistleblower will 
 172 Article 43B Paragraph 2 of the Employment Rights Act.
 173 Online access to the text of the Act:  https://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1989/6/contents.
 174 Waszak, “Związki zawodowe”, p. 40.
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not be protected, if they are convicted of committing such an offence or 
if – on the basis of presented evidence – a court is convinced that the whis-
tleblower committed such an offence.
We should also indicate that the PIDA recognizes as qualifying disclosure 
only confidential disclosure that is not anonymous, which requires greater 
trust towards addressees.176 It seems that this measure is aimed at discour-
aging the anonymous disclosure of wrongdoings, because it may make 
it impossible to determine significant issues in the scope of the disclosed 
wrongdoings. Moreover, the confidentiality of the disclosure does not have 
an absolute character, which enables holding those people liable who dis-
close information, should their actions turn out to be e.g. malicious.
The PIDA offers the following modes of disclosing information with 
increasing thresholds of protection:177
 1) internal disclosure of information to employers;
 2) disclosure of information to an appointed external body (of regulatory 
character) or a member of Parliament; and
 3) a broader disclosure of information e.g. to the police, the media, or a 
non-governmental organization.178
Whistleblowers are encouraged to first undertake internal actions by means 
of certain restrictions for disclosing wrongdoings outside of workplace.179 
Internal disclosure consists of a whistleblower passing information about 
perceived wrongdoings on the forum of the organization.180 Such a disclo-
sure will be protected, should the whistleblower truly believe it will prove 
that a malpractice occurred, occurs, or presumably will occur. Pursuant to 
Article 43C Paragraph 1a of the Act of 1996, qualifying disclosure occurs, 
should an employee disclose information to his employer. However, if the 
employee has justified reasons to think that the wrongdoings concern solely 
or above all actions of a different person than his employer, or matters 
 176 Cichy, Whistleblowing w bankach, p. 10.
 177 OECD (2016), Committing to Effective Whistleblower Protection, OECD 
Publishing, Paris, p. 105.
 178 Waszak, “Związki zawodowe”, p. 40.
 179 Wojciechowicz, “Sytuacja sygnalistów,” p. 12.
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that a different person than his employer is legally responsible for, then 
he discloses information to the relevant person.181 On the other hand, 
Article 43C Paragraph 2 constitutes that the employee who – on the basis 
of a procedure authorized by the employer – makes qualifying disclosure 
to other person than the employer, must be treated like a person who 
makes qualifying disclosure to the employer. The above provisions estab-
lish that – as a result of informing the management of the employer about 
the perceived wrongdoings – the management will take steps to clarify the 
presented information and eliminate potential threats. The objective is to 
discourage actions undertaken to harm the institution and enable their 
early detection.182
The implementation of special internal procedures of disclosure exami-
nation by employers should be recognized as a good practice. Even though 
the PIDA does not impose an obligation to establish such procedures, 
encouraging employees to report wrongdoings within the organization is 
in the interest of the employers. A lack of such a procedure may make 
whistleblowers disclose the issue outside of their workplace.183
Moreover, employees of state bodies will have protection, should 
they directly inform about their concerns a superior ministry and not 
their employer. It seems that the objective of the implementation of such 
regulations is to increase the certainty in the examination of the issue and 
the elimination of potential wrongdoings. If a whistleblower encounters 
negative consequences in result of disclosing information in such a way, 
their claim may be directed against the employer, not against the minister 
to whom he disclosed information.184
On the other hand, Article 43D of the Act of 1996 constitutes that quali-
fying disclosure also occurs if it is made during the reception of legal advice. 
The regulations enable employees to receive legal advice on wrongdoings 
perceived by them and to receive legal protection from potential nega-
tive consequences. When an employee authorizes their lawyer to further 
 181 Article 43C Paragraph 1b of the Employment Rights Act.
 182  Wojciechowska-Nowak, Jak zdemaskować szwindel?, p. 44.
 183 Waszak, “Związki zawodowe”, p. 41.
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disclosure of information, e.g. to the media or the employer himself, the 
actions of the lawyer are considered as undertaken on behalf and for the 
benefit of the employee.185
The provisions impose more rigorous conditions on employees who dis-
close information outside of the organization.186 In such a case, the protec-
tion is granted to a whistleblower, if they disclose to a prescribed person, 
indicated in a special register,187 and truly believe that a relevant offence 
falls within the scope of matters to which such a person was appointed, 
and that the disclosed information and all included allegations are substan-
tially true. What follows from the above is that whistleblowers may turn to 
a prescribed person with an issue within the scope of its competences. In 
this regard, certain institutions should be indicated, such as those that act 
in areas of finances, health services, environmental protection, insurance, 
or consumer rights, including local government.188 To obtain legal protec-
tion, whistleblowers must have reasonable belief that information and all 
included allegations are substantially true and relevant for the regulatory 
body.189 Let us indicate that contacting bodies not in the register is quali-
fied as disclosure to the wide audience, which results in a necessity to fulfil 
more rigorous conditions.190
However, in a case of disclosure to the wide audience, whistleblowers 
omit not only their employer but also proper supervisory bodies, and they 
present observed wrongdoings to e.g. the police or the media in order to 
popularize the issue and gain special attention.191 The whistleblower when 
deciding on this path of disclosure – in order to receive protection – must 
demonstrate the important reasons that prevented him from informing in 
 185 Wojciechowska-Nowak, Jak zdemaskować szwindel?, p. 46.
 186 Waszak, “Związki zawodowe”, p. 40.
 187 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Blowing the Whistle 




 188 Waszak, “Związki zawodowe”, p. 40.
 189 OECD (2016), Committing to, p. 105.
 190 Wojciechowska-Nowak, Jak zdemaskować szwindel?, p. 44.
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the first place his employer or the supervisory body.192 In such a case, the 
protection is granted to whistleblowers, if:
 1) they have reasonable belief that the disclosed information and all 
included allegations are substantially true;
 2) the disclosure is not for personal gain; and
 3) all circumstances suggest that it is reasonable to disclose information, 
and one of the following conditions is met:
 (a) at the moment of disclosure, the employee has reasonable grounds 
to think that they will suffer harm from the employer if the infor-
mation is disclosed to this employer or a prescribed person;
 (b) should nobody be provided for the objective of Article 43F – dis-
closure to a prescribed person  – concerning a given offence, the 
employee has justified reasons to think that proofs connected to the 
given offence will presumably be concealed or destroyed if disclosed 
to the employer; or
 (c) the employee previously disclosed the same information to the 
employer or to the prescribed person.
When determining whether – in all circumstances of the issue – it was rea-
sonable to disclose information, courts consider, among other things, the 
identity of the person to whom the information was disclosed, the signifi-
cance of the offence, and whether it still occurs or presumably will occur in 
the future.193 Noteworthy, the required degree of the offence’s significance 
will be lower when the disclosure is made to the police than if the same 
information is disclosed to the media.194
The provisions of the Act of 1996 also guarantee protection in the case 
of disclosing information that does not meet the above conditions, if it 
concerns exceptionally serious offenses. In accordance with Article 43H of 
the Act, the qualifying disclosure will take place if the employee:
 – has justified reasons to think that disclosed information and all included 
allegations are substantially true;
 192 Wojciechowska-Nowak, Jak zdemaskować szwindel?, p. 44.
 193 Article 43G Paragraph 3 of the Employment Rights Act.
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 – does not disclose information for personal gain;
 – discloses an offence of exceptionally serious character and it is reason-
able to disclose information in all circumstances of the issue.
On the other hand, Paragraph 2 of the Article constitutes that – during the 
examination whether the disclosure of information in all circumstances of 
the issue is reasonable –the identity of the person to whom the informa-
tion is disclosed is specifically considered; e.g. the police or the press. The 
provisions do not contain any particular guidelines on the basis of which 
a given offence may be recognized as “particularly serious.” This issue is 
decided individually for every case.195
In accordance with the British legislation, a dismissal of a person 
disclosing cases of violations will be recognized as unfair if its only or 
main reason is the fact that a whistleblower made a protected disclosure. 
Moreover, employees are also protected from suffering any other detri-
ment related to the whistleblowing activity, e.g. making threats or lim-
iting promotion opportunities. People who make protected disclosures in 
accordance with the provisions of the PIDA and were dismissed or suffered 
other detriment due to their whistleblowing activity may file a complaint to 
employment tribunals, which deal with the issues of whistleblowers in the 
United Kingdom. In their jurisprudence, employment tribunals are limited 
to deciding on the occurrence of the detriment of whistleblowers and on the 
amount of due compensation; i.e. they do not decide on the wrongdoings 
identified by employees.196
In accordance with Article 47B introduced by the PIDA to the Act of 
1996, an employee has the right for his situation not to deteriorate due 
to any action or any deliberate negligence on the part of the employer, 
 195 Protect, “Raising exceptionally serious concerns. 43H of the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998,” https://protect-advice.org.uk/raising-exceptionally-
serious-concerns-43h-of-the-public-interest-disclosure-act-1998, 
access: 25.06.2019.
 196 Transparency International, Providing an Alternative to Silence: Towards 
Greater Protection and Support for Whistleblowers in the EU. Country 
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undertaken on the basis of the protected disclosure made by the employee. 
Noteworthy, the employer will be also held responsible in a case when the 
employee, after informing about wrongdoings, is exposed to detriment 
colleagues, e.g. intimidation or harassment. Such an activity is treated as 
also made by the employer.197 It does not matter if it happened with the 
knowledge or permission of the employer.198 The employer may defend him-
self by indicating that he undertook all reasonable steps to avoid detriment 
due to the abovementioned actions.199
If the employment tribunal recognizes the complaint of an employee as 
valid, it may grant him compensation from the employer.200 Its amount is 
established based on what is just and right in all circumstances of the issue, 
taking into consideration the violation that is the subject of the complaint 
and also every detriment suffered by the whistleblower due to the deterio-
ration of his situation.201 Compensation should cover in particular reason-
able costs bore by the whistleblower or lost profits – e.g. the remuneration 
for the unemployment period – which he could expect if he did not lose 
the job or did not experience other victimized actions of the employer.202 
Noteworthy, recognized compensation is not subject to the statutory limit 
that is applied in standard claims of unjustified dismissal.203 However, we 
should remember that the employment tribunal has the right to reduce all 
compensations even by 25 %, if it deems that the protected disclosure of 
information was not made in good faith.204 In the case of litigation, the 
employer must provide proof. He must explain in front of the tribunal the 
reasons for which he undertook negative activities towards the whistle-
blower and prove that they were not the consequence of the disclosure of 
information.205
 197 Article 47B Paragraph 1B of the Employment Rights Act.
 198 Article 47B Paragraph 1C of the Employment Rights Act.
 199 Article 47B Paragraph 1D of the Employment Rights Act.
 200 Article 49 Paragraph 1 of the Employment Rights Act.
 201 Article 49 Paragraph 2 of the Employment Rights Act.
 202  Wojciechowska-Nowak, Jak zdemaskować szwindel?, pp. 47–48.
 203 Save Us Now, “UK Rights and remedies for whistleblowers,” 2019, https://
www.saveusnow.org.uk/uk-rights-and-remedies-for-whistleblowers/, 
access: 12.07.2019.
 204 OECD (2016), Committing to, p. 106.
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1.2.3  Romania
Another European country that has regulations on whistleblower protec-
tion is Romania. The relevant act is the Law No. 571/2004 regarding the 
protection of the staff of the public authorities, public institutions, and 
other units that notifies breaches of the law.206 This regulation is the result 
of actions undertaken to fight corruption in public administration. The 
provisions of the Law No. 571/2004 enable one the disclosure of a broad 
scope of wrongdoings and provide protection from retaliation. However, 
this protection is limited to individuals of the public sector.207 Although, 
private entities have the possibility of implementing solutions from the 
public sector in their internal regulations.208
Article 3 of the Law No. 571/2004 includes a definition of disclosure in 
public interest, which should be recognized as disclosing in good faith the 
case of unlawful activity, violation of ethical professional standards or the 
principles of good administration, productivity, effectivity, economy, and 
transparency. Not all disclosed information may be protected.209 Pursuant 
to Article 5 of the Law No. 571/2004, the disclosed wrongdoings may 
concern:
 a) actions of corruptive character or actions connected to such or to ones 
directly related to them, frauds, breaches of responsibilities, or profes-
sional responsibilities related to the breach;
 b) unlawful actions against the financial interest of the European 
Community;
 c) practices or treatment which privileges or discriminates individuals 
listed in Article 2 of the Law;
 d) breaking of provisions concerning incompatibilitas and the conflict of 
interest;
 e) the abuse of material and human resources;
 206 Published in the Romanian Official Gazette No. 1214 of December 17, 
2004. Online access to the text of the Act: https://www.whistleblowing.it/
Romanian%20Law%20571-2004%20-%20whistleblowingEN.pdf.
 207 Dąbrowski, “Demaskacja,” p. 43.
 208  Wojciechowicz, “Sytuacja sygnalistów,” p. 13.
 209 R. Dimitriu, “Romania:  First Steps to Whistleblowers’ Protection,” 
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 f) biased political activity by means of occupied office, except for people 
elected or appointed on political rules;
 g) breaking of the law on access to information and transparency of 
decisions;
 h) breaking of provisions concerning the public procurement and nonre-
fundable financing;
 i) incompetence and negligence of responsibilities;
 j) subjective evaluation of the personnel during the process of recruit-
ment, selection, promotion, degradation, and dismissal;
 k) breaking of administrative procedures or establishing internal 
procedures that are against the law;
 l) issuing administrative acts or other acts in the interest of a particular 
group or a clientele;
 m) flawed or fraudulent management of property of public authorities, 
public institutions, or other establishments provided in Article 2 of 
the Law;
 n) breaking of other provisions issued in order to achieve the principle of 
good administration or to protect the public interest.
The provisions of the Act enable whistleblowers to choose the path of dis-
closing wrongdoings. It is possible to use any channel in all circumstances.210 
Their register was included in Article 6 of the Law No. 571/2004. Namely, 
it is possible to disclose information:
 – directly to the supervisor of a person who broke the law;
 – to the head of a public authority, institution, or budget unit, in which 
the person who violated the law is employed or in which an illegal 
practice was disclosed, even if the author of the disclosure cannot be 
identified;
 – to a disciplinary committee or another similar body within the public 
authority;
 – to judicial bodies;
 210 Blueprint for Free Speech, “Gaps in the System:  Whistleblower Laws in 
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 – to bodies responsible for detecting and examining conflicts of interest 
and discrepancies;
 – to a parliamentary committee;
 – to the mass media;
 – to professional bodies, trade unions, sector organizations; or
 – non-governmental organizations.
However, the literature indicates that – despite the lack of indication of 
the order of using the abovementioned channels – the initial exhaustion of 
internal ways of disclosure seems to be an element that demonstrates the 
good faith of whistleblowers.211 On the other hand, disclosing information 
about wrongdoings directly to the media – instead of the bodies proper for 
their resolution – may indicate the lack of whistleblowers’ good faith.212 The 
Law No. 571/2004 lists a number of principles of whistleblower protection 
in public interest. Among other things, the list includes the principle of lia-
bility, according to which the violation of law disclosed by whistleblowers 
must be supported by information or proofs concerning the committed act. 
On the other hand, the principle prohibiting the abuse of sanctions towards 
the person disclosing the violation of law constitutes that such a person 
cannot be submitted to unfair sanctions or be more severely penalized for 
other disciplinary misconducts. Whereas, the principle of good leadership 
constitutes that employees are encouraged to disclose in public interest in 
order to improve the administration potential and to increase the prestige of 
the public authorities, public institutions, and other entities specified in the 
Law No. 571/2004. The principle of good faith is also rather significant for 
whistleblowers, in accordance with which a person, who is an employee of 
public authorities, institutions, or another entity specified in the Law, and 
who discloses an action which constitutes a violation of rights, is guaranteed 
protection if they believe that such an action indeed occurred and that it 
was unlawful. The disclosure made in public interests uses the presump-
tion of good faith unless it is disproved. Moreover, upon the request of the 
whistleblower, against whom began disciplinary proceedings as a result of 
the disclosure of information, the disciplinary committee or any similar 
 211 Dimitriu, “Romania: First Steps,” p. 253.
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body within the organizational structure of the public authorities has the 
obligation to invite the press and a representative of a trade union or pro-
fessional body. The disciplinary committee has the obligation to provide 
the whistleblower with protection by means of concealing their identity if 
any indicated person is their supervisor or has the power of control over 
the whistleblower. Moreover, if the whistleblower acted in good faith, the 
court may decide on the invalidity of the disciplinary or administrative 
sanctions applied towards them in the scope of retaliation actions under-
taken due to his activity.
1.2.4  Slovenia
Slovenia has no act devoted exclusively to the protection of whistleblowers. 
Moreover, the provisions of the Slovenian labor law do not provide specific 
protection for people who disclose the perceived wrongdoings.213 However, 
the protection of whistleblowers is inscribed in the anti-corruption activities 
of the state. The main act concerning the discussed issue is the Integrity and 
Prevention of Corruption Act of 2010.214 This Act covers a broad scope 
of good manners recognized in the international arena in the field of whis-
tleblower protection. Its provisions regulate such issues as the disclosure 
of wrongdoings, the guarantee of identity protection for whistleblowers, 
definitions of illegal and unethical actions or sanctions in a case of the vio-
lation of the whistleblower protection. This regulation does not provide the 
obligation to make disclosures of perceived wrongdoings nor the financial 
rewards for such actions.215
Article 1 of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act establishes 
the means and methods for the purposes of strengthening integrity and 
 213 D. S.  Peček, “Protection of Persons Reporting Corruption and Other 
Whistleblowers in the Republic of Slovenia,” in:  Whistleblowing  – 
A Comparative Study, p. 263.
 214 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No. 45/2010, 26/11 and 43/11. 
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transparency in order to prevent corruption and avoid and eliminate 
conflicts of interest. On the other hand, in accordance with Article 4 of the 
Act, “corruption” means any violation of the proper conduct of respon-
sible officials in public or private sector – which also means the conduct 
of people who initiate such violations – or of people benefiting from the 
violation in order to gain undue, promised, offered, or transferred directly 
or indirectly benefits, or in order to gain undue, demanded, accepted, or 
expected benefits for own gain or for the gain of any other person.
Chapter III of the Act consists of regulations concerning the protection 
of people working in public and private sectors, who in good faith and in a 
reasonable way disclose their suspicions about illegal or unethical conducts, 
is crucial for the subject matter of the present study.216 This chapter is 
composed of three articles, which concern the disclosure of corruption and 
the protection of disclosing people (Article 23), the disclosure of unethical 
and unlawful action (Article 24), or the means of protecting the disclosing 
person (Article 25).
No legal act in Slovenia includes a definition of whistleblowers. However, 
Article 23 of the discussed Act constitutes that every person may inform 
the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption217 or another proper 
body about cases of corruption in the state office, within the local com-
munity, public authorities, or other legal entities subject to the public or 
private law, or about the conduct of a natural person in regard to which 
such a person thinks it contains elements of corruption. If the Commission 
recognizes that the disclosure contains elements of an offence prosecuted 
ex officio, it informs about it the proper law enforcement authorities. Upon 
the request of the disclosing person, the Commission and other proper 
authorities inform the disclosing person about the means or proceedings 
of actions undertaken in this matter.
The Commission for the Prevention of Corruption deals with the protec-
tion of not only whistleblowers, but also their disclosures.218 Moreover, it 
 216 OECD (2016), Committing, p. 109.
 217 See the website of the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption: https://
www.kpk-rs.si/.
 218 Annual reports from the proceedings of the Commission for the Prevention 
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ensures help for people who disclose perceived wrongdoings and monitors 
their activity and retaliatory actions against them. The legal status of the 
Commission for the Prevention of Corruption is regulated by Article 5 of 
the discussed Act, in accordance with which it is an autonomous and inde-
pendent state body which – in order to strengthen the efficient functioning 
of legal state and to protect it from risks of corruptive practices – realizes its 
competences autonomously and fulfils its tasks determined in the Act and 
in other legal acts within and on the basis of proper legal provisions. What 
follows is that the Commission is not subjected to any ministry. Its main 
task is to protect the legal state from corruptive practices.219 It has a wide 
scope of competences, among other things, the prevention and detection 
of corruption, violations of ethics and integrity principles in public offices. 
Moreover, the Commission has rights to access financial documents, pose 
questions to officials, or instruct various law enforcement authorities.220 
Thus, its main interests are activities in which there exists a suspicion that 
corruption or other wrongdoings do occur.
The Act regulates a number of protection means for whistleblowers, 
including identity protection. In accordance with Article 23 Paragraph 4 
of the Act, the Commission will not reveal the identity of a disclosing 
person who prepared a report in good faith and truly believes the included 
information that will be evaluated by the Commission is true. However, if 
the disclosure was made anonymously, the identity of the whistleblower 
will not be determined if the abovementioned premises are fulfilled.221 
The court has the exclusive right to reveal the information and identity 
of whistleblowers if it is absolutely necessary for the protection of the 
public interest or rights of other people.222 An attempt against the law to 
determine or reveal their identity is treated as an offence and is subject to 
penalty by fine.223 In accordance with Article 77 Paragraph 2 Section 1 of 




 220  The Commission for the Prevention, p. 2.
 221 Senčur Peček, “Protection of Persons,” p. 265.
 222 Article 23 Paragraph 8 of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act.
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the Act, a person who – against the law – reveals the identity of a person, 
who made a report in good faith or in a reasonable way thought that the 
information was true, is subject to a fine of €1,000–2,000. However, for 
the sole attempt of determining the whistleblower’s identity, there is a fine 
of €400–1,200 euros.224 In turn, Article 77 Paragraph 6 of the Act states 
that a person responsible in a state or local body who has public authority 
or a legal entity of public or private law who violates the provisions of the 
Act by initiating proceedings to determine or reveal the whistleblower’s 
identity due to the report, risks a fine of €400–4,000.225
If no feature of an offence is determined, the submission of a report 
in bad faith will be penalized on the basis of the present Act. Article 77 
Paragraph 2 Section 1 of the Act constitutes that in a situation when the 
disclosure was made in bad faith and no feature of offence was determined, 
the whistleblower is subject to a fine of €1,000–2,000 euros. In turn Article 
23 Paragraph 5 states that – when during the evaluation whether the report 
was made in good faith and the whistleblower truly believes that his infor-
mation is true – the Commission will take into particular account the char-
acter and the seriousness of the disclosed practice, the risk of occurrence 
of detriment caused by this practice, the actual detriment which resulted 
from a potential violation of the obligation of the whistleblower to protect 
specific information, and the status of the body and person for whom the 
report was prepared.
Noteworthy, if the protection conditions for a whistleblower and 
his family are met in the context of the disclosure of corruption,226 the 
Commission for the Prevention of Corruption may propose to the 
Commission for Witness Protection to put such people under the witness 
 224 Article 77 Paragraph 1 Section 3 of the Integrity and Prevention of 
Corruption Act.
 225 In accordance with Article 78 of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption 
Act, a person with public authority or any legal entity of public or private 
law who commits a minor offence, referred to, among others, in Article 77 
Paragraph 6 of the present Act, is subjected to a fine of 400 to 100,000 euros, 
except for the Republic of Slovenia and local authorities.
 226 In accordance with the Act on Witness Protection (Zakon o zaščiti prič), 
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protection program or to the Attorney General to undertake immediate 
protection actions.227
In the discussed Act, the disclosure of other unethical or unlawful actions 
was regulated separately from cases of corruption disclosure. In accordance 
with Article 24 Paragraph 1 of the Act: “An official person who has rea-
sonable grounds to believe that he has been requested to engage in illegal 
or unethical conduct, or has been subject to psychological or physical vio-
lence to that end, may report such practice to the superior or the person 
authorised by the superior (hereinafter: the responsible person).” Article 
4 of the Act contains definitions of its terms, and so it explains that state 
officials are: officials, high-ranking officials, other state officials, managers 
and members of management, and supervisory boards of public sector 
entities.
In turn, Article 24 Paragraph 2 of the Act declares that the report speci-
fied in the previous paragraph and related to it procedure will be included 
in the scope of the Commission’s competences if there is no responsible 
person, if the responsible person does not answer to the report in writing 
within the period of five business days, or if it is the responsible person who 
requests that a state official engage in illegal or unethical conduct. Next, 
the responsible person or the Commission will evaluate the actual situa-
tion on the basis of the received report, will give orders concerning further 
actions that must be undertaken if they are essential, and will undertake 
all essential actions to prevent illegal or unethical actions and their unfa-
vorable consequences.228
Should the disclosure result in retaliation against the whistleblower, 
which has an unfavorable influence on him, they have the right to claim 
compensation from the employer for unlawful detriment. In accordance 
with Article 25 Paragraph 2 of the Act, the Commission for the Prevention 
of Corruption may offer the whistleblower its help in determining the 
causal connection between negative consequences and retaliation actions. 
After the determination of the occurrence of the above causal connection, 
the Commission may request from the employer an assurance that their 
 227 Article 23 Paragraph 6 of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act.
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retaliatory actions will cease immediately.229 What follows from the above, 
the Commission may play an important role in such cases, because without 
its help the employee may have difficulties in proving that the negative 
actions (e.g. mobbing) are the consequence of the disclosure e.g. of corrup-
tion.230 The help of the Committee may be granted only when a legal dispute 
is initiated, and it ends after the dispute’s final settlement.231
For causing detriment to whistleblowers or the sole undertaking of retal-
iatory actions against them, a person responsible on the part of state or 
local authority bodies, people with public authority, or other legal entities 
subject to public or private law is subject to a fine of €400–4,000.232 In 
turn, the employer, except for the Republic of Slovenia and local author-
ities, is subject for the above actions to a fine of €400–100,000.233 The 
same penalties are applied in the case of noncompliance to the request of 
the Commission concerning the immediate cessation of retaliatory actions 
against whistleblowers.
Moreover, the provisions of the Act enable whistleblowers who are 
state officials the submission of a transfer request to another, equal posi-
tion.234 It is possible in a situation when – despite the above request of the 
Committee – the retaliatory actions against the employee did not cease and 
they prevent the employee from continuing work in the current position. 
Such a request for the transfer of the employee is related to the obligation 
of the employer to inform the Commission about the actions undertaken to 
complete it. Pursuant to Article 25 Paragraph 6 of the Act, the employer of 
a public official has up to ninety days to transfer the employee to another, 
equal position. If the employer fails to do so without providing justified 
reasons, they are subject to a fine. For people responsible on the part of the 
employer, the fine equals €400–4,000,235 while in the case of the employer it 
equals €400–100,000 euros, except for the Republic of Slovenia and local 
 229 Article 25 Paragraph 3 of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act.
 230 Peček, “Protection of Persons,” p. 268.
 231 K-Monitor Association and Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, “Final study,” 
http://www.whistleblowing-cee.org/summing-study/, access: 13.07.2019.
 232 Article 77 Paragraph 7 of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act.
 233 Article 78 of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act.
 234 Article 25 Paragraph 4 of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act.
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authorities.236 Let us emphasize that only employees who are state officials 
may submit transfer requests.237
In accordance with the provisions of the Act, the employer must prove 
that all measures undertaken against the whistleblower were not related 
to his disclosure of wrongdoings; i.e. that they did not have a retaliatory 
character.238
1.2.5  Ireland
The main legal act that guarantees the protection of whistleblowers in 
Ireland is the Protected Disclosures Act of July 8, 2014.239 Often called “the 
Whistleblowers Act,” it entered into force on July 15, 2014. The decision 
for its creation and the pace of legislative work were influenced by a number 
of political and economic events,240 such as controversies regarding the 
disclosure of wrongdoings in An Garda Síochána – the Irish police ser-
vice – which led to such actions as the resignation of the then Ireland’s 
Minister for Justice and Equality and the Garda Commissioner.241 The Act 
was a breakthrough in the Irish law, as it constituted the first attempt at a 
comprehensive coverage of the protection of people who disclose the cases 
of malpractices at work in a single document.242 The literature indicates 
that – before its adoption – the protection of whistleblowers in Ireland was 
merely fragmentary and contained loopholes.243
The objective of the Act was the creation of an environment in which 
employees of the public, private, and noncommercial sectors may disclose 
 236 Article 78 of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act.
 237 Peček, “Protection of Persons,” p. 274.
 238 Article 25 Paragraph 5 of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act.
 239 The text of the Act is accessible online at: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/
eli/2014/act/14/enacted/en/html.
 240  Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, Statutory Review of the 
Protected Disclosures Act 2014, 2018, p. 6, https://assets.gov.ie/8765/7e1f2c
66e7c04062a25561a848e17943.pdf, access: 25.07.2019.
 241 Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia, “Garda whistleblower scandal,“ https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garda_whistleblower_scandal, access: 11.09.2019.
 242 OECD (2016), Committing to, p. 171.
 243 M. Doherty and D. Ryan, “Whistleblowing: National Report for Ireland” 
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malpractices244 without fear of retaliation from the employer or a third 
party.245 Therefore, the provisions provide a number of protection meas-
ures for whistleblowers.
The Act provides protection for employees of public, private, and non-
profit sectors. Its definition of the term “worker” has a very broad meaning. 
In accordance with Article 3 of the Act, which explains the terms used in 
its contents, a “worker” means a person who:
 (a) is an employee;
 (b) entered into or works or worked under any other contract, whether 
express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, 
whereby the individual undertook to do or perform (whether per-
sonally or otherwise) any work or services for another party to the 
contract for the purposes of that party’s business;
 (c) works or worked for a person in circumstances in which:
 (i) the individual is introduced or supplied to do the work by a third 
person; and
 (ii) the terms on which the individual is engaged to do the work are or 
were in practice substantially determined not by the individual but 
by the person for whom the individual works or worked, by the 
third person or by both of them;
  or
 (d) is or was provided with work experience pursuant to a training 
course or programme or with training for employment (or with both) 
otherwise than:
 (i) under a contract of employment; or
 (ii) by an educational establishment on a course provided by the estab-
lishment, and includes an individual who is deemed to be a worker 
by virtue of subsection (2) (b) and any reference to a worker being 
employed or to employment shall be construed accordingly.
 244 In accordance with Article 5 Paragraph 3 of the Protected Disclosures Act.
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Moreover, for the purposes of the Act every person who is or was a member 
of Garda Síochána or “a civil servant is deemed to be an employee and an 
individual who is or was a member of the Permanent Defence Force or the 
Reserve Defence Force is deemed to be a worker.”246
We should mention here Article 13 of the Act, which constitutes that, “If 
a person causes detriment to another person because the other person or a 
third person made a protected disclosure, the person to whom the detriment 
is caused has a right of action in tort against the person by whom the det-
riment is caused.” Thus, the above fragment provides protection not only 
for the employee but also e.g. for people who encourage others to make 
disclosures or confirm disclosures made by whistleblowers.247
In turn, Article 5 of the Act defines which types of information disclo-
sure receive protection. Above all, it must concern “relevant information.” 
It may be considered as such if an employee demonstrates with reason-
able belief one or more relevant wrongdoings, and the employee obtains 
the information due to the situation of employment. In accordance with 
Paragraph 7 of the indicated Article, the motivation of a whistleblower 
does not matter from the viewpoint of protection. Such an attitude has the 
objective of encouraging whistleblowers to act by means of eliminating 
as many discouraging elements as possible. Moreover, the protection of 
whistleblowers disregards whether the disclosed information will even-
tually reveal the existence of wrongdoings. However, intentionally false 
disclosures are excluded from protection, because they do not meet the 
criterion of “reasonable belief.”248
In accordance with Article 5 Paragraph 3 of the Act, the relevant 
wrongdoings are:
 (a) that an offence has been, is being or is likely to be committed;
 (b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any 
legal obligation, other than one arising under the worker’s contract of 
employment or other contract whereby the worker undertakes to do 
or perform personally any work or services;
 246 Article 3 of the Protected Disclosures Act.
 247  Doherty and Ryan, “Whistleblowing: National Report for Ireland,” p. 183.
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 (c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely 
to occur;
 (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely 
to be endangered;
 (e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged;
 (f) that an unlawful or otherwise improper use of funds or resources of a 
public body, or of other public money, has occurred, is occurring or is 
likely to occur;
 (g) that an act or omission by or on behalf of a public body is op-
pressive, discriminatory or grossly negligent or constitutes gross 
mismanagement; or
 (h) that information tending to show any matter falling within any of the 
preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be concealed or 
destroyed.
The listed wrongdoings may take place in Ireland and abroad.
The Act provides a multilevel (“gradual”) system of wrongdoing disclo-
sure. Even though there is no legal requirement for whistleblowers to dis-
close information firstly in their workplace, the legislator encourages them 
to do so by requiring the fulfilment of additional conditions in the case of 
disclosures through other channels.
In accordance with Article 6 Paragraph 1 of the Act, a whistleblower 
may disclose wrongdoings to the employer or other responsible person. 
The “worker” is permitted to disclose to a responsible person where the 
worker reasonably believes that this person has legal responsibility for the 
relevant wrongdoing or the wrongdoing does not relates solely or mainly to 
the “worker’s” employer.249 This is an internal path whose use requires only 
the reasonable belief of the whistleblower that the disclosed wrongdoings 
actually occurred.
Moreover, a person who is or was employed in a public institution may 
disclose protected information to a proper minister.250 In this case, the proof 
 249 Doherty and Ryan, “Whistleblowing: National Report for Ireland,” p. 184.
 250  Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, Statutory Review, p. 7, https://
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criteria for the disclosure of information are the same as those that are ap-
plied to the internal disclosure to the employer, i.e. an employee must have 
justified reasons to believe that the disclosure of information concerns law 
violation or a possibility of the occurrence of such violation.
The disclosure of wrongdoings may also be made to prescribed persons. 
These include specific bodies,251 which may receive disclosures connected 
to the activity they monitor and regulate.252 On account of their role, 
these bodies may be a proper place for the reception and examination of 
issues disclosed by whistleblowers. Such bodies are, among others, the 
Central Bank of Ireland, the Health and Safety Authority, and the Data 
Protection Commission.253 Pursuant to Article 7 of the Act, the disclosure of 
wrongdoings to a specific body will be protected, if a whistleblower has rea-
sonable belief that a given malpractice is within the competences of the spe-
cific body and the information that he discloses and all included allegations 
are substantially true; i.e. it is a higher standard than that required in the 
case of disclosing wrongdoings to the employer.
In accordance with Article 9 of the Act, a “worker” may also make a 
protected disclosure of information during the reception of legal advice 
from a lawyer, attorney-at-law, representative of a trade union, or an offi-
cial of a statutory body.
After fulfilling conditions specified in the Act, the protected disclosure 
may also be made in a different manner than indicated above, i.e. by means 
of disclosing information to an external person, e.g. a representative of the 
media.254 To receive protection, an employee must have reasonable belief 
 251 Listed in SI 339/2014 (http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2014/si/339/made/en/
print), amended SI 448/2015 (http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/si/448/
made/en/print) and S.I. 490/2016 (http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2016/
si/490/made/en/print).
 252   Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, Statutory  Review,  p.  4
9,  https://assets.gov.ie/8765/7e1f2c66e7c04062a25561a848e17943.pdf, 
access: 13.07.2019.
 253   Citizens Information, “Protection for whistleblowers,” https://www.
citizensinformation.ie/en/employment/enforcement_and_redress/protection_
for_whistleblowers.html, access: 24.07.2019.
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that the disclosed information and all included allegations are substantially 
true and – taking into account all circumstances of the issue – that the disclo-
sure of information is reasonable. Pursuant to Article 10 Paragraph 3 of the 
Act, in order to confirm the above, one must take into account in particular:
 (a) the identity of the person to whom the disclosure is made;
 (b) … the seriousness of the relevant wrongdoing;
 (c) … whether the relevant wrongdoing is continuing or is likely to occur 
in the future;
 (d) … any action which the employer of the worker or the person to whom 
the previous disclosure was made has taken or might reasonably be ex-
pected to have taken as a result of the previous disclosure; and
 (e) … whether in making the disclosure to the employer the worker 
complied with any procedure the use of which by the worker was 
authorised by the employer.
Moreover, to make a protected disclosure in the discussed mode, the objec-
tive cannot be personal gain. Furthermore, at least one of the conditions 
listed in Article 10 Paragraph 2 of the Act must be met:
 (a) that, at the time the worker makes the disclosure, the worker reason-
ably believes that the worker will be subjected to penalisation by the 
worker’s employer if the worker makes a disclosure …;
 (b) that, in a case where no relevant person is prescribed … in relation 
to the relevant wrongdoing, the worker reasonably believes that it is 
likely that evidence relating to the relevant wrongdoing will be con-
cealed or destroyed if the worker makes a disclosure …;
 (c) that the worker has previously made a disclosure of substantially the 
same information …;
 (d) that the relevant wrongdoing is of an exceptionally serious nature.
The Act provides protection for people who disclose wrongdoings about 
which they learned due to their employment. The literature indicates that 
the Protected Disclosures Act changed the Unfair Dismissals Acts of 1977255 
in several significant aspects.256
 255 The text of the Act is accessible online at: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/
eli/1977/act/10/enacted/en/html.





Whistleblower Protection in Selected Legislatures62
Above all, we should emphasize that the dismissal of an employee which 
in consequence of their protected disclosure is considered unfair. A whis-
tleblower dismissed for such action, despite following the provisions of 
the Protected Disclosures Act, may receive compensation in a maximal 
amount of up to five-years-worth of remuneration; the maximal amount 
of compensation in other cases concerning unfair dismissal is limited to 
a two-year remuneration.257 Just as in the case of every unfair dismissal, 
in this case the sued employer must provide proof. It means that it is the 
obligation of the employer to prove that there were reasonable premises to 
dismiss the employee, unrelated to their protected disclosure. Moreover, we 
should indicate that the protection from an unfair dismissal is substantially 
applied to employees with more than one year of experience, although this 
limitation is not applicable in cases of dismissal due to the submission of 
protected disclosure.258
The Protected Disclosures Act also provides protection for whistleblowers 
from other types of retaliation from the employer. Article 12 Paragraph 1 of 
the Act constitutes that – in the case of a protected disclosure – the employer 
cannot punish or threat to punish the employee, encourage it, or allow 
other people to do so. Article 3 of the Act indicates that “punishment” 
means every action or negligence which causes detriment to the employee, 
e.g. suspension, dismissal, degradation, deprivation of promotion oppor-
tunities, reduction of remuneration, initiation of disciplinary proceedings, 
reprimanding, or application of another penalty – including a financial 
one – coercion, intimidation, harassment, discrimination, or a threat of 
retaliation. Should any of the above occur, the employee may also receive 
compensation of up to five-years-worth of remuneration.259
Moreover, Article 13 of the Act provides the right of action in tort 
regarding every detriment suffered due to the submission of a protected 
 257 Doherty and Ryan, “Whistleblowing: National Report for Ireland,” p. 186.
 258  Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, Statutory Review,  p.  7, 
https://assets.gov.ie/8765/7e1f2c66e7c04062a25561a848e17943.pdf, access: 
13.07.2019.
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disclosure. In Paragraph 3, detriment is defined as: coercion, intimidation, 
or harassment; disadvantage or adverse treatment in relation to employ-
ment (or prospective employment); injury, damage or loss; and threat of 
retaliation.
Noteworthy, the amount of fair and just compensation in the case in 
which an inquiry of a relevant offence was not the only or main motivation 
for the information disclosure, may be up to 25 % lower than the amount 
of compensation due in other cases.
The provisions of the Protected Disclosures Act protect the identity of 
whistleblowers. In accordance with Article 16 Paragraph 1 of the Act, a 
person to whom information is disclosed by means of a protected disclosure 
and every person to whom information is disclosed in such a manner from 
the former person in the scope of their responsibilities, is obligated to keep 
in secrecy all information that may reveal the identity of the whistleblower. 
Hence, there is an obligation that the recipients of disclosed information 
to undertake all reasonable steps in order to protect the identity of the 
whistleblower and ensure that the information is treated as confidential. 
However, there are some exceptions to this rule. The above will not apply 
in a number of cases indicated in the Act, e.g. if a disclosure of information 
is essential to the public interest or is required by law. Let us add that the 
disclosure may be made anonymously, though it may significantly hamper 
the effective reaction of a proper entity.
1.2.6.  Italy
The increasing number of legal regulations concerning the protection of 
whistleblowers worldwide also influenced Italy. In 2012, Italy passed the 
Anti-Corruption Law 190/2012,260 whose main goal was to improve trans-
parency in the public sector. The Law contains regulations for the protection 
of whistleblowers. Among other things, the Law introduces obligation for 
public administration bodies and state enterprises to adopt internal meas-
ures for the protection of whistleblowers. The application of its provisions 
 260 The complete text of the Law is available online at https://www.gazzettaufficiale.
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is limited, as they only concern persons employed in the public sector, which 
causes a significant gap in the protection of whistleblowers.
The situation changed with the introduction of Law 179/2017 of 
November 30, 2017, which entered into force on December 29, 2017.261 Its 
aim was to strengthen the protection of whistleblowers in the public sector 
and to introduce protection measures for private sector whistleblowers. The 
new rules extended the scope of the existing regulations for the protection 
of civil servants to include employees of public enterprises and public sector 
entities, and also private sector entities which supply the public sector. 
The main change introduced by the Law 179/2017 was the regulation of 
employers’ obligations concerning the implementation of a whistleblowing 
system. The provisions of the Law slightly differ in relation to the public 
and private sectors, which this work discusses in more detail below.
As mentioned, the amendments also apply to private companies, namely 
those that decided to implement an advanced compliance program for the 
prevention of criminal offenses, in accordance with the Legislative Decree 
231/2001 of June 8, 2001.262 An effective implementation of this program 
may exempt a company from liability for offenses committed by its CEOs, 
employees, or external partners in the interest of the company.
Previously, the protection of whistleblowers in Italy in the private sector 
was limited and only result from the implementation of EU regulations.263 
The Decree’s entry into force was intended to encourage the private sector 
to adopt specific internal compliance programs. However, one of the sig-
nificant shortcomings of the Decree 231/2001 was that it did not ensure 
the protection of whistleblowers. The provisions of the Decree 231/2001 
were supplemented in this respect by Law 179/2017. The latter applies to 
 261 The complete text of the Law is available online at https://static1.
squarespace.com/static/5a742d5ae9bfdf1f3304898d/t/5a974db8419202f909e
e4e01/1519865278761/Italy+WBer+Law+-+2017+English.pdf. Later referred 
to as the Law 179/2017.
 262 The complete text of the Law is available online at https://sherloc.unodc.
org/res/cld/document/legislative-decree-8-6-2001-n-231_html/Legislative_
Decree_8-6-2001_n_231_EN.pdf. Later referred to as Law 231/2001.
 263 We must mention in this respect such EU Directives as: 2013/36/EU, 2015/849/
EU, 2016/1034/EU, which obligate financial institutions and insurance com-
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companies that implemented a compliance model based on the provisions 
of the Decree 231/2001, which provides further obligations for these 
companies.
According to Article 1(1) of the Law 179/2017, a whistleblower in the 
public sector is a person who – in the interest of public administration – 
reports information about illegal conduct of which they became aware in 
connection with their employment. A whistleblower may be any employee 
employed in public administration. These protection measures are also 
extended to employees of private companies under public control (it. societá 
private sotto il controllo pubblico) and public economic entities (it. enti 
pubblici economici), and also all employees and associates of private com-
panies who work or supply products and services to public entities. In the 
latter case, the protection covers whistleblowers who are not part of the 
public administration, but who – by virtue of their work – have access to 
information that may be the subject of their report. We should note that 
each of these companies must adopt or amend its whistleblowing policy to 
comply with statutory requirements.
Informers can report detected violations to the Transparency and 
Anticorruption Officer, the National Anticorruption Agency (ANAC), 
directly to the judiciary authority, or the accountant as the fiscal authority.
The provisions of Law 179/2017 stipulate that – after lodging a report – 
a whistleblower shall not be the subject of retaliation through imposition 
of any sanctions, dismissal, demotion, transfer to another office, or any 
other measures that directly or indirectly impact their working conditions 
negatively. If a whistleblower is dismissed for their actions, they have the 
right to demand reinstatement, compensation for the damage suffered, and 
payment of social security contributions due for the period between their 
dismissal and reinstatement. An employer who wishes to discharge oneself 
of the liability must prove that the measures against the whistleblower were 
not retaliatory or discriminatory and have no relation to the whistleblower’s 
disclosure of irregularities. We should emphasize that the above protection 
is not absolute and does not apply to persons whose reports are defama-
tory or libelous. The aim of this provision is to prevent abuse of the whis-
tleblowing system. The Law 179/2017 also provides the protection of the 
whistleblower’s identity, which may nevertheless be disclosed as part of a 
criminal trial.
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Moreover, we must note that Article 1(6) of the Law 179/2017 provides 
the possibility that ANAC will impose sanctions of €5,000–30,000 on the 
entities responsible for retaliatory measures against the whistleblower, and 
€10,000–50,000 if ANAC finds that there is no internal system for re-
porting irregularities or that no appropriate measures were taken as a result 
of the whistleblower’s report.
The Law 179/2017 is a substantial amendment to Decree 231/2001 on the 
criminal liability of private-sector operators. As already mentioned above, 
the effective implementation of a protection mechanism for whistleblowers 
can exempt the company from liability for offenses committed by its CEOs, 
employees, or external partners in the interest of the company.
The Law 179/2017 requires private entities with already established 
compliance programs to introduce irregularity reporting systems for 
whistleblowers. Moreover, the Law 179/2017 specifies the requirements 
that these systems should meet. In particular, according to Article 2 
Paragraph 2-bis(a), such a mechanism must provide one or more channels 
for employees to internally report irregularities. We should highlight that 
the whistleblower must base their allegations on “precise and coherent 
factual elements.” Moreover, the companies should implement at least 
one alternative reporting channel to guarantee confidentiality of the 
whistleblower’s identity. Once a report is lodged, these channels should 
protect the identity of the whistleblower and the confidentiality of the 
information transmitted.
The law further provides a prohibition of direct or indirect retaliation 
or discrimination against whistleblowers following their report; e.g. such 
an employee may not be dismissed or transferred to another post. Article 
2 Paragraph 2-quarter states that discriminatory or retaliatory dismissals, 
changes in duty, or any other retaliatory or discriminatory action against 
the whistleblower are null and void. It is the responsibility of the employer 
to prove that the measures taken are justified, for reasons other than the 
whistleblower’s disclosure of irregularities.
Furthermore, the Law 179/2017 imposes an obligation to enforce 
sanctions, both against persons who retaliate against whistleblowers and 
against those whistleblowers who file unsubstantiated complaints inten-
tionally or as a result of gross negligence. According to Article 2 Paragraph 
2-ter of the Law, discriminatory measures against whistleblowers may be 
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the subject of an individual’s or a competent trade union’s report to the 
National Labor Inspectorate (it. Ispettorato del Lavoro).
1.2.7  France
After a long support campaign from NGOs, the French legislators decided 
to create a protective legal framework for whistleblowers. On December 
9, 2016, the Law No. 2016–1691 on transparency, fight against corrup-
tion, and economic modernization264 was passed – the so-called Sapin II 
Law265 – and entered into force on June 1, 2017. This regulation is a legal 
instrument for combating corruption and contains provisions relating to 
the activity of whistleblowers.266
The provisions of the Law impose an obligation to implement whis-
tleblowing procedures on public and private entities that employ at least 
fifty employees, state administration offices, municipalities with more than 
10,000 inhabitants, and also public inter-municipal cooperation institutions 
with own taxation, departments, and regions. These must have the pos-
sibility to enable information sharing by employees and by external and 
occasional business partners. Entities with fewer than fifty employees are 
not obligated to implement this procedure but can do so on a voluntary 
basis. The details of this obligation are laid down in Decree 2017-564 of 
April 19, 2017,267 which entered into force on January 1, 2018.
The Sapin II Law contains the definition of a “whistleblower.” 
According to Article 6, a whistleblower is “an individual who discloses or 
reports, selflessly and in good faith, an offense or misdemeanor, a serious 
 264 The complete text of the Law is available online at https://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000033558528&dateTe
xte=20170616. Later referred to as Sapin II Law.
 265 This commonly used term comes from the name of the Minister of Economy 
and Finance, Michel Sapin, who presented its draft version.
 266 J. Meijers, The Protection of Whistleblowers. Challenges and Opportunities for 
Local and Regional Government, Governance Committee, 2019, p. 14, https://
rm.coe.int/the-protection-of-whistleblowers-challenges-and-opportunities-for-
loca/16809312bd, access: 06.08.2019.
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and clear breach of an international obligation ratified or approved by 
France, a unilateral act of an international organization adopted on the 
basis of such an obligation, right or regulation, or a serious threat to, 
or damage to, public interest, of which he or she has become aware.” 
As mentioned above, only individuals can be considered whistleblowers. 
Legal persons may also notify the relevant entities of abuses, but such 
informants will not benefit from legal protection provided by this law. 
The whistleblower must report irregularities in good faith, i.e. they must 
have sufficient grounds to believe that the information they provide is true. 
Moreover, the Sapin II Law emphasize that the whistleblower should act 
in a selfless manner by only taking into account public interest. This prin-
ciple clearly rejects e.g. the US approach, where certain legal acts – like 
the Dodd-Frank Act – allow whistleblowers to receive remuneration for 
disclosing irregularities.
The law imposes certain restrictions on the scope of information that 
whistleblowers can report. Namely, facts, information, or documents, 
regardless of their form and medium, covered by the obligation to main-
tain national secrecy, medical confidentiality, or professional lawyer-client 
secrecy, are excluded from the scope of the reporting system.
The procedures for reporting infringements and threats should indicate 
to potential whistleblowers the method of providing information and the 
scope of information that they can report.268 Moreover, these procedures 
should provide the following routine operations:
 (a) immediately informing the whistleblower that his or her report has 
been received, giving a reasonable and foreseeable time for its exami-
nation, and indicating how they will be informed of the action taken;
 (b) ensuring strict confidentiality of the identity of the whistleblower, re-
ported facts, and persons concerned; and
 (c) destroying elements of the report, which could enable the identifica-
tion of the whistleblower or persons concerned; in cases in which no 
action was taken or two months elapsed since all admissibility or ver-
ification procedures were completed.
 268 Hryniewicz, Krak, Sygnaliści, p. 46.
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To benefit from the protective measures provided by the Sapin II Law, 
the whistleblower must operate according to its reporting system. In this 
respect, Article 8 of the Law provides a specific three-step procedure. The 
first recipient of the report must be the direct or indirect superior of the 
informer: the employer or a person designated by the employer (référent). 
If this person takes no action to verify the admissibility of the report within 
a reasonable period of time, the whistleblower may refer the matter to a 
judicial, administrative, or professional organization body (second stage of 
the procedure). As a last resort, if the abovementioned authorities do not 
examine the report within three months, the whistleblower may disclose 
the information to the public (third stage of the procedure). The rules allow 
whistleblowers to submit a report without completing the first stage in the 
event of a serious and imminent threat or risk of irreparable harm.
Article 9 (I) of the Sapin II Law stipulates that the reporting procedures 
shall ensure strict confidentiality of the identity of the whistleblower, the 
facts, and the persons concerned. Information that would allow one to 
establish the identity of the whistleblower may be disclosed only upon the 
whistleblower’s consent. One exception is the disclosure of these data to judi-
cial authorities. While providing full confidentiality for the whistleblower’s 
identity and simultaneously enabling judicial authorities to obtain infor-
mation on the subject whenever necessary, the rules ensure an appropriate 
balance between protecting the confidentiality of whistleblowers and the 
possibility of a fair trial. According to Article 9 (II) of the Law, the above 
disclosure of the confidential information may result in a sentence of two 
years’ imprisonment and a fine of €30,000.
Employees who disclose perceived irregularities benefit from special pro-
tection against any retaliatory or discriminatory measures in the workplace. 
According to Article 10 of the Sapin II Law, a person who lodged a report 
under its provisions cannot be excluded from participation in the recruit-
ment procedure on that basis and cannot be refused access to internships 
and traineeships. Furthermore, employers shall not penalize, dismiss, or 
discriminate against any worker on the grounds of their report, especially 
in regard to salary, incentives, shareholdings, training, reclassification, 
division of duties, qualification, classification, promotion opportunities, 
or contract extension. Consequently, any decision or action against an 
employee in breach of the above provisions is invalid. The Sapin II Law 
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also provides the burden of proof to be shifted to the employee’s benefit, 
should there arise a dispute between the employee and the employer as a 
result of the above forms of retaliation. In such a situation, it is the defen-
dant employer who must prove justification for their action by an objective 
reason unrelated to the reporting of irregularities by the informant.
In order to ensure effective protection, the Sapin II Law creates the pos-
sibility of imposing sanctions on individuals who in any way hinder the 
whistleblower’s report of irregularities. In this respect, Article 13 of the 
Sapin II Law provides a penalty of up to one year of imprisonment and a 
fine of €15,000.
However, we must indicate that the whistleblower’s failure to comply 
with the provisions of the Law, but also with the internal procedures e.g. 
specifically introduced in the workplace, should generally inhibit the use 
of the legal protection system. The whistleblower’s failure to comply with 
the Sapin II Law may constitute a basis for their employee’s liability e.g. 
dismissal, civil liability e.g. for damage caused, or even criminal liability.
1.2.8  Other Selected States
For the purpose of the present study, I  detailed above the regulations 
concerning the protection of whistleblowers only for certain countries. 
However, let us note that the legislation of many other countries also 
provides regulations to the matter in question.
For example, Australia has regulations on the protection of whistleblowers 
for many years. However, these regulations differ between individual 
states.269 Legal solutions in Australia were gradually introduced over sev-
eral years, due to the country’s internal conditions.270 The first legal act was 
the Whistleblowers Protection Act of 1993 in the state of South Australia.271 
In the following years, legal acts that regulate the protection in the field of 
whistleblowing272 were successively created at the state level. At the federal 
 269 J. J. Wojciechowicz, “Sytuacja sygnalistów,” p. 12.
 270 Dąbrowski, “Demaskacja,” p. 42.
 271 J. J.  Wojciechowicz, Rozwiązania australijskie w zakresie ochrony 
whistleblowerów, 2009, http://www.batory.org.pl/doc/Australia_
prezentacja_30032009.pdf., access: 24.07.2019.
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level, the Public Interest Disclosure Bill was created in 2001, followed by 
the Public Interest Disclosure Act,273 which introduced solutions for the 
public sector in 2013. On February 19, 2019, the Australian Parliament 
adopted a reform of the legislation on whistleblowers in the form of the 
Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Act of 
2019,274 which aimed to protect whistleblowers and provide serious civil 
and criminal sanctions.
Slovakia introduced the protection of whistleblowers in the Act of 
October 16, 2014, on Methods of Reporting Actions against Society 
and on Amendments to Certain Laws, passed by the National Council 
of the Slovak Republic.275 The aim of the Act is to safeguard the rights of 
employees who decide to report – in good faith – behaviors that threaten 
public interest, while ensuring that they do not become victims of retal-
iatory measures.276 The legislation on the protection of whistleblowers in 
Slovakia was amended as of March 1, 2019. The Act of 2014 was repealed 
in its entirety and replaced by Act 54/2019 on the Protection of Persons 
who Report Actions against Society and on Amendments to Certain Laws. 
Its purpose was to strengthen and increase the effectiveness of the pro-
tection provided by the previous regulation. The regulations of the Act 
54/2019 expand the scope of protection of whistleblowers and establish a 
new supervisory authority for the protection of whistleblowers. They also 
introduce new obligations for whistleblowing and strengthen the ones ex-
isting for employers.
 273 The complete text of the Act is available online at https://www.legislation.gov.
au/Details/C2019C00026.
 274 The complete text of the Act is available online at https://www.legislation.gov.
au/Details/C2019A00010.
 275 Słow. Zakon zo 16. oktobra 2014 o niektórych opatreniach súvisiacich z 
oznamovanim protispoločenskej činnosti a o zmene a doplnení niektorých 
zákonov. The complete text of the Act is available online at http://www.reming.
sk/files/2015-07-22-075206-z__kon_307_2014.pdf.
 276 M. Waszak, “Status osób ujawniających nieprawidłowości w miejscu pracy 
w Republice Słowackiej i jego ewolucja z perspektywy przepisów ustawy 
z dnia 16 października 2014 roku,” Zarządzanie Publiczne 4(40)/ 2017, 
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In the Netherlands, the Whistleblowers Authority Act277 came into 
force on July 1, 2016, and established Huis voor klokkenluiders – the 
institution that receives reports on irregularities. Among other things, the 
Whistleblowers Authority Act obligates all entities in the Netherlands with 
more than fifty employees to implement an internal whistleblower reporting 
procedure and prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers. However, the 
literature highlights the shortcomings of this regulation, including penalties 
for those who retaliate against whistleblowers and measures to compensate 
for their losses as a result of their actions.278
Moreover, there are present comprehensive legal solutions that protect 
whistleblowers in Sweden, Malta, Hungary, Malta, New Zealand, South 
Africa, Japan, India, South Korea, Ghana, Uganda, and Jamaica.279
1.3  Whistleblower Protection in the Jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights
In order to achieve the goals of this study, we should scrutinize the jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which shapes the 
understanding of human rights in Poland. A number of rulings of the ECHR 
determined the scope of freedom of expression of persons who report irreg-
ularities in the workplace. The literature indicates that the ECHR case law 
may be useful in cases before Polish courts, because it is binding for these 
courts, while their failure to comply with it exposes the state to liability 
for damages.280
The ECHR examined the activities of whistleblowers in the context of the 
protection of freedom of expression. It considered whether whistleblowers 
may invoke the freedom of expression – in this case freedom of informa-
tion281 – under Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
 277 The complete text of the Act is available online at https://huisvoorklokkenluiders.
nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/20160803_Wet-_Engelse-versie_BZK116131.
pdf.
 278 Wojciechowicz, “Sytuacja sygnalistów,” p. 13.
 279 Waszak, “Status osób ujawniających,” p. 554.
 280 Głowacka, Ploszka, Sczaniecki, Wiem, p. 17.
 281 I. Kondak, “Wolność pracowników do wyrażania opinii na gruncie 
orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka,” in:  Prawo do 
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Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.282 Article 10 Paragraph 1 of the 
Convention stipulates that, “Everyone has the right to freedom of expres-
sion. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers.” However, this provision is not absolute.283 Article 
10 Paragraph 2 explains that the said freedom may be subject to limitations 
and sanctions, as provided by law and necessary in a democratic society, for 
the protection of the reputation and rights of others and for the protection 
of confidential information, among other things.
Freedom of expression, since everyone is entitled to it, therefore also 
applies to workers, regardless of their status, form of work or sector of 
employment.284 However, the ECHR has underscored in its case law that 
this freedom is subject to certain restrictions in the workplace. When 
exercising this freedom, employees must bear in mind their obligations 
towards the employer, such as the duty of loyalty, restraint, and discretion.
As already indicated in previous parts of the study, a particularly high 
degree of loyalty may be required of civil servants285 or officers of uniformed 
services,286 but in certain situations these functionaries should also benefit 
from protection against the negative consequences of reporting irregulari-
ties. We should also note that in some professions a lower degree of loyalty 
is required, e.g. from journalists.287 Due to the nature of their profession, 
standardów międzynarodowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych  – 
Departament do Spraw Postępowań przed Międzynarodowymi Organami 
Ochrony Praw Człowieka, Warszawa 2018, p. 53.
 282 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
drew up by the Council of Europe and signed on November 4, 1950; Dziennik 
Ustaw 61.284/1993.
 283 Kondak, “Wolność,” p. 49.
 284 Kondak, “Wolność,” p. 49.
 285 Ruling of 17.11.2016, Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, complaint No. 
59001/08 concerning the dismissal of senior officials of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs due to them publicly stating that the presidential elections 
were fraudulent.
 286  ECHR ruling of November 25, 1997, in Grigoriades v. Greece, complaint No. 
24348/94; ECHR ruling of May 20, 1999 in Recveni v. Hungary, complaint 
No. 24348/94. See also ECHR ruling of January 8, 2013, in Bucur and Tom 
v. Romania, complaint No. 40238/02, described in Chapter Three.













Whistleblower Protection in Selected Legislatures74
they have the right – or even duty – to comment on matters of public 
interest.288
In the context of whistleblower activities, the rulings of the ECHR in Guja 
v. Moldova289 and Heinisch v. Germany290 are particularly important, as they 
set criteria for assessing whether a worker can be considered a whistleblower.291
First, we should mention the ruling of February 12, 2008, in Guja 
v. Moldova,292 in which the ECHR referred for the first time to the activ-
ities of whistleblowers. This ruling introduces a conventional concept for 
the protection of whistleblowers. In this case, an official from the Moldovan 
Prosecutor’s Office provided information on the influence of politicians on 
the prosecution’s activities. In response, the ECHR concluded that persons 
employed in the public sector by virtue of their function may possess infor-
mation – including confidential information – whose disclosure would serve 
public interest.293 Moreover, the proceedings found that an employee who 
reports information may benefit from protection by meeting certain criteria:
 – in the first instance, the whistleblower benefits from another effective 
means of providing an adequate response to the breach to be disclosed; 
if any such means exist;
 – the disclosure serves public interest;
 – the disclosed information is authentic;
 – the whistleblower undertakes action in good faith;
 – the damage suffered as a result of the disclosure, if any, does not exceed 
the benefits accruing from the whistleblower’s actions;
 – sanctions against whistleblowers are proportionate.294
 288 ECHR ruling of February 29, 2000, in Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, complaint No. 
39293/98; ECHR ruling of July 16, 2009 in Wojtas Kaleta v. Poland, complaint 
No. 20436/02.
 289 ECHR ruling of February 12, 2008 (The Grand Chamber) in Guja v. Moldova, 
complaint No. 14277/04.
 290 ECHR ruling of July 21, 2011 in Heinisch v.  Germany, complaint No. 
28274/08.
 291 Głowacka, Ploszka, Sczaniecki, Wiem, p. 13.
 292 ECHR ruling of February 12, 2008 (The Grand Chamber) in Guja v. Moldova, 
complaint No. 14277/04.
 293 Kondak, “Wolność,” p. 49.
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When examining the above, the ECHR concluded that the authorities inter-
fered with the freedom of expression.295 Moreover, the interference was 
disproportionate and therefore infringed Article 10 of the Convention.296 
Since that ruling, the ECHR always examined the proportionality of state 
interference with the freedom expressed in Article 10 of the Convention 
through the prism of the above criteria.297
The ECHR applied these criteria also in e.g. Bucur and Toma v. Romania, 
which concerned the disclosure of wiretapping by the Romanian intelli-
gence service.298 In this case, the ECHR concluded that the public interest 
may outweigh the interests of the employer. The ECHR emphasized that 
although public officials were obliged to be more loyal and discreet towards 
the employer, they could also be covered by special protection e.g. against 
dismissal. In this case, the ECHR decided that the protection will be granted 
to the whistleblower, if the importance of the disclosed information for the 
public interest prevails over the obligation of secrecy towards the employer.
In Heinisch v.  Germany,299 the ECHR also extended protection to 
private sector employees who report irregularities.300 This was another 
important ruling that affected the nature of the conventional protection 
of whistleblowers. The dispute concerned the dismissal of a nurse from a 
nursing home, following her notification to the prosecutor’s office of a crime 
possibly committed by the employer. In its deliberations, the ECHR pointed 
to the obligation of the state to protect the freedom of expression, which 
also applies to relations governed by private law.301 The ECHR’s conclusion 
was that the criteria for granting protection to whistleblowers – mentioned 
 295 M. A. Nowicki, “Guja przeciwko Mołdawii – wyrok ETPC z dnia 12 lutego 
2008 r., skarga nr 14277/04,” in: Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka. 
Wybór orzeczeń 2008, ed. M. A. Nowicki, Wolters Kluwer Polska, Warszawa 
2009, p. 214.
 296 A. Ploszka, “Ochrona,” p. 15.
 297 Ploszka, “Ochrona,” p. 15.
 298 ECHR ruling of January 8, 2013 in Bucur and Toma v. Romania, complaint 
No. 40238/02.
 299 ECHR ruling of July 21, 2011 in Heinisch v.  Germany, complaint No. 
28274/08.
 300 Kondak, “Wolność,” p. 55.
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above in the context of Guja v. Moldova – apply also to Heinish v. Germany. 
The ECHR considered that all of the criteria were met and underscored the 
fact that, among other things, the whistleblower first utilized the internal 
procedure for reporting irregularities and that she acted in good faith and 
in public interest.302 The ECHR further held that public interest in being 
informed about the lack of institutional care provided to the elderly by 
a state-owned company is so important in a democratic society that it 
outweighs the interest in protecting the company’s business reputation and 
interests.303 In this case, the ECHR also found that the dismissal of the 
informant infringed Article 10 of the Convention. ECHR stated that the 
employer’s failure to ensure an effective route for whistleblowers to report 
irregularities and for employers to respond appropriately justified the use 
of an external route for reporting irregularities. Although the ECHR case 
law does not explicitly say that the state must have provisions obligating it 
to provide legal protection to whistleblowers in the workplace, the above 
analysis clearly shows that – in certain circumstances – its absence may 
constitute a violation of the Convention.304
If we refer the above arguments to the activity of whistleblowers, we can 
conclude that their loyalty to the employer must not lead to them excluding 
the possibility of directing critical comments towards the employer.305 The 
duty of loyalty is not absolute, and it is inferior to the public interest, should 
the seriousness and scale of the infringements be so important that it justifies 
the disclosure of such information by the employee.
Moreover, the ECHR examined the issue of whistleblowers’ good 
faith. Here we must mention the grounds for the ruling in the case of 
 302 The ECHR held that care for the elderly, in particular when we consider the 
ageing of the population, was a matter of public interest.
 303 Nowicki, Europejski, p. 391.
 304 Ploszka, “Ochrona,” p. 17.
 305 Detailed argumentation of the Ombudsman on the dismissal of a Polish Radio 
journalist: Ombudsman of the Republic of Poland, “Szczegółowa argumentacja 
Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich w sprawie zwolnionego dziennikarza 
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Marchenko v. Ukraine,306 which contains a certain presumption of good 
faith in the activities of trade union representatives who reported observed 
irregularities.307
We must also note that the form of expression used by the whistleblowers 
will be important for granting protection to their activities. The ECHR in 
Palomo Sanches and Others v. Spain concluded that a statement made in 
a vulgar and degrading manner would not benefit from the protection the 
Convention provides.308
1.4  Whistleblower Protection in the Directive (EU) 
2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 October 2019 on the Protection of 
Persons Who Report Breaches of Union Law
On February 14, 2017, the European Commission was summoned by the 
Members of the European Parliament to urgently propose an “effective and 
comprehensive program for the protection of whistleblowers.” In response, 
a draft version of the Directive, which included standards for the protection 
of whistleblowers,309 was proposed by the European Commission in April 
2018. Subsequently, on April 16, 2019, the European Parliament approved 
the Directive on the protection of persons who report on breaches of Union 
law310 – the Whistleblower Protection Directive – accepted by the Council 
of the European Union on October 7, 2019; it was published in the Official 
 306 ECHR ruling of February 19, 2009 in Marchenko v. Ukraine, complaint No. 
4063/04.
 307 Ploszka, “Ochrona,” p. 18.
 308  See, in particular, the ECHR ruling of September 12, 2011, in Palomo Sanches 
and Others v. Spain, complaints No. 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06 and 
28964/06.
 309 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (COM(2018) 218 
final; 2018/0106 (COD); Whistleblower Protection Directive).
 310 European Parliament legislative resolution of 16 April 2019 on the proposal 
for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the pro-
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Journal of the European Union on November 26, 2019.311 The EU Member 
States are thus required to implement these provisions within two years.
The Whistleblower Protection Directive sets minimal guidelines for the 
Member States, while allowing them to refine details. They may also extend 
these provisions to other areas. It will be the first EU regulation to pro-
tect whistleblowers.312 A study conducted by the European Commission in 
2017,313 which indicated the necessity for its introduction, estimates that – 
in the area of public procurement alone – the EU loses around €5.8–9.6 bil-
lion annually314 due to the lack of sufficient protection for whistleblowers.
According to Article 1 of the Whistleblower Protection Directive, 
its objective is to improve the enforcement of EU law and policies by 
establishing standard guidelines, thus ensuring a high level of security for 
the persons who report breaches of Union law. Its regulations refer to the 
protection of whistleblowers who report on breaches EU financial interests 
and internal market rules, but also breaches in the following areas:
 – public procurement;
 – services, products, and financial markets, including the prevention of 
money laundering and financing of terrorism;
 – product safety and their fulfillment of requirements;
 – transport safety; environment protection;
 – radiological protection and nuclear safety;
 – food, fodder, health, and animal welfare safety;
 – public health;
 – consumer protection;
 – privacy and personal data protection, and the security of networks and 
information systems.
 311 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019L1937.
 312 G. Makowski, Dyrektywa o ochronie sygnalistów przyjęta przez Parlament 
Europejski, http://www.sygnalista.pl/dyrektywa-o-ochronie-sygnalistow-
przyjeta-przez-parlament-europejski/, access: 28.08.2019.
 313 L. Rossi,  J.   McGuinn, M. Fernandes, Estimating the Economic Benefits 
of Whistleblower Protection in Public Procurement. Final Report  – 
Study, 2017,  https://publications.europa.eu/pl/publication-detail/-/
publication/8d5955bd-9378-11e7-b92d-01aa75ed71a1, access: 19.08.2019.
 314 M. Gertig, “Dyrektywa w sprawie ochrony osób zgłaszających przypadki 
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Let us indicate that the above catalog does not include the sector of 
“employment, working conditions, workers’ rights and the principle of 
equal opportunities, and equal treatment of men and women at work” 
proposed in the framework of the draft of the Whistleblower Protection 
Directive. The Member States may extend the scope of protection in their 
national legislation e.g. to areas not covered by this list. Noteworthy, ac-
cording to recital 106 of, the transposition of the Whistleblower Protection 
Directive absolutely cannot reduce the level of protection already provided 
in the Member State to whistleblowers.
Article 4 of the Whistleblower Protection Directive broadly defines its 
subjective scope. Protection extends to the whistleblowers who work in both 
the public and private sector. A whistleblower, apart from an employee,315 
may also be a self-employed person, a stakeholder, a financial partner, 
a member of another company body, a volunteer, or a trainee, also one 
non-remunerated. Besides, anyone who works under the supervision and 
direction of contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers may be granted this 
status. The Directive also refers to persons whose employment relation-
ship has already ended or is yet to be established; they can obtain certain 
information e.g. during admissions. According to Article 4(4) of the Act, 
protection will also apply, where appropriate, to persons who helped the 
whistleblower file the report, are linked to the whistleblower, and may thus 
experience retaliation – e.g. colleagues or relatives – and to individual legal 
entities e.g. owned by the whistleblower or otherwise linked to him.
Article 6 of the Whistleblower Protection Directive defines infringement 
as an unlawful act or omission, which refers to EU acts or their areas 
of application. It may also be contrary to the subject or purpose of EU 
regulations in the areas mentioned above. Furthermore, information about 
infringements means a fact or reasonable suspicion on actual or potential 
violations or attempts to conceal them, which occurred or are likely to occur 
in the organization in which the reporting person works, has worked, or 
has maintained contact in the context of their work. A whistleblower may 
raise a legitimate concern or suspicion and is not required to provide clear 
 315 I mean here employees according to Article 45 Paragraph 1 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, which also includes civil servants.
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evidence.316 On the other hand, recital 43 of the Whistleblower Protection 
Directive indicates that the spread of unjustified rumors or transfer of infor-
mation fully accessible to the public will not benefit from the protection.
In order to report, the whistleblower has three procedural paths. One 
should first indicate the possibility of using an internal channel to transfer 
the information within a private or public legal entity. Recital 47 indicates 
that the whistleblower should be encouraged to use these channels and 
report infringements to their employer and reasonably expect that such a 
report will bring results.317 However, the Whistleblower Protection Directive 
provides the possibility to skip this stage and make an external report, i.e. 
to relevant public agencies. The third path for whistleblowers is public dis-
closure, i.e. the release of information through the media.
The Whistleblower Protection Directive envisions that entities of the 
Member States – both in the private and public sectors – will be obliged 
to establish an internal channel and a reporting procedure for violations. 
Should national law so require, the procedure will occur after consulta-
tion and in cooperation with public stakeholders. Private entities with at 
least fifty employees are obliged to implement this procedure. However, the 
obligation may also be imposed by the Member States on entities with less 
than fifty employees. Thus, they require to conduct an appropriate risk as-
sessment to consider the nature of their activities.318 Furthermore, all public 
legal entities – including legal entities owned or controlled by public legal 
entities – are required to establish an internal channel and reporting pro-
cedure. However, one should highlight that a Member State may exempt 
from this obligation municipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants or 
less than fifty employees or other entities with less than fifty employees.319
Article 9 of the Whistleblower Protection Directive sets procedures 
for internal reporting and follow-up actions. First, they must protect the 
 316 Gertig, “Dyrektywa,” p. 11.
 317 Gertig, “Dyrektywa,” p. 11.
 318 The Directive mentions in this context especially environmental and public 
health activities.
 319 Noteworthy, the member states may make provisions for the establishment of 
internal notification channels common to several municipalities or operated 
by shared municipalities in accordance with national law, provided that they 
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identity of the whistleblower and any third party mentioned in the report. 
Second, the person who submits the report should receive a confirmation 
of receipt within a maximum of seven days. One should also indicate that 
the entity (person or department) designated to follow-up actions must be 
impartial and act with due diligence. A reasonable time limit must also 
be set to provide feedback to the whistleblower of no longer than three 
months.320
According to recital 58 of the Whistleblower Protection Directive, the 
information provided to the whistleblower about the proceedings should 
be as comprehensive as possible, given the legal measures available.
Article 9 Paragraph 2 of the Whistleblower Protection Directive further 
specifies that internal channels must enable whistleblowers to submit a 
notification in writing, orally, via telephone, other voice communication 
systems, and in the form of a direct meeting (at the whistleblower’s request). 
The Whistleblower Protection Directive leaves the decision whether to ac-
cept anonymous reports to the Member States.
In the case of reports through external channels, persons who report on 
breaches transfer information about irregularities directly to the appro-
priate agency or after the use of internal channels.321
Article 11 of the Whistleblower Protection Directive obligates the 
Member States to designate appropriate agencies to receive such reports, 
provide feedback, and follow-up actions upon notification. According to 
recital 65, these may be a judiciary agency, supervisory agency, or the 
Ombudsman.
Appropriate agencies will be required to establish independent channels 
to enable whistleblowers communicating malpractice in writing, orally, 
via telephone, via other voice communication systems, and during direct 
meetings (upon request).
External channels must be designed, established, and operated in a way 
that ensures the comprehensiveness, integrity, and confidentiality of infor-
mation and to prevent unauthorized access by the staff of the appropriate 
 320 This deadline should be counted from the acknowledgment of receipt of the 
notification or, if no confirmation is received, from the expiry of the seven-day 
deadline after submitting the application.
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agency.322 Besides, it will be necessary to acknowledge the receipt of the 
report without delay; necessarily within seven days of receipt. Due diligence 
will be required in follow-up actions by the appropriate agency. However, 
information about undertaken actions will be transferred to the whistle-
blower within a reasonable period of time; not exceeding three months or, 
in justified cases, six months. Article 12 Paragraph 4 of the Whistleblower 
Protection Directive indicates that staff members of the agency will be des-
ignated and provided with specialized training to deal with external reports.
Furthermore, in compliance with Article 13 of the Whistleblower Protection 
Directive, the appropriate agencies will be required to publish on their 
websites information about the channels and procedures; i.e. the conditions 
of whistleblowers’ eligibility for protection and the confidentiality rules about 
notifications.
Article 15 of the Whistleblower Protection Directive concerns public 
disclosures. A whistleblower benefits from protection in this procedure, if he 
first used internal and external channels (in some instances only the external), 
but their report was not processed within the prescribed time limit. A whis-
tleblower may also use this route if they have reasonable grounds to believe 
that the breach may present an immediate or apparent threat to the public 
interest.323 In the case of an external report, public disclosure is also possible if 
the whistleblower is at risk of retaliation or is unlikely to effectively prevent the 
breach due to particular circumstances, e.g. the risk of evidence destruction.
Chapter V of the Whistleblower Protection Directive, which deals with 
rules applicable to internal and external notifications, introduces the obli-
gation for the Member States to ensure that the identity of whistleblowers – 
along with other information that enables their recognition – should not be 
disclosed without their expressed consent to anyone who is not an autho-
rized member of staff competent to receive and follow up on reports. The 
disclosure of such information may take place only where it is a necessary 
and proportionate obligation under EU or national law in the context of 
federal investigations or judicial proceedings.324
 322 Gertig, “Dyrektywa,” p. 12.
 323 For instance, in case of an emergency situation or risk of irreparable damage.
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Moreover, the Whistleblower Protection Directive applies to measures 
of security to whistleblowers. The most important one is the protection 
against any retaliation, direct or indirect, including threats and retaliation 
attempts; especially dismissal, suspension, salary reduction, degradation, 
discrimination, or mobbing. Article 20 of the Whistleblower Protection 
Directive requires the Member States to ensure that whistleblowers have 
access to support, which include free and open access to information and 
advice on procedures of legal protection, along with their rights.
Furthermore, the EU legislator decided that whoever undertakes activ-
ities damaging to the whistleblower is responsible for justifying the retal-
iatory actions; in court or during any other agency proceedings related to 
the person concerned. Regarding employment relationships, it will be the 
employer who will have the obligation to prove that the infringement report 
did not motivate the actions to aggravate the situation of the employee 
whistleblower.
Following Article 21 Paragraph 8 of the Whistleblower Protection 
Directive, the Member States must take necessary measures to provide 
a whistleblower – who follows a legal path of notification – all just rem-
edies and full compensation for damages suffered. Persons who report 
on breaches of Union law must fulfill specific conditions to be protected. 
They should have reasonable grounds to believe the information is accu-
rate at the time of notification; the report should be within the scope of 
the Whistleblower Protection Directive; they should make an internal, 
external, or public disclosure under the requirements of the Whistleblower 
Protection Directive.
The EU legislator offers the Member States the possibility to deter-
mine the penalties for the infringement on whistleblower protection; i.e. 
impeding whistleblower reporting, retaliation against whistleblowers, and 
breach of identity confidentiality. However, Article 23 Paragraph 1 of the 
Whistleblower Protection Directive indicates that the penalties are to be 
effective, proportionate, and deterring.
For the whistleblower protection system to work correctly, it must not 
be abused. One should use protection as intended in the Whistleblower 
Protection Directive. Therefore, the Member States must provide penalties 
and compensation measures also for persons who knowingly inform of or 
publicly disclose false notifications.
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1.5  Summary
In an attempt to compare the above legal solutions, we should overview 
their most essential aspects in each country.
One should note that the USA has a highly developed and complex 
system of protection for whistleblowers. The False Claims Act and the 
Whistleblower Protection Act in the public sector are the most important 
provisions in this area, similarly to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-
Frank Act in the private sector. These are not the only American legal acts 
for the protection of whistleblowers.325 The literature indicates that there 
are many state and federal US laws concerning reports on irregularities 
which, on the one hand, significantly differ326 from one another and, on 
the other hand, often interact or overlap at state and federal levels.327 The 
authors underline the fragmented approach to protecting whistleblowers 
by the creation of sectoral legislation.328 For example, the False Claims 
Act refers only to reports of fraud against the government, while the 
Whistleblower Protection Act applies only to illegal activities within the 
federal administration. There is no single instrument that comprehensively 
covers all whistleblowers’ actions throughout the country in both the public 
and private sector, regardless of the line of business.
The activity of US whistleblowers shows how much it can benefit the 
state. The US Department of Justice announcement from December 21, 
2018,329 further confirms it. It shows that, since 1986, when Congress 
 325 We may mention here also e.g. the Consumer Products and Safety Improvement 
Act of 2008, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2010, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.
 326 Dworkin, “US Whistleblowing,” p. 36.
 327 Henkel, “Whistleblower Rights.”
 328 Boyne, “Financial Incentives,” p. 283.
 329 U.S. Justice Department communique of December 21, 2018, is available 
at: U.S. Department of Justice, “Justice Department Recovers Over $2.8 Billion 
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018,” 2018, https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-28-billion-false-claims-act-cases-
fiscal-year-2018. The 2018 False Claims Act statistics can be found at: U.S. 
















significantly strengthened the provisions of the False Claims Act, more 
than $59 billion were recovered. In Fiscal Year 2018 alone, it was over 
$2.8 billion. The number of entries and the number of prizes awarded 
shows that the opportunity to receive a financial reward for their disclo-
sure is an essential stimulus for whistleblowers to act. In this context, let 
us indicate that in the 2018 tax year alone, SEC received more than 5200 
applications.330 Besides, the Commission has awarded more than $168 mil-
lion331 in prizes to persons who report on breaches of US law332 in this year. 
This amount reflects the importance of the information provided to the 
SEC by whistleblowers. The biggest prize ever awarded by the Commission 
was $49 million.333 The opportunity to receive financial compensation for 
reporting violations triggered much discussion but, as the above statistics 
reveal, this has proven a sufficient incentive.334 The literature argues that, 
for whistleblowers, the possibility of receiving a high price can be the most 
significant protection, because it enables them to cope with the loss of a 
job or slowdown in a career.335
The UK system of whistleblowers’ protection is widely regarded in the lit-
erature as one of the best and most advanced in Europe.336 The advantages of 
the discussed regulations include that they cover persons employed in both 
private and public sectors and offer a large number of available channels 
to report information. Whistleblowers may make protected disclosures to 
e.g. their employers, prescribed persons, or – in a broader context – the 
police or the media. Employees are encouraged to take internal actions first. 
 330 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2018 Annual Report to 
Congress: Whistleblowing Program, 2018, p. 2, https://www.sec.gov/sec-2018-
annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf, access: 19.08.2019.
 331 This amount exceeds the total amount allocated in all previous years.
 332 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2018 Annual Report to 
Congress, p. 1.
 333 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Order Determining Whistleblower 
Award Claims, March 19, 2018, https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2018/34-
82897.pdf, access: 24.08.2019.
 334 Kutera, “Whisteblowing,” p. 133.
 335 Dworkin, “US whistleblowing,” p. 44.
 336 Kutera, “Whisteblowing,” p. 138.; Waszak, “Związki zawodowe”, p. 40; 
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However, after meeting certain conditions, they also benefit from protec-
tion by disclosing information outside the workplace. Persons dismissed or 
who suffered other damage due to their reports may file a complaint with 
the Employment Tribunal and – if deemed justified – receive compensa-
tion. Besides, whistleblowers who claim to the Employment Tribunal are 
required to demonstrate reasonable proof that their disclosure was made in 
public interest. It prevents the workers from using the protection granted 
to settle their private business.
The literature disagrees on the assessment of the abolishing of the 
requirement of “good faith” in protected disclosures. Nevertheless, this 
change allowed more people to report irregularities without fear of pos-
sible problems with their good intentions. However, we should remember 
that acting in bad faith may reduce the amount of compensation awarded 
by as much as 25 %.
Besides many undeniable advantages of the UK legislation, there also 
increase numbers of critical assessments, which indicating that after twenty 
years of practice the PIDA requires careful review, as it now offers less 
protection and places more burdens on whistleblowers than initially fore-
seen.337 The report338 prepared by the Thomson Reuters Foundation339 and 
Blueprint for Free Speech340 reviews case files and rulings of employment 
 337 M. Worth, S. Dreyfus, C. Lavite, G. Hanley, Safe or Sorry: Whistleblower 
Protection Laws in Europe Deliver Mixed Results, Blueprint for Free 




 338 S. Wolfe, M. Worth, S. Dreyfus, Protecting Whistleblowers in the UK: A 
New Blueprint, 2016, https://blueprintforfreespeech.net/wp-content/
uploads/2016/05/Report-Protecting-Whistleblowers-In-The-UK.pdf, 
access: 20.08.2019.
 339 The Thomson Reuters Foundation stands for free, independent jour-
nalism, human rights, women’s empowerment, and the rule of law, https://
blueprintforfreespeech.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Report-Protecting-
Whistleblowers-In-The-UK.pdf, access: 20.08.2019.
 340 Blueprint for Free Speech is a charity that provides research and analysis 
in support of freedom of expression for all people, as described in the UN 









tribunal, media reports, research analyses, and studies, but also interviews 
with jurists, informants, experts, and lawyers. It concluded that the PIDA 
“is no longer capable of adequately protecting whistleblowers.”341 The main 
disadvantages of the regulation are the lack of protection of whistleblowers 
from retaliation, the cost and length of the system for reporting complaints 
to employment tribunals, and the lack of direct civil or criminal sanctions 
to deter, prevent, or discourage retaliation against whistleblowers.342
Romania is also considered to have some of the best legal solutions for 
the protection of whistleblowers.343 However, the literature stresses that the 
execution of Romanian legislation in this area is lacking.344 Furthermore, 
the lack of direct reference to the private sector should be considered a 
deficiency of this regulation.
On the other hand, according to Transparency International’s report 
Whistleblowing in Europe: Legal Protections for Whistleblowers in the 
EU from 2013,345 Slovenia is one of the countries with the highest level 
of protection for whistleblowers in the European Union.346 Moreover, 
the OECD Working Group Bribery praised Slovenia for its legislation on 
the protection of whistleblowers and recommended raising awareness in 
the private sector and among state-owned companies about the protec-
tion provided.347 Although some time has passed since these reports were 
published, Slovenia is still one of the countries with a high level of protec-
tion for whistleblowers. One can draw this conclusion in particular from 
the analysis of the provisions of its Integrity and Prevention of Corruption 
 341 S. Wolfe, M.  Worth, S.  Dreyfus, Protecting Whistleblowers in the UK:  A 
New Blueprint, 2016, https://blueprintforfreespeech.net/wp-content/
uploads/2016/05/Report-Protecting-Whistleblowers-In-The-UK.pdf, p. 3, access: 
20.08.2019.
 342 Worth, Dreyfus, Lavite, Hanley, “Safe or Sorry,” p. 18.
 343 Wojciechowicz, “Sytuacja sygnalistów,” p. 13
 344 Dimitriu, “Romania: First Steps,” p. 259.
 345 Worth, Whistleblowing in Europe, p. 8.
 346 Besides Slovenia, the report remarks Luxembourg, Romania, and the UK.
 347 OECD (2014e), Phase 3 Report on Implementing the Anti-Bribery Convention 
in Slovenia, www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/SloveniaPhase3ReportEN.
pdf, access: 28.08.2019, qtd. after OECD (2016), Committing to Effective 
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Act of 2010, which provides for a wide range of internationally recognized 
good practices in the protection of whistleblowers.
The advantages of the above include the protection of whistleblower’s 
identity and the protection from retaliation by employer. The support from 
the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption in the determination of a 
causal relationship between report and retaliation is essential. The bill does 
not contain a definition of such actions. Therefore, it is assumed that all activ-
ities in result of whistleblowers’ reports that bring negative consequences 
on them, e.g. mobbing, will be regarded as retaliation. Another noteworthy 
procedure is the imposition of the burden of proof on the employer in the 
event of a dispute with a whistleblower, along with the possibility for gov-
ernment officials to be transferred to another equivalent position, should 
retaliatory measures against them ceased not, thus preventing further work 
on the current post. We should stress that the provisions of the bill protect 
only persons who act in good faith. However, a report in bad faith may 
result in several legal consequences for the whistleblower.
On the other hand, the literature argues that Integrity and Prevention of 
Corruption Act of 2010 lacks execution and that the Commission for the 
Prevention of Corruption is ineffective in its actions, even though it has a 
significant role in raising public awareness and solving problems related to 
the protection of whistleblowers.348 Among the disadvantages of the Act 
is its broad scope that nevertheless only refers to cases of reports about 
potential corruption. Whereas regulations of the disclosure of illegal or 
unethical behavior concern only government officials. In other areas, only 
Slovenian Labor Code may apply, which does not provide for any special 
protection for whistleblowers, as in other countries.
Meanwhile, the Protected Disclosures Act in Irish law was a break-
through in the protection of whistleblowers. The Protected Disclosures Act 
is one of the best in Europe. It is confirmed by the report Best Practice Guide 
for Whistleblowing Legislation,349 published by Transparency International, 
which contains recommendations for the protection of whistleblowers. The 
Irish legislation is repeatedly cited as an example of a good or potentially 
 348 Peček, “Protection of Persons,” p. 264.







good practice. Besides, in 2018, the Blueprint for Free Speech reported on 
the implementation of whistleblower legislation in the EU and gave the Irish 
legislation the highest rating among all the Member States in the protection 
of whistleblowers.350
The advantages of the Irish legislation include the coverage of employees 
in both the public and private sector, a wide range of channels for the disclo-
sure of irregularities, and a broad scope of reportable infringements catego-
ries. The Act also provides high protection against retaliation by employers 
or third parties. If an employee is dismissed or otherwise punished or threat-
ened with punishment as a result of their report, they may receive compen-
sation of up to a maximum of five-years-worth of remuneration. Besides, 
the Act provides the right to take legal actions in respect of any damage 
suffered as a result of a protected disclosure. An exceptional procedure 
is also the possibility to reduce the amount of compensation due to the 
whistleblower’s motivation.
As regards the regulation in Italy, the Law 179/2017 introduced a sound 
basis for the protection of whistleblowers. Among the advantages of its 
provisions, one should first highlight the introduction of a ban on retalia-
tory or discriminatory actions for reports on irregularities. Whereas, in case 
of a dispute, the burden of proof that the measures are unrelated to the noti-
fication is placed on the employer. Sanctions are provided for the violation 
of the above provisions. Moreover, one should emphasize the importance of 
the protection of whistleblowers’ identity in the Law 179/2017, although 
without guarantees of anonymity in all court proceedings. However, the main 
disadvantage of the system is that it does not cover all the employees of the 
country. Not all actors in the private sector are obligated to adopt compliance 
programs under Decree 231. Therefore, they are not obligated to introduce 
whistleblower protection programs either. Therefore, there is a well-founded 
concern that – despite the introduction of high protection provisions – it will 
not cover whistleblowers in many private sector entities, especially in small 
and medium-sized enterprises, which have no links with public entities.
In France, the Sapin II Act guarantees a high level of protection for 
whistleblowers. The main advantages of the regulation are its broad 
 350 “Gaps in the System.”
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scope – which covers both the public and private sector – the concept of 
a three-step approach to the process of notification, and the high level of 
sanctions for the breach of confidentiality or obstruction of report proce-
dure. Although the protection system was inspired by the Anglo-Saxon rules 
on whistleblowing, unlike the US, the Sapin II Act does not e.g. provide for 
financial incentives for whistleblowers.351 On the other hand, a possible flaw 
in regulation is visible in the fact that whistleblowers are only protected 
from retaliation, if they report abuses “gratuitously and in good faith.” It 
seems that – in practice – it may be easy to prove that the whistleblower 
did not act without self-interest. This may lead to an unnecessary focus on 
the whistleblower instead of the disclosed information.
The above analysis shows that some countries applied universal pro-
tection, expressed in the adoption of a single legislation that comprehen-
sively regulates the protection of whistleblowers, e.g. the United Kingdom, 
while other countries assumed a sectoral approach, consisting in scattered 
provisions in different legal acts related to different sectors, e.g. the USA.352 
The abovementioned regulations differ in the following areas:
 – the type of irregularities that may be reported;
 – the available channels of disclosure;
 – the requirement of good faith and public interest on the part of the 
whistleblower; and
 – the possibility of receiving financial compensation for disclosure.
On the other hand, the typical central characteristic of all these regulations 
is that they protect whistleblowers from retaliation caused by a disclosure 
when made within the means proposed by law. This protection usually 
consists of a ban on taking any negative actions against whistleblowers, e.g. 
dismissal or discrimination, and ensures the possibility of appealing against 
the negative actions to a competent court or body. As a rule, the burden of 
proof in such cases lies with the defendant employer.
 351 Hryniewicz, Krak, Sygnaliści, p. 47.
 352 A. Wojciechowska-Nowak, Ochrona prawna sygnalistów w doświadczeniu 






Chapter II  Whistleblower Protection in 
Polish Legislature
2.1  Preliminary Remarks
The Polish law offers no legal act that would comprehensively regulate the 
protection of whistleblowers.353 Besides, there is still no clear concept of 
the status of whistleblowers and their activities. It regards both the employ-
ment relationship and the branches of law other than the Labor Code.354 
However, this does not mean that whistleblowers in Poland are deprived of 
any protection. Specific provisions may be invoked by persons who report 
irregularities. However, they are included in various legal acts and are char-
acterized by inconsistency and incompleteness.355 We should emphasize 
that the Polish legal culture assumed the Polish term “sygnalista” from 
the English “whistleblower,” which is a literal translation.356 The Polish 
literature on the subject sometimes translated this as a “demaskator” or 
“informator” who acts in the public interest.357
The need to regulate the legal situation of whistleblowers was highlighted 
e.g. in:358
 353 Polish literature also uses such terms as “demaskator,” “informator w dobrej 
wierze,” “denuncjator,” or “sygnalizator.” See M.  Wujczyk, “Podstawy 
whistleblowingu w polskim prawie pracy,” Przegląd Sądowy 6/2014, Wolters 
Kluwer Polska, Warszawa, p. 114; M. Derlacz-Wawrowska, “Whistleblowing 
a ochrona informacji poufnych pracodawcy,” in:  Prawo pracy. Refleksje 
i poszukiwania. Księga jubileuszowa Profesora Jerzego Wratnego, ed. 
G. Uścińska, Instytut Pracy i Spraw Socjalnych, Warszawa 2013, p. 390.
 354 Wujczyk, “Podstawy whistleblowingu,” p. 114.
 355 Cf. Ł. Bolesta, “Sygnalizacja jako przejaw obowiązku lojalności wobec 
pracodawcy?”, Annales UMCS – sectio G (Ius) 65.2/2018, Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin, p. 39.
 356 Szymczykiewicz, Miejsce, p. 6.
 357 Rogowski, “Whistleblowing,” p. 38; I. Świątek-Barylska, “Whistleblowing w 
praktyce. Postawy i zachowania pracowników organizacji gospodarczych,” 
Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu 249/2012, 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław, 
pp. 403–412.
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 1. the Article 33 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
ratified by Poland in 2006;359
 2. the Article 9 of the Civil Law Convention of the Council of Europe on 
Corruption of November 4, 1999, ratified by Poland in 2002;360
 3. the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution No. 1729 on 
the protection of whistleblowers of April 29, 2010,361 and Resolution 
No. 2060 on increasing the protection of whistleblowers of June 23, 
2015;362
 4. the Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe No. 1916 of 2010;363
 5. the Recommendation No. 7 of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on the protection of whistleblowers of April 30, 
2014.364
However, the need to take action in this area among Polish authorities and 
institutions was recently stressed by e.g. the Ombudsman.365 Moreover, 
also state authorities closely observe the matters of whistleblowers’ activity, 
 359 The United Nations Convention against Corruption, adopted by the UN 
General Assembly on October 23, 2003. Dziennik Ustaw 84.563/2007.
 360 Dziennik Ustaw 244.2443/2004.
 361 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Resolution 1729 (2010) 
Protection of whistle-blowers,” 2010, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/
Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17851&lang=en, access: 18.08.2019.
 362 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Resolution 2060 
(2015) Improving the protection of whistle-blowers,” 2015, http://assembly.
coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=21931&lang=en, 
access: 18.08.2019.
 363 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Recommendation 
1916 (2010) Protection of whistle-blowers,” 2010, http://assembly.coe.
int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=17852&lang=EN, 
access: 18.08.2019.
 364 Council of Europe, Protection of Whistleblowers: Recommendation (CM/
Rec(2014)7) Adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
on 30  April  2014 and Explanatory Memorandum, 2014, https://rm.coe.
int/16807096c7, access: 12.06.2019.
 365 Ombudsman of the Republic of Poland, “The Ombudsman’s letter to 
the Minister of Family, Labour, and Social Policy, of December 18, 

















which is visible e.g. in the Draft Law on Transparency in Public Life scru-
tinized below or the Resolution No. 207 of the Council of Ministers of 
December 19, 2017, on the Government Anti-Corruption Program for 
2018–2020.366 This document considers the introduction of a unitary and 
coherent system of protection for whistleblowers a priority.
The 2018 PwC report Who steals from Polish companies and how? shows 
how important the activity of whistleblowers in Poland can be,367 which is 
based on the eighth survey of economic crime; it reveals that whistleblowers 
helped detect as much as 45 % of all fraud in Polish companies.368
Finally, we should consider the 2019 report from a Poland-wide 
research Gnębieni, podziwiani i... zasługujący na ochronę. Polacy o 
sygnalistach (Oppressed, Admired, and… Deserving Protection: Poles on 
Whistleblowers).369 The work provides impressive but unfortunately pessi-
mistic conclusions about Poles’ attachment to their workplace, the common 
good, and adherence to law.370 The main objective of this project was to 
prepare and promote a Citizens’ Draft Law, which would regulate the status 
of whistleblowers in Poland.371 One of the questions asked during the survey 
concerned the respondent’s attitude toward noticing a clear case of violation 
of law by a co-worker in the form of a bribe.
Only 26 % of respondents decided to inform their superiors about the 
situation. The number of people who declared that they would not do so 
was comparable, whereas as many as 29 % of respondents said that they 
did not know how they would behave in such a situation. It indicates that 
 366 Bill 207 of the Polish Council of Ministers of December 19, 2017 about the 
Govenrmental Program for Counteracting Corruption in 2018–2020.
 367 PwC Polska, “Kto I jak okrada polskie firmy?” 2018, https://www.pwc.pl/pl/
publikacje/2018/badanie-przestepczosci-gospodarczej-2018-raport-pwc.html, 
access: 12.09.2019.
 368 For comparison, in 2016 the measurement reached only 9 %.
 369 G. Makowski, M. Waszak, Gnębieni, podziwiani i... zasługujący na ochronę. 
Polacy o sygnalistach. Raport z badania opinii publicznej, 2018, p. 3, http://
www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/
Internet_Raport_sygnalisci_12-06.pdf, access: 22.08.2019.
 370 M. Waszak, “Dlaczego nie cenimy sygnalistów?” 2019, http://www.batory.
org.pl/blog_wpis/dlaczego-nie-cenimy-sygnalistow/, access: 12.09.2019.
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Poles have a problem with adopting an unambiguous attitude toward this 
type of issues.372 The report also shows that the main demotivating factor 
for reporting irregularities is fear of being considered an informer and sub-
jection to ostracism.373 Poles’ historical experiences strongly inform these 
choices. The many years of partitioning, German occupation during Second 
World War, and the period of communism afterwards contributed to a pejo-
rative perception of any form of “denunciation.” Whistleblowing is some-










Yes No It depends I do not know Refusing to
answer
Graph 1: Please imagine a situation where your work colleague accepts bribes 
in connection to his professional duties. Would you inform your superiors after 
discovering the fact?
Source: own elaboration based on G. Makowski, M. Waszak, Gnębieni, 
podziwiani i... zasługujący na ochronę. Polacy o sygnalistach. Raport z 
badania opinii publicznej, 2018, p. 12, http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/
Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/Internet_Raport_sygnalisci_12-06.pdf, 
access: 22.08.2019.
 372 Makowski, Waszak, Gnębieni, p. 12.
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the security service and party apparatus of the Polish People’s Republic.374 
As a result, the boundary between the notification of irregularities in good 
faith and public interest and ordinary denunciation is blurred.
Besides, in the absence of special protection for whistleblowers, fear of 
legal consequences repeatedly prevents Poles from acting. Whistleblowers 
are exposed to liability for e.g. infringement of personal rights (Article 24 
of the Civil Code), defamation (Article 212 of the Civil Code), or disclosure 
of confidential information of the employer (Articles 265–267 of the Civil 
Code). In search of a model for the legal protection of whistleblowers in 
the workplace, we should analyze the provisions of the Polish Labor Code.
2.2  Whistleblower Protection in Polish Labor Law
2.2.1  The Law of June 26, 1974, in the Labor Code
The provisions of the Labor Code375 do not directly regulate the notification 
of irregularities observed by employees as their duty or entitlement.376 In 
this context, we should mention Article 100 Paragraph 2(4) of the Labor 
Code, which obligates employees to look after the good of the workplace 
and protect its property, but also to keep confidential all the information 
whose disclosure could expose the employer to damages. Employee’s self-in-
terest and the interest of the employee’s team377 determine the limits of this 
obligation. One should consider the good of the workplace as a common 
good of all members of the community.378 An employee is obliged to ful-
fill this obligation in the interest of an employer or take necessary actions 
beyond the contractual conditions to reverse the financial or non-financial 
damage threatening the employer.379
 374 Rogowski, “Whistleblowing,” p. 23.
 375 Act of June 26, 1974. Labor Code in Dziennik Ustaw 1040/2019.
 376 Raczkowski, Ekspertyza w sprawie ochrony osób zatrudnionych 
sygnalizujących nieprawidłowości przed nadużyciami ze strony podmiotu 
zatrudniającego, Kielce 2009, p. 2.
 377 Wujczyk, “Podstawy whistleblowingu,” p. 116.
 378 For more, see Bolesta, “Sygnalizacja,” p. 41.
 379 A. Kosut, “Dbałość o dobro zakładu pracy jako źródło obowiązku lojalności 
pracownika wobec pracodawcy,” Annales UMCS – sectio G (Ius) 65.2/2018, 
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In this context, one should discuss the position taken by the Supreme 
Court in its decree of October 1, 1998,380 which states that an employee 
is obligated to inform the employer about risks to the good of the work-
place and to inform the employer about any knowledge of actions to the 
employer’s detriment. Failure to comply may be considered a severe vio-
lation of essential employee obligations. Such notification is undoubt-
edly a fulfillment of the duty of loyalty towards the employer. The work 
regulations or the employment contract also specify this obligation. One 
should also underline another Supreme Court decree,381 which states that 
the above violation of the obligation will be an indiscriminate accomplish-
ment of an unlawful order which, at least potentially, threatens the interests 
of the employer, while its harmfulness is known to the employee. One 
should also highlight the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR), which shows that the scope of the duty of loyalty toward 
the employer is not the same in every profession. Less loyalty is required 
of e.g. journalists. Their right and duty is to comment on matters of public 
importance; these include the organization of work or the functioning of 
the media, which realize the public mission.382 On the other hand, service 
in uniformed formations like the army or the police is linked with severe 
discipline, an obligation of loyalty to superiors, and preservation of the 
integrity of the workplace.383 Particular loyalty must also be shown by 
e.g. civil servants.384 However, we should emphasize that this does not 
completely deprive them of their right to criticism. The ECHR ruling of 
July 21, 2011,385 declares that the employee’s duty of loyalty toward the 
employer is in some cases subordinated to the right to public disclosure of 
information on infringements at work. Here, the conflict between the duty 
of loyalty and the employer contradicts the possibility of public disclosure 
 380 Supreme Court ruling of October 1, 1998, I PKN 351/98.
 381 Supreme Court ruling of June 2, 2010, II PK 364/09.
 382 ETHR ruling of February 29, 2000, in Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, No. 39293/98; 
ETHR ruling of July 16, 2009, in Wojtas-Kaleta v. Polsce, No. 20436/02.
 383 Głowacka, Ploszka, Sczaniecki, Wiem, p. 23.
 384 ETHR ruling of February 2, 2008, in Guja v. Moldova, No. 14277/04.
 385 ETHR ruling of July 21, 2011, in Heinisch v. Germany, No. 28274/08, qtd. 
after M. A. Nowicki, Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka. Wybór orzeczeń 
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of irregularities. Moreover, the ECHR mentions the right to permitted criti-
cism and protection against negative consequences for notification of irreg-
ularities in several other cases,386 some of which will be described below.
Polish jurisprudence also confirms these views and conclusions. An 
employee has the right to permitted public criticism of the superior  – 
the right for whistleblowing – when it does not lead to violation of his 
obligations, which primarily consist of care for the good of the workplace 
and nondisclosure of information, which could expose the employer to 
harm – the duty of loyalty – along with adherence to the company’s rules of 
social coexistence.387 The literature describes employer criticism as an obli-
gation for the sake of the good of the workplace.388 Criticism is permitted 
if it is consistent with the legal order,389 it is formulated in an appropriate 
form and place, and it is justified.390 The above allows us to deduce the 
employee’s legitimacy to disclose irregularities at work.391
In search of the sources of no explicit regulation of employee obligation 
of whistleblowing, we should quote the content of Article 100 Paragraph 
2(6) of the Labor Code, according to which an employee is especially obli-
gated to observe the principles of social coexistence in the workplace. The 
legislator did not specify which behavior is considered compatible with 
or contrary to the principles of social coexistence. However, the literature 
indicates that the provision of Article 100 Paragraph 2(6) of the Labor 
 386 ETHR ruling of November 25, 1997, in Grigoriades v. Greece, No. 24348/94; 
ETHR ruling of May 20, 1999, in Rekvenyi v. Hungary, No. 24348/94. See 
also ETHR ruling of January 8, 2013, Bucur and Toma v. Romania, No. 
40238/02, described in Chapter III.
 387 Supreme Court ruling of August 28, 2013, No. I PK 48/13.
 388 A. Nowak, “Wygaśnięcie stosunku pracy na skutek wykluczenia ze spółdzielni 
pracy a ochrona członków związków zawodowych. Glosa do wyroku Sądu 
Najwyższego z dnia 16 czerwca 2005 r., I  PK 257/04,” Gdańskie Studia 
Prawnicze – Przegląd Orzecznictwa 4.16/2006, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Gdańskiego, Gdańsk, p. 169.
 389 Supreme Court ruling of October 13, 1999, No. I  PKN 269/99, OSNP 
4.114/2001.
 390 A. Drozd, “Dopuszczalna krytyka pracodawcy (przełożonych) w orzecznictwie 
Sądu Najwyższego,” Praca i Zabezpieczenie Społeczne 8.25/2012, Polskie 
Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, Warszawa, pp. 23–26.
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Code imposes on employees the obligation to comply with the principles 
of social coexistence currently required in the Polish society, along with the 
standards of conduct accepted by the company, regardless of whether they 
directly or indirectly relate to the organization of work.392 Jurisprudence 
found that what disagrees with the principles of social coexistence is e.g. 
the giving of false evidence regarding facts commonly known to the crew in 
proceedings after an accident.393 Therefore, we should state that the duty of 
compliance includes the obligation to apply non-legal norms, in particular 
moral, manners-related, social, ethical, and customary norms; in a word, 
the general and specific rules in a given workplace.394 Behavior contrary to 
the principles of social coexistence may be the basis for a penalty or even 
termination of contract.
Therefore, we should recognize that the disclosure of behaviors that vio-
late the principles of social coexistence in the workplace would implement 
the obligation to comply with these principles.
Measures to protect whistleblowers against retaliatory actions for the 
disclosure of irregularities can be found primarily in the provisions con-
cerning the employer’s obligation to counteract discrimination in employ-
ment, i.e. Articles 183a–183e of the Labor Code. Noteworthy, Article 32 
Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Poland,395 states that no one may be 
discriminated in political, social, or economic life for any reason. Whereas, 
in accordance with Article 183a Paragraph 1 of the Labor Code, employees 
should be treated equally in the establishment and termination of employ-
ment relationship, conditions of employment, promotion and access to 
training for the improvement of professional qualifications, regardless of 
gender, age, disability, race, religion, nationality, political opinion, trade 
 392 A. M.  Świątkowski, “Article 100.” In:  Kodeks pracy. Komentarz. 
Wydawnictwo C. H. Beck, Warszawa, 2018, https://sip.legalis.pl/document-
view.seam?documentId=mjxw62zogi3damrqgy3denjoobqxalrugi4tinbxguza, 
access: 11.09.2019.
 393 Supreme Court ruling of January 12, 1998, No. I PKN 458/97.
 394 K. Ziółkowska, “Obowiązek przestrzegania zasad współżycia społecznego 
w relacji do pracowniczego obowiązku dbałości o dobro zakładu pracy,” 
Studia Prawnoustrojowe 28/2015, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-
Mazurskiego, Olsztyn, p. 242.
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union membership, ethnic origin, religion, sexual orientation, employment 
for a fixed or indefinite period, and full-time or part-time employment. 
According to Article 183d of the Labor Code, a person toward whom the 
employer breached the principle of equal treatment has the right to compen-
sation in the amount not lower than the minimum wage. Moreover, Article 
183e Paragraph 1 of the Labor Code states that an employee’s exercise of 
rights from the breach of the principle of equal treatment in employment 
cannot be the basis for the unfavorable treatment of the employee, and it 
cannot cause any negative consequences for the employee, especially con-
stitute a cause for the termination of the employment relationship or its 
termination without notice.
Moreover, the above protection also applies to the employee who 
supported another employee in exercising the rights from the principle of 
equal treatment in employment from Article 183e Paragraph 2 of the Labor 
Code. The notion of granting support used in the provision in question is 
of broad significance. Such support may be an attempt to counteract dis-
crimination against a whistleblower by intervening with the employer or by 
witnessing in court proceedings in the case of a discriminated employee.396 
It is a typical activity of whistleblowers.397
Moreover, according to Article 943 Paragraph 1 of the Labor Code, 
the employer is obligated to counteract mobbing. Mobbing means actions 
or behaviours concerning an employee or directed against an employee, 
consisting in persistent long-term harassment or intimidation of the 
employee, causing the employee’s underestimation of own professionalism, 
causing or aimed at humiliating or ridiculing the employee, isolating them 
or eliminating their colleagues from the team (Article 943 Paragraph 2 of 
the Labor Code). According to Article 943 Paragraph 3 of the Labor Code, 
if harassment caused an employee’s ill health, the employee may claim 
an appropriate amount from the employer as financial compensation for 
the harm suffered. Besides, an employee who was subject to mobbing or 
terminated work relationship due to mobbing has the right to claim com-
pensation from the employer in the amount not lower than the minimum 
 396 L. Florek, T. Zieliński, “Art. 18(3(e)),” in: Kodeks pracy. Komentarz, ed. 
L. Florek, ed. VII, Wolters Kluwer Polska, Warszawa, 2017, pp. 172–173.
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remuneration for work (Article 943 Paragraph 4 of the Labor Code). 
Harassment can also be a criminal offense, which exposes the employer to 
criminal liability.398
The literature states that the source of protection for whistleblowers 
may be Article 8 of the Labor Code.399 Its content allows the interpretation 
that one cannot make use of one’s own right against the socioeconomic 
purpose of this right or the principles of social coexistence. Such an act 
or omission is not considered an exercise of the right and does not benefit 
from protection. The jurisprudence400 states that courts can examine the 
legitimacy of a termination under Article 8 of the Labor Code in the context 
of abuse of legal right.401 However, these provisions are practically reserved 
only for particularly severe and evident abuses of law, so their usefulness is 
questioned e.g. in cases of reinstatement.402 Therefore, this provision cannot 
be treated as a legal basis for the adequate protection of whistleblowers 
against potential retaliation.
One should notice that an employee cannot freely choose the circle 
of people to whom he reports irregularities in the workplace. The use of 
an external channel is allowed only when there is no internal channel, it 
does not function correctly, or if it would be unreasonable to expect the 
internal channel to function correctly, taking into account the nature of 
the problem.403 The addressees of such a report should be legal protec-
tion agencies such as the police, the prosecutor’s office, the State Labor 
Inspectorate, the Supreme Audit Office, or an institution acting in the public 
interest, e.g. the media.404
The review of provisions contained in the Labor Code that allow 
for appealing to the Labor Court against termination of employment 
 398 Szymczykiewicz, Miejsce, p. 15; Supreme Court ruling of January 17 2017 r., 
WA 18/16.
 399 Szymczykiewicz, Miejsce, p. 20–21; Wojciechowska-Nowak, Ochrona prawna 
sygnalistów, p. 96.
 400 Por. wyrok Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 5 grudnia 2007 r., II PK 122/07; wyrok 
Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 19 lipca 1984 r., I PRN 98/84.
 401 Szymczykiewicz, Miejsce, p. 20.
 402 Wojciechowska-Nowak, Ochrona prawna sygnalistów, p. 96.
 403 Głowacka, Ploszka, Sczaniecki, Wiem, p. 14.
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contracts – including termination without notice – or change of employ-
ment contracts, allows for building a picture of the legal status that gives 
a sense of security, which in practice may turn out to be only apparent.405
Depending on the circumstances and type of employment, an employee 
is entitled to the recognition of ineffective termination of employment, 
reinstatement at work on previous terms, or compensation. We should 
emphasize that this protection is of a follow-up nature and is updated only 
in proceedings before the Labor Court.406
In the case of employees employed for an indefinite period, the employer 
must indicate in a statement the reason justifying the termination of their 
contracts or their termination without notice. The statement should be 
authentic and specific.407 An apparent reason – i.e. fictional, unreal, false, 
or non-existent – is equivalent with the lack of its indication and results 
in considering the termination as unjustified.408 Upon the termination of 
contracts with whistleblowers, the reason given by employers for the termi-
nation of employment relationship usually does not concern the signaling 
activity of the employee but other circumstances on the employee’s part. 
Such employees have difficulty to prove in court that the indicated reason is 
not apparent or that the revealed irregularities are not real.409 The literature 
mentions in this context e.g. the liquidation of the position of a whistle-
blower.410 In the event of an employee’s appeal against such termination, 
 405 Wojciechowska-Nowak, Ochrona prawna sygnalistów, p. 95.
 406 Global Compact Network Poland, “Projekt założeń do projektu ustawy o 
działalności sygnalizacyjnej i ochronie sygnalistów z dnia 4 września 2017 
r. (zaktualizowany 19 czerwca 2018 r.),” in: Systemy zgłaszania nieprawidłowości, 
Założenia do ustawy o ochronie sygnalistów, 2018, p. 18, https://ungc.org.
pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Za%C5%82o%C5%BCenia-do-ustawy-o-
oschronie-sygnalist%C3%B3w.pdf, access: 16.08.2019.
 407 This is confirmed by e.g. the Supreme Court ruling of November 4, 2008, II 
PK 82/08; the Supreme Court ruling of October 24, 2017, II PK 307/16; or 
the resolution of the full committee Labour and Social Security Office of June 
27, 1985, III PZP 10/85 (OSNCP 11.164/1985).
 408 Cf. the Supreme Court ruling of January 27, 2015, II PK 62/14; the Supreme 
Court ruling of October 7, 2009, III PK 34/09; the Supreme Court ruling of 
October 13, 1999, I PKN 304/99.
 409 Wojciechowska-Nowak, Ochrona prawna sygnalistów, p. 96.
 410 A. Wojciechowska-Nowak, “Skuteczna ochrona prawna sygnalistów. 
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the Labor Court does not examine the need to liquidate the position in 
the company structure. The implementation of organizational and eco-
nomic changes by the employer constitutes their autonomous decision.411 
The Labor Court will be bound by the reason for dismissal given by the 
employer, and it will be the main subject of the proceedings.412 Incidentally, 
in the case of termination of temporary contracts, employers are not obli-
gated to state the reasons for termination, which facilitates the termination 
of employment relationships. Such an obligation exists only in the case of 
termination of an employment contract without notice.
According to Article 45 Paragraph 1 of the in the Labor Code, if the 
Labor Court finds that the termination of an employment contract for an 
indefinite period is unjustified or violates the provisions on termination 
of employment contracts, the Court rules the ineffectiveness of the termi-
nation. If the contract was already terminated, the reinstatement of the 
employee under previous conditions413 or upon compensation is possible. 
It all depends on the employee’s request and the circumstances.414 When a 
decision on the reinstatement to work on previous terms and conditions 
is ruled, the employee may demand employment on the same position as 
previously held. However, it does not suffice to provide the employee with 
employment on an equivalent position.415 A claim for reinstatement on 
previous terms and conditions or for compensation is also available to 
środowisk prawniczych,” Przegląd Antykorupcyjny 7/2016, Wydawnictwo 
Centrum Szkolenia Policji w Legionowie, Warszawa, p. 20; Szymczykiewicz, 
Miejsce, p. 19.
 411 This way e.g. in the Supreme Court ruling of January 12, 2012, II PK 83/11.
 412 Szymczykiewicz, Miejsce, p. 19.
 413 In the event of reinstatement to work, the employee who returned to work in 
its result is additionally entitled to remuneration for period of unemployment 
(Article 47 of the Labor Code).
 414 In accordance with Article 45 Paragraph 1 of the Labor Code, the Labor Court 
may not accept the employee’s request that the termination be ineffective or 
that they be reinstated, if the Court determines that such a request is impos-
sible or unintentional; in such a case the Labor Court rules on compensation. 
In this context, it may be significant that e.g. there is a serious conflict in the 
workplace between the employee and the supervisor. Cf. the Supreme Court 
ruling of April 3, 1997, I PKN 63/97.
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an employee with whom the employment contract has been terminated 
without notice, in violation of the provisions of this procedure, according 
to Article 56 Paragraph 1 of the Labor Code.
We should indicate that the above regulations refer to employees, i.e. per-
sons employed on the basis of an employment contract, nomination, elec-
tion, promotion, or cooperative employment contract, according to Article 
2 of the Labor Code. Protection against negative consequences of reports on 
violations is practically non-existent in the case of employment outside of 
the employment relationship; it especially means civil law contracts under 
which persons, who provide work, are not entitled to the same protection 
as employees.416 In the case of possible irregularities related to the termi-
nation of such contracts, employees may only file claims for compensation 
with the Civil Court and not the Labor Court.417
According to the above, reports on irregularities at the workplace should 
be considered one of employees’ obligations. However, there is no spe-
cific form of protection for whistleblowers in the above legislation, which 
endangers employees with the risk of retaliation from the employer, e.g. 
discrimination, mobbing, or termination of the employment relationship. 
In practice, the employee may encounter problems in challenging one’s 
dismissal in court as a result of whistleblowing activities.
2.2.2  The Law of May 23, 1991, on Trade Unions
As mentioned above, reports on irregularities can be spontaneous, but they 
can also fulfill the obligations imposed on specific categories of employees.418 
The literature indicates that trade unions are essential in this respect.419 
According to Article 23 of the Law on Trade Unions,420 trade unions exercise 
control over the observance of the labor law and participate – under the 
principles determined in separate regulations – in the supervision over the 
observance of regulations and rules of health and safety at work. Within 
 416 Cf. Raczkowski, Ekspertyza, p. 15.
 417 Szymczykiewicz, Miejsce, p. 35.
 418 D. Skupień, “Whistleblowing in Poland According to Legislation and Case 
Law,” in: Whistleblowing – A Comparative Study, p. 225.
 419 Wojciechowska-Nowak, “Skuteczna ochrona prawna sygnalistów,” p. 18.
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the framework of these tasks, trade unions may undertake disputes with the 
employer and signal irregularities in the workplace.421 Trade unions in the 
role of whistleblowers help protect workers from retaliation by employers 
or co-workers.422 Trade union activists benefit from special protection of 
their employment relations, which allows them to more freely perform 
their duties related to the defense of the rights of workers, along with the 
representation of professional and social interests of workers (Article 1 of 
the Law on Trade Unions). This particular protection is expressed e.g. in 
the prohibition of unequal treatment on the grounds of membership or 
affiliation to a trade union, lack of participation in a trade union, or the 
exercise of trade union functions, which especially affects:
 1) refusal to establish a legal relationship or termination of a legal 
relationship;
 2) unfavorable terms of remuneration for gainful employment, other 
unpropitious conditions of employment, omission from promotion or 
deprivation of other benefits related to gainful employment;
 3) omission from the selection for participation in training courses which 
improve professional qualifications, unless the employer proves that 
he was guided by objective reasons (Article 3 of the Law on Trade 
Unions).
Trade union duties may include disclosure of irregularities or help pro-
vided to other whistleblowers. Let us indicate that trade unions may sup-
port whistleblowers in their court cases.423 Article 462 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure424 states that – in matters concerning labor law and social 
security and with the consent of the employee or the insured expressed 
in writing – non-governmental organizations, within the scope of their 
statutory tasks, may bring actions on behalf of the employee or appeal 
against decisions of pension authorities. They may also, with the consent 
of the employee or the insured expressed in writing, join whistleblowers in 
 421 Szymczykiewicz, Miejsce, p. 35.
 422 Wojciechowska-Nowak, “Skuteczna ochrona prawna sygnalistów,” pp. 18–19.
 423 Skupień, “Whistleblowing in Poland,” p. 225.
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ongoing proceedings. We should also note that one of ECHR judgments 
attributes a certain presumption of good faith in reports on violations to 
trade union representatives.425
2.2.3  The Law of June 24, 1983, on Social Labor Inspection
Whistleblowing may also concern the activities of social labor inspectors. 
According to Article 1 of the Law on Social Labor Inspection,426 it is a social 
service provided by employees to ensure health and safety at work and pro-
tect employee rights specified in the provisions of the labor law. The social 
labor inspection represents the interests of all employees in the workplace 
and is managed by trade unions. As a rule, a social labor inspector may be 
an employee of a given company who is a member of a trade union and 
does not hold the position of a workplace director or a managerial posi-
tion directly subordinate to the company director. According to Article 4 
of the Law on Social Labor Inspection, the social rights of labor inspectors 
include control of the condition of buildings, machines, technical and san-
itary equipment of a workplace, along with technological processes under 
occupational health and safety. Their duties may also include control of 
compliance with labor law provisions, including the provisions of collec-
tive agreements and labor regulations, in particular concerning health and 
safety at work, rights of employees associated with parenthood, young 
and disabled persons, holidays and working time, and benefits in respect 
of accidents at work and occupational diseases. On the other hand, Article 
9 Paragraph 1 of Law on Social Labor Inspection stipulates that if the 
provisions referred to in Article 4 are not complied with, the social labor 
inspector shall inform the head of the workplace and department and 
make an appropriate entry in documents mentioned in Article 12.427 The 
director of the workplace and department shall remove the irregularities 
 425 The ECHR judgment of February 19, 2009, Marchenko v. Ukraine, application 
No 4063/04.
 426 The Law of June 24, 1983, on Social Labor Inspection, Dziennik Ustaw 
567/2015.
 427 According to Article 12 Paragraph 1 of the Law on Social Labor Inspection, the 
company is obliged to establish a book of recommendations and notes, along 
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and inform the social labor inspector about it. Apart from the above rights, 
the company social inspector is entitled to issue written recommendations 
to the employer in the form of recommendations to manage the identified 
infringements within a specified time (Article 11 of the Law on Social Labor 
Inspection). We may conclude that there is an obligation to signalize irreg-
ularities detected in the workplace.
Let us notice that social labor inspectors are obliged by law to cooperate 
with the National Labor Inspectorate and other supervisory and control 
bodies (Article 17 Paragraph 1 of the Law on Social Labor Inspection), 
to which they may report observed irregularities. The National Labor 
Inspectorate should provide social assistance to the labor inspector in the 
performance of their tasks, in particular through legal counseling, specialist 
press, and training.428
Moreover, the employment relationship of a social labor inspector shall 
be subject to special protection against dismissal during the term of office 
and within one year after its expiry, unless there are reasons that justify 
the termination of the employment contract without notice (Article 13 
Paragraph 1 of the Law on Social Labor Inspection). In such a case, the 
termination of the employment contract may occur after obtaining prior 
consent of the statutorily competent authority of the trade union. Even if 
the employee is guilty of serious misconduct, the courts should take into ac-
count the employee’s right to protection,429 which ensures that social labor 
inspectors are protected in their independence and performance of duties.
2.2.4  The Law of April 13, 2007, on the National Labor Inspectorate
We should also refer to the regulations concerning the activities of the 
National Labor Inspectorate. It is a body appointed to supervise and con-
trol the observance of labor law, especially the regulations and principles 
of health and safety at work. It also regulates the legality of employment 
within the scope specified in the Law on the National Labor Inspectorate.430 
 428 T. Liszcz, Prawo pracy, Wolters Kluwer Polska, Warszawa 2019, p. 589.
 429 The Supreme Court judgment of May 8, 2014, III PK 110/13.
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At the request of employees or their representatives concerning health 
and safety, labor inspectors of the National Labor Inspectorate conduct 
inspections and apply legal measures provided for in the provisions of 
the National Labor Inspectorate.431 In the reply to parliamentary question 
8304 on the legal protection of whistleblowers,432 the Secretary of State at 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy stated on October 1, 2012,433 that,
In case of doubts of employees concerning the compliance of employer’s conduct 
with the Law on the National Labor Inspectorate, it is possible to request assis-
tance, including a request for intervention, from the locally competent regional 
labor inspectorate. The Labor Inspectorate is equipped with appropriate powers 
and means to perform tasks related to supervision and control, along with the 
enforcement of employers’ compliance with the current legislation. Pursuant to 
Article 23(2) of the Law on the National Labor Inspectorate,434 if there is a justi-
fied concern that an employee’s disclosure of information to a labor inspector in 
matters covered by the inspection could expose that employee to any damage or 
accusation due to the provision of this information, the labor inspector may issue 
a decision to keep secret the circumstances that would disclose the identity of the 
employee, including their personal data.
We may conclude that the labor inspector has the right to keep 
whistleblower’s identity secret if there is a concern of negative consequences 
for the employee due to the disclosure of certain information. Moreover, 
according to Article 44 Paragraph 3 of the Law on the National Labor 
Inspectorate, its controllers are obliged to not disclose information that 
the control is conducted as a result of a complaint unless the complainant 
consents to it in writing. The guarantee of an employee’s anonymity based 
on the mentioned provisions may undoubtedly encourage the reporting of 
irregularities.
 431 Wojciechowska-Nowak, “Skuteczna ochrona prawna sygnalistów,” p. 9.
 432 Parliamentary Question No. 8304 of August 29, 2012, to the Minister of Labor 
and Social Policy on the legal protection of “whistleblowers,” http://www.sejm.
gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/InterpelacjaTresc.xsp?key=01A1F464, access: 12.12.2018.
 433 Response of the Secretary of State in the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy of 
October 1, 2012, to the Parliamentary Question No. 8304 on the legal protec-
tion of “whistleblowers,” http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/InterpelacjaTresc.
xsp?key=543A7299, access: 12.12.2018.
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2.3  Whistleblower Protection in Other Polish Regulations
2.3.1  The Law of August 5, 2015, on Macroprudential 
Supervision of the Financial System and Crisis 
Management in the Financial System
As we discuss the issue of whistleblowers in the Polish legal system, we 
should mention the Law of August 5, 2015, on Macroprudential Supervision 
of the Financial System and Crisis Management in the Financial System.435 
The Law introduced specific requirements in this respect in the banking 
and financial sector. Namely, Paragraph 2a and 2b were added to Article 
9 of the Banking Law of August 29, 1997.436 The first of these provisions 
introduces a requirement that the management system at the bank should 
include procedures for anonymous reports to the designated member of the 
management board and, in special cases, to the supervisory board of the 
bank, violations of law and ethical procedures and standards applicable at 
the bank. On the other hand, the second of the introduced provisions states 
that – under the above procedures – the bank provides whistleblowers with 
protection at least against repressive actions, discrimination, and other types 
of unfair treatment. Let us indicate that these regulations are strictly related 
to the activities of whistleblowers, which provide them with the possibility 
of the anonymous reporting of irregularities. Since the entry into force of the 
above regulations, i.e. November 1, 2015, reports of infringements in banks 
became mandatory.437 However, the Law does not specify the requirements 
concerning the above procedures. They are specified in Chapter 5 Article 
45 of the Decree of the Minister of Development and Finance of March 6, 
2017, on the risk management system and internal control system, remuner-
ation policy, and a precise method of estimating internal capital in banks.438 
 435 The Law of August 5, 2015, on Macroprudential Supervision of the Financial 
System and Crisis Management in the Financial System, Dziennik Ustaw 
483/2019.
 436 The Banking Law of August 29, 1997, Dziennik Ustaw 2187/2018.
 437 Cichy, Whistleblowing w bankach, p. 13.
 438 Decree of the Minister of Development and Finance of March 6, 2017, on the 
risk management system and internal control system, remuneration policy, 
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Article 45 Paragraph 3 of the Minister’s Decree requires that the bank 
ensure that employees can report violations through a special, indepen-
dent, and autonomous channel of communication. Paragraph 4 stipulates 
that the procedures for anonymous reports on breaches by employees must 
specify such issues as,
 – how infringement reports are received;
 – how to protect the reporting employee, which shall at least provide 
protection against victimization, discrimination, and other unfair 
treatment;
 – protection of the personal data of the reporting employee and the al-
leged infringer;
 – rules ensuring the confidentiality of the reporting agency, if the re-
porting agency has disclosed their identity or it is possible to identify 
the person;
 – the identification of persons responsible for receiving reports of breaches; 
type and nature of follow-up action to be taken upon the reception and 
verification of a report of breaches and a plan to coordinate such action;
 – deadline for the removal of personal data contained in reports of 
violations by the bank.439
The management is responsible for the adequacy and effectiveness of 
procedures for the anonymous reporting of violations by employees. The 
supervisory board shall conduct an assessment in this respect as appro-
priate and at least once a year. The bank is further obliged to conduct 
initial and regular training for employees on reports of infringements, espe-
cially procedures applicable in this respect. The literature indicates that the 
above procedures are deliberate and may serve as an example for future 
regulations concerning the protection of whistleblowers in Poland.440
 439 W. Jasiński, “Sygnalizacja o nieprawidłowościach. Nowe wyzwanie dla biznesu, 
administracji i ustawodawcy,” in:  Systemy zgłaszania nieprawidłowości. 
Założenia do ustawy o ochronie sygnalistów, 2018, p. 15, https://ungc.org.
pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Za%C5%82o%C5%BCenia-do-ustawy-o-
oschronie-sygnalist%C3%B3w.pdf, access: 16.08.2019.
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Moreover, the Law on Macroprudential Supervision introduced new 
regulations to Article 83a of the Law on Trading in Financial Instruments.441 
According to Article 83a Paragraph 1a, the investment firm is required to have 
procedures for anonymous reports of the violations of law to the indicated 
board member and – in exceptional cases – to the supervisory board, including 
Regulation 596/2014,442 Regulation 600/2014,443 and the ethical procedures 
and standards in force in the investment company. However, Article 83a 
Paragraph 1b of the Law states that – within the procedures referred to in 
Paragraph 1a – the investment firm protects employees who report violations 
at least against activities of a repressive nature, discrimination, and other types 
of unfair treatment. The last provision introduced is Article 83a Paragraph 
1c, under which – in the case of a brokerage house operating as a partner-
ship – the requirements referred to in Paragraph 1a apply to general partners 
who have the right to conduct cases of the company or represent it pur-
suant to the provisions of the Law of September 15, 2000 on the Commercial 
Companies Code.
Detailed guidelines for anonymous reports referred to in Article 83a 
Paragraph 1a of the Law on Trading in Financial Instruments are cur-
rently determined in Chapter 4 (Paragraph 32) of the Regulation of the 
Minister of Finance of May 29, 2018, on detailed technical and organi-
zational conditions for investment firms and banks referred to in Article 
70 Paragraph 2 of the Law on Trading in Financial Instruments and Trust 
Banks.444 Paragraph 32 of the Law contains requirements for anonymous 
 441 The Law of July 29, 2005, on Trading in Financial Instruments, Dziennik 
Ustaw 2286/2018.
 442 EU Regulation No. 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing 
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC.
 443 EU Regulation No. 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012.
 444 The Regulation of the Minister of Finance of May 29, 2018, on detailed 
technical and organizational conditions for investment companies and banks 
referred to in Article 70 Paragraph 2 of the Law on Trading in Financial 
Instruments and Trust Banks, Dziennik Ustaw 1111/2018. It replaced the 








Whistleblower Protection in Other Polish Regulations 111
reports, which are practically identical to the ones presented above in the 
Regulation of the Minister of Development and Finance on the internal 
control system in banks.
Some argue that the above provisions were the first to introduce the legal 
regulation of protection strictly related to whistleblowers.445 Let us indicate 
that the adoption of these regulations was part of the implementation of 
Article 71 of the so-called CRD IV Directive (Capital Requirements Regulation 
2013),446 which imposes on EU member states the obligation to establish ef-
fective and reliable mechanisms for the notification of competent authorities 
of potential or actual infringements of national provisions in the area regu-
lated by this Directive and EU Regulation of the European Parliament and 
the Council of EU No. 575/2013.447
2.3.2  The Law of July 29, 2005, on Capital Market Supervision; 
the Law of May 27, 2004, on Investment Funds and 
Alternative Investment Fund Management; and the Law 
of June 9, 2011, on Geological and Mining Law
Among the laws that impose the obligation of procedures for anonymous 
notification of regulations on certain entities also include the Law of July 
29, 2005, on Capital Market Supervision,448 the Law of May 27, 2004, 
detailed technical and organizational conditions for investment companies and 
banks referred to in Article 70 Paragraph 2 of the Law on Trading in Financial 
Instruments and Trust Banks, Dziennik Ustaw 855/2017.
 445 Hryniewicz, Krak, Sygnaliści, p. 14.
 446 EU Directive No. 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the pruden-
tial supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC.
 447 EU Regulation No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and invest-
ment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, in: Hryniewicz, Krak, 
Sygnaliści, p. 14.
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Investment Funds and Alternative Investment Fund Management,449 and 
the Law of June 9, 2011, on Geological and Mining Law.450
According to Article 3b of the Law on Capital Market Supervision, 
entities such as investment firms’ agents, trust banks, companies operating 
a regulated market, or companies operating commodity exchanges are 
required to have procedures for the anonymous reports of violations of 
EU Regulation 596/2014,451 committed by their employees to a designated 
member of the management board and, in individual cases, to the supervi-
sory board. Based on the delegation in Article 3a Paragraph 3 of the Law on 
Capital Market Supervision, the Minister of Finance issued the Regulation 
of June 25, 2018, on the reception of reports on violations of EU Regulation 
596/2014 by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority.452 Its provisions 
determine the possibility of notification via electronic devices, in writing, 
by phone, or in person.
In turn, Article 237b of the Law on Investment Funds and Alternative 
Investment Fund Management imposes on entities like investment fund 
companies or fund management companies the obligation to implement 
procedures for the anonymous reporting of violations committed by 
employees of these entities of its provisions to a designated member of the 
management board and – in exceptional cases – to the supervisory board; 
in the absence of such bodies: to a designated general partner or partner 
authorized to conduct company cases following the provisions of the Code 
of Commercial Companies.
The Geological and Mining Law is another legal act which implements 
EU regulations on reporting irregularities.453 It concerns Directive 2013/30/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of EU of June 12, 2013, 
on the safety of oil and gas activities in maritime areas along with the 
 449 The Law of May 27, 2004, on Investment Funds and Alternative Investment 
Fund Management, Dziennik Ustaw 1355/2018.
 450 The Law of June 9, 2011, on Geological and Mining Law, Dziennik Ustaw 
868/2019.
 451 EU Regulation No. 596/2014.
 452 Regulation of the Minister of Finance of June 25, 2018 on the reception by 
the Polish Financial Supervision Authority of reports of violations of EU 
Regulation 596/2014, Dziennik Ustaw 1262/2018.
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amendment of the Directive 2004/35/WE of the European Parliament and 
the Council of EU.454 Under Article 117c of the Geological and Mining Law, 
in the case of exploration, identification, or extraction of hydrocarbons 
from deposits within the maritime areas of the Republic of Poland, the 
Mining Operations Unit Head shall locate information – in a generally 
accessible place within the premises of the mining plant – about the possi-
bility of the anonymous reporting of safety and environmental problems 
related to such activities to the competent authority and the President of the 
State Mining Authority of the Republic of Poland. Moreover, the Mining 
Operations Unit Head shall inform the persons present within the premises 
of the mining plant about such a possibility, especially during each training 
course in the field of health and safety at work. Moreover, the President 
of the State Mining Authority is obliged to publish a telephone number 
in the Public Information Bulletin on the website of the relevant office, 
through which the above problems should be reported. While reporting 
the problems, it is not necessary to provide data enabling the identification 
of the applicant. The analysis of the applications itself is also conducted 
anonymously. Noteworthy, a Mining Operations Unit Head who did not 
display information about the above possibility of anonymous reporting of 
problems or did not inform persons present on the premises of the mining 
plant about this possibility, especially during each training course in the 
field of health and safety at work, may be fined.
2.3.3  The Law of April 16, 1993, on Combating Unfair Competition
On September 4, 2018, the provisions of the Law of July 5, 2018, amending 
the Law on Combating Unfair Competition and certain other acts455 of 
importance for whistleblowers entered into force. This act introduced sig-
nificant amendments to the Law of April 16, 1993, on Combating Unfair 
 454 EU Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending 
Directive 2004/35/EC.
 455 The Law of July 5, 2018, Amending the Law on Combating Unfair Competition 
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Competition.456 The above was due to the obligation to implement Directive 
2016/943 of the European Parliament and European Council of June 8, 
2016, on the protection of confidential know-how and business secrets 
against the unlawful acquisition, use, and disclosure.457
The amendment to the Law contains mainly changes concerning def-
inition issues – e.g. business secrets – but it also refers to the issue of 
whistleblowers’ activity in the enterprise.458 According to Article 11(8) of 
the Law on Combating Unfair Competition, the disclosure, use, or acqui-
sition of information constituting business secrets does not constitute an 
act of unfair competition:
 a) if it was in order to protect a legitimate interest protected by law, in the 
exercise of freedom of expression, or in order to disclose irregularities 
detrimental to the public interest,
 b) when disclosure to the employees’ representatives of this informa-
tion was necessary for their proper performance of functions required 
to law.
Therefore, this regulation provides for the protection of whistleblowers. 
Let us indicate that – in accordance with Article 100 Paragraph 2(4–5) 
of the Civil Code, an employee is obliged to keep confidential the infor-
mation whose disclosure could expose the employer to damage and to 
observe the confidentiality specified in separate regulations.459 The Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence confirms this point by emphasizing that the care for 
the employer’s welfare should be understood as the obligation to refrain 
 456 The Law of April 16, 1993, on Combating Unfair Competition, Dziennik 
Ustaw 1010/2019.
 457 EU Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business infor-
mation (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure.
 458 For more, see Ł. Bolesta, “Ujawnianie nadużyć przez sygnalistów a ochrona 
tajemnicy przedsiębiorstwa,” in:  Prawne, ekonomiczne i finansowe 
uwarunkowania rozwoju przedsiębiorstw, eds. P Antonowicz, P. Galiński, 
P.  Nogal-Meger, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk 2019, 
pp. 125–136.
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from actions that cause damage or even expose the employer to damage 
and to refrain from actions that may expose the employer to damage by the 
disclosure of information that constitute its secret.460 An unjustified breach 
of this obligation and exposition of the employer to damage may consti-
tute a severe breach of essential employee obligations, thus leading to the 
termination of employment relationship with the employee.461 We should 
highlight that the exclusion of whistleblowers from the ban on disclosure 
of the company’s secrets is not unconditional and must be considered in 
a strict and restrictive manner.462 When investigating the legality of sig-
naling activities, let us notice the motivation of the person and whether he 
or she has used the company’s pre-existing internal reporting procedures. 
On the other hand, we should stress that the discussed amendment in 
regulations prevents the infringing employer from covering their abuses 
with company secrets whose disclosure to the employee would be subject 
to severe consequences. The literature emphasizes that the entry into force 
of the above provisions was an essential step in protecting whistleblowers 
from legal liability for the violation of legally protected secrets in connection 
with the transmission of information about irregularities.463
2.3.4  The Law of March 1, 2018, on Counteracting 
Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing
Another legislation important in the context of whistleblowing in Poland 
is the Law of March 1, 2018, on Counteracting Money Laundering and 
Terrorism Financing.464 This Law contains specific requirements for the 
protection of whistleblowers. Article 53 concerns internal procedures of 
anonymous reporting of infringements of provisions on the prevention of 
money laundering and terrorism financing. It is also referred to as the AML 
(Anti Money Laundering) procedure. According to Article 53 Paragraph 
 460 The Supreme Court judgment of June 6, 2000, I PKN 49/14.
 461 The Supreme Court judgment of September 11, 2019, II PK 49/14.
 462 Such conclusions were reached by the author in Bolesta, “Ujawnianie nadużyć 
przez sygnalistów,” p. 132.
 463 Hryniewicz, Krak, Sygnaliści, p. 24.
 464 The Law of March 1, 2018, on Counteracting Money Laundering and 













Whistleblower Protection in Polish Legislature116
1, obliged institutions must develop and implement an internal procedure 
for the anonymous reporting by employees or other persons performing 
activities for the obliged institution of actual or potential violations of 
anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing regulations. Hence, 
the channel enabling reports of irregularities should be available not 
only to employees of obliged institutions but also to other persons who 
perform activities for the benefit of the institution. A broad catalog of 
addressees of the above obligation is contained in Article 2 Paragraph 
1 of the Law. The catalog includes domestic banks, branch offices of 
foreign banks, branch offices of credit institutions, cooperative savings 
and credit unions, the National Cooperative Savings and Credit Union, 
domestic payment institutions, domestic electronic money institutions, 
investment firms, trust banks, foreign legal persons conducting brokerage 
activities in the territory of the Republic of Poland, companies operating 
a regulated market – to the extent that they operate an auction plat-
form – investment funds, alternative investment companies, investment 
fund companies, entrepreneurs conducting currency exchange activities, 
notaries within the scope of activities performed in the form of a notarial 
deed, attorneys, legal advisors, foreign lawyers, tax advisors within the 
scope of providing legal assistance, or tax advisory services to the client 
within the scope in question.
Pursuant to Article 53 Paragraph 2 of the Law on Counteracting Money 
Laundering and Terrorism Financing, the procedure of anonymous re-
porting of infringements of provisions on counteracting money laundering 
and terrorism financing specifies:
 1) a person responsible for receiving notifications;
 2) the manner of receiving reports;
 3) how to protect the employee that issues the report, ensuring at least 
protection against repressive actions, discrimination, and other types 
of unfair treatment;
 4) how to protect personal data of the reporting employee and the person 
alleged to have committed a breach, following the provisions on the 
protection of personal data;
 5) the rules of confidentiality in the case of disclosure of the identity of 
persons referred to in point 4, or when their identity can be established;
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 6) the type and nature of follow-up actions taken after the reception of the 
notification;
 7) the deadline for the removal of personal data contained in the 
notifications by obliged institutions.
The provisions of the Law also provide for administrative penalties for 
failure in the implementation of internal procedures for anonymous re-
porting.465 According to Article 150 of the Law on Counteracting Money 
Laundering and Terrorism Financing, these penalties include:
 a) the publication of information about the obliged institution and the 
scope of violation of the provisions of the Law by this institution in the 
Public Information Bulletin on the website of the office of the minister 
in charge of public finance;
 b) the order to cease particular actions by the obliged institution;
 c) the withdrawal of concession or permit or deletion from the register of 
a regulated activity;
 d) the ban on performing managerial duties by a person responsible for 
the breach of the provisions of the Law by an obliged institution for a 
period not exceeding one year;
 e) financial penalty.
The Law provides for two instances of notification: it is possible to transfer 
information about detected irregularities to the management board, but 
also to the General Inspector of Financial Information as a governmental 
body.466
In the performance of the delegation under Article 80 Paragraph 3 of the 
Law on Counteracting Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, the 
Minister of Finance issued the Regulation of May 16, 2018, on Receiving 
Notifications of Infringements of Provisions on Counteracting Money 
Laundering and Financing of Terrorism.467 It defines how the General 
Inspector for Financial Information collects reports of actual or potential 
 465 Jasiński, “Sygnalizacja o nieprawidłowościach,” p. 15.
 466 Jasiński, “Sygnalizacja o nieprawidłowościach,” p. 15.
 467 Regulation of the Minister of Finance of May 16, 2018, on Receiving 
Notifications of Infringements of Provisions on Counteracting Money 
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violations of provisions on anti-money laundering and financing of ter-
rorism. The General Inspector for Financial Information may collect the 
reports from employees, former employees of obliged institutions, or other 
persons who perform or performed activities for the benefit of obliged 
institutions on the basis other than an employment relationship, may also 
define how reports are handled and stored, and how the information on 
actions allowed after the report is accepted.468
The provisions of the Regulation on the reception of notifications impose 
on the General Inspector for Financial Information the obligation to create 
the possibility of receiving notifications in electronic version and paper 
form. However, these are not anonymous notifications, as the person who 
reports is obliged to indicate the means of contact in the notification: an 
e-mail address or a correspondence address. The General Inspector for 
Financial Information may ask the notifying person for explanations 
regarding the information provided. The means of communication adopted 
by the General Inspector for Financial Information are:
 a) independent of the means of communication used in the ordinary 
course of activities of the General Inspector;
 b) ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the informa-
tion, including its protection against unauthorized reading;
 c) allowing for the storage of notifications in a manner ensuring a fol-
low-up by the General Inspector.
The lack of the possibility of an anonymous signaling activity in the 
Regulation may have an impact on the number of whistleblowers who 
dare to provide information necessary for the General Inspector for 
Financial Information. The literature stresses that this approach is incom-
prehensible in the context of the provisions of the Law on Counteracting 
Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, which provides for such a 
procedure.469 Moreover, the above regulations narrow down the list of 
violations that can be reported by whistleblowers only to those in the 
 468 Paragraph 1 of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of May 16, 2018, 
on Receiving Notifications of Infringements of Provisions on Counteracting 
Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, Dziennik Ustaw 959/2018.
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field of counteracting money laundering and terrorism financing, which 
does not give them the possibility to disclose other types of irregularities. 
Nevertheless, let us indicate that these provisions constitute another essen-
tial step in the Polish legislation in the area of the system of reports of 
irregularities by whistleblowers.
2.3.5  The Law of June 6, 1997, on the Code of Criminal Procedure 
and the Law of June 6, 1997, on the Penal Code
We should also discuss the criminal law provisions that may apply in prac-
tice to whistleblower activities.470 Under criminal law, both in material 
and formal terms, there are no provisions directly relating to the protec-
tion of whistleblowers. The expressions such as “the injured party” or 
“the witness” cannot be considered synonymous with the concept of the 
whistleblower. Nevertheless, we should mention Article 304 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure,471 which concerns reports on irregularities and 
provides for a social obligation to report suspicions of a crime. According 
to Paragraph 1 of this provision, everyone who knows of an offense pros-
ecuted ex officio has the social obligation to notify the prosecutor or the 
Police. This obligation is not subject to any legal liability in the event of 
its abandonment. It is only an expression of a moral obligation incumbent 
on citizens.472 Exceptions to this rule are crimes listed in Article 240 of the 
Penal Code.473 They include genocide, espionage, murder, or seizure of a 
ship or aircraft. A person who has credible information about a punish-
able preparation, attempt, or committing a prohibited act listed in the Law 
and who does not immediately notify an authority appointed to prosecute 
crimes shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to 
three years.
In the context of this social obligation to report suspicions of a crime, 
there is doubt whether these provisions do not give rise to abuse by persons 
 470 For more, see Szymczykiewicz, Miejsce, pp. 396–401.
 471 The Law of June 6, 1997, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Dziennik Ustaw 
1987/2018.
 472 Derlacz-Wawrowska, “Whistleblowing,” p. 396.
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wrongfully accusing others to harm them. The Supreme Court judgment of 
November 20, 2007, answers that,474
The mere fact of reporting a crime does not, in principle, have the characteristics 
of unlawfulness. Anyone who recognizes an offense prosecuted ex officio has not 
only the right but also the social obligation to notify the law enforcement author-
ities about it (Article 304 Paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Thus, 
only a notification that does not fulfill this obligation but uses the institution to 
harm another person may be considered unlawful.
The content of the judgment indicates that only reporting in bad faith can 
be unlawful. The above conclusion should be applied to the broadly under-
stood activity of whistleblowers. According to the literature on the subject, 
persons who disclose information in good faith should benefit from pro-
tection even if their information is not confirmed. Good faith means that 
these persons follow justified suspicions based on premises, on which they 
could reasonably assume that the irregularities they determine happened 
in the circumstances of a specific case.475
The legal obligation to report a crime is incumbent on the state and 
local government institutions, which – in connection with their activities – 
learned about the commission of an offense prosecuted ex officio. According 
to Article 304 Paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, they are 
obliged to immediately notify about it the prosecutor or the police and 
undertake necessary actions until the arrival of an authority appointed 
to prosecute crimes; or until the issuance of an appropriate order by this 
authority to prevent the blurring of traces and evidence of the crime. In 
its verdict of August 3, 1962,476 the Supreme Court indicates that, “The 
obligation to notify is incumbent on the institution, which should be under-
stood primarily as its management board, but also on each of its bodies 
appointed to oversee the proper functioning of this institution.” Therefore, 
this obligation applies to persons who exercise managerial or supervisory 
functions and not to all the employees of those institutions.477 In its verdict 
of February 12, 2008,478 the Supreme Court indicated that the failure to 
 474 The Supreme Court judgment of November 20, 2007, IV CSK 310/07.
 475 Derlacz-Wawrowska, “Whistleblowing,” p. 400.
 476 The Supreme Court judgment of August 3, 1962, WA 1/08.
 477 Skupień, “Whistleblowing in Poland,” p. 226.
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fulfill this obligation may result in criminal liability provided for public 
officers in Article 231, Paragraph 1 of the Penal Code (penalty of depriva-
tion of liberty for up to three years).
To conclude, the above provisions provide for an obligation to report 
suspicions of a crime and thus to signal. However, apart from the situations 
listed in the Penal Code, this obligation exists only at the moral level.479
Among the numerous mechanisms of protection480 of persons who notify 
of a crime – contained in the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure – 
we should mentioned the institution of the anonymous witness to meet the 
objectives of this study. The status of the anonymous witness, the grounds 
and manner of anonymization, and the course of hearings are regulated by 
Article 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. First, let us indicate that 
the essence of the above institution is to maintain secrecy and hide any data 
and circumstances from the parties that would enable them to disclose the 
identity of the witness.481 Not only the personal data of the witness shall 
be kept confidential but also all the circumstances that could allow for the 
identification of the witness, as contained in the witness examination report 
and relevant files.482 According to Article 184 Paragraph 1 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, the status of anonymous witness may be obtained in 
both pre-trial and judicial proceedings. In the former case, the decision 
belongs to the prosecutor while, in the latter case, to the court. This status 
may be acquired if there is a justified fear of danger to life, health, freedom, 
or property of a witness or a person closest to him or her. An order to make 
confidential the circumstances that could disclose the identity of the wit-
ness, including personal data, may be issued if they are not relevant to the 
outcome of the case. The provisions further provide that the proceedings 
 479 Szymczykiewicz, Miejsce, p. 47–48.
 480 For more on the mechanisms for the protection of persons who report a crime, 
including witnesses and victims, included in the provisions of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, see Szymczykiewicz, Miejsce, p. 55.
 481 Szymczykiewicz, Miejsce, p. 55–67.
 482 B. Kolasiński, T. Kulikowski, ”Glosa do uchwały Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 
20.01.1999 r.,  I KZP 21/98,” Prokuratura i  Prawo, Vol. 4, Prokuratura 
Krajowa, Warszawa 2000, p.  100; M.  Kowal,  ”Instytucja  świadka 
anonimowego w świetle kodeksu postępowania karnego,” Prokuratura 
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in this respect shall be conducted without the participation of the parties 
and shall be kept “secret” or “top secret.” Anonymized information about 
the witness is available for the court and prosecutor only; if necessary also 
for the police officer conducting the proceedings. The provisions do not 
contain a catalog of prohibited acts in cases of the application of witness 
protection. Therefore, we should recognize that the status of anonymous 
witness may be obtained in the case of any crime.483 Since the above regu-
lation guarantees anonymity to the person who gives testimony – including 
whistleblowers – it may also be an excellent incentive for whistleblowers to 
undertake signaling activities in their places of employment.
2.4  Summary
To summarize, there is no legal act in the Polish law that comprehensively 
regulates the legal situation of whistleblowers. The legal concept of whistle-
blower status, signaling activities, and legal protection for whistleblowers 
has not yet been developed. Moreover, I believe that the current legisla-
tion does not create an effective legal framework for the protection of 
whistleblowers. The regulations in this area are scattered in various acts 
and are not consistent with one another. The literature indicates that the 
legal protection of whistleblowers in Poland has two basic shortcomings: a 
narrow scope and low effectiveness of available legal instruments in court 
proceedings.484
We should note that employees have a duty of signaling activity at the 
workplace. When taking any actions, the whistleblower should bear in 
mind the obligation to consider the employer’s reputation. However, this 
obligation is not absolute. We should emphasize that the lack of appropriate 
regulations and – consequently – the lack of protection for whistleblowers 
discourage employees to disclose information about detected irregularities. 
As practice shows, employees are thus exposed to negative consequences, 
such as discrimination, mobbing, or dismissal, which can sometimes be dif-
ficult to challenge in court. This is mainly due to difficulties with evidence 
 483 T. Grzegorczyk, Kodeks postępowania karnego, Vol. 1, Articles 1–467, Wolters 
Kluwer Polska, Warszawa 2014, p. 638.








in proceedings before the labor court, mainly in terms of demonstrating by 
whistleblowers that the reason indicated in the notice is merely apparent. 
The literature indicates that the employee’s argumentation about reported 
irregularities is irrelevant in court proceedings, as the subject of examina-
tion is the reason for the termination of the employment relationship indi-
cated by the employer, e.g. liquidation of the workplace.485 Moreover, even 
granting compensation to an employee or restoring them to work after long 
court proceedings can rarely be considered adequate to the moral, health, 
or material losses incurred. Noteworthy, in the case of employment on the 
basis of a temporary employment contract, when terminating the contract 
with an employee, the employer does not have to give any reason, so the 
court does not examine the legitimacy of termination. Whereas persons 
employed under civil law contracts are, in fact, beyond any protection 
whatsoever.
We should take notice of the emergence of the first provisions relating to 
the activities of whistleblowers in the Polish legal system. Let us emphasize 
that the above occurred as part of the implementation of EU regulations. 
A similar case is pending in connection with the adoption of the directive 
on the protection of individuals who report infringements of the EU law, 
whose regulations are discussed in this publication.
Moreover, we witness a noticeable increase in the interest in 
whistleblowers’ activities among employers themselves, who increasingly 
often create internal procedures that enable employees to report irregular-
ities. They can be an effective tool to warn against abuses in the organi-
zation. We should indicate that these systems often differ from one other. 
The most complex of them includes both the creation of documents, e.g. 
ethical codes, and solutions that facilitate reporting irregularities, e.g. the 
establishment of special anonymous hotlines or ethics officers.486 The litera-
ture highlights that a number of guaranteed information paths is important 
for the correct functioning of such procedures.487 In practice, the following 
channels of reporting irregularities are used:
 485 Wojciechowska-Nowak, “Skuteczna ochrona prawna sygnalistów,” p. 18.
 486 Waszak, Sygnaliści, p. 137.
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 a) in person, through contact with a member of the management or a spe-
cially designated person, such as an Ethics Officer;
 b) via e-mail to an address specifically designated for this purpose;
 c) via phone: to a special number, sometimes free of charge;
 d) via the Internet: by means of an anonymous data encryption form;
 e) via an external professional legal person e.g. a law firm.
The key to the success of these procedures is the awareness of potential 
whistleblowers of their existence and functioning. It is necessary to train 
employees in the use of signaling paths and explain the importance of 
these activities for the good of the company. Moreover, the employer’s 
attitude towards compliance with the proposed procedures is important. If 
in practice they prove ineffective or give no anonymity despite assurances, 
employees will lose interest in them and will not want to share infor-
mation.488 It seems necessary to provide at least one way of anonymous 
reporting of abuse. It enables action to be taken without fear of nega-
tive consequences e.g. dismissal. On the other hand, open reports should 
ensure the protection of whistleblowers’ identities and comply with the 
provisions on personal data protection. Thanks to this, the employee will 
not be afraid of ostracism or retaliation from other employees on behalf 
of their superiors.489 Some employers also allow outside parties, such as 
business partners, to use internal reporting systems. Therefore, not only an 
employee but also a customer or contractor can become a whistleblower 
in such procedures.490
 488 P. Chmiel, “T-MOBILE POLSKA,” in: Systemy zgłaszania nieprawidłowości, 
Założenia do ustawy o ochronie sygnalistów, Global Compact Network Poland, 
Warszawa, 2018, p.  30, https://ungc.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
Za%C5%82o%C5%BCenia-do-ustawy-o-oschronie-sygnalist%C3%B3w.
pdf, access: 16.08.2019.
 489 A. Wojciechowska-Nowak, Założenia do ustawy o ochronie osób 
sygnalizujących nieprawidłowości w środowisku zawodowym. Jak polski 
ustawodawca może czerpać z doświadczeń państw obcych?, Fundacja im. 
Stefana Batorego, Warszawa, 2012, p. 20.
 490 I. Czerwińska-Engel, “3M POLAND,” in: Systemy zgłaszania nieprawidłowości, 
Założenia do ustawy o ochronie sygnalistów, Global Compact Network Poland, 










Anti-discrimination and anti-mobbing policies deserve special attention 
among all the procedures introduced for reporting embezzlement491. These 
help employers to meet their obligations to counteract discrimination and 
mobbing in workplaces and to prevent these negative phenomena. These 
undoubtedly make it easier for employees to conduct signaling activities.
However, these reporting procedures do not necessarily enjoy the trust 
of employees and do not always meet the standards of actual protection. 
Company whistleblowers face e.g. cultural barriers.492 Moreover, employers 
are reluctant to consult internal regulations with employees or their repre-
sentatives, which results in a lack of agreement and mutual trust between 
the social partners. Despite the above, the implementation of in-company 
procedures that enable employees reporting irregularities should be con-
sidered good practice, which brings measurable benefits to the employers 
themselves. Moreover, the application of such procedures helps to promote 
the idea of whistleblowing in the Polish employee circles.493
 491 Wujczyk, “Podstawy whistleblowingu,” p. 118.
 492 Wojciechowska-Nowak, “Skuteczna ochrona prawna sygnalistów,” p. 3.








Chapter III  Proposal of Whistleblower’s 
Legal Protection Model in the 
Workplace in Poland
3.1  Preliminary Remarks
We should also discuss the legal regulations proposed at the time of the 
preparation of this study, which more or less relate to the reporting of 
irregularities and protection of whistleblowers, i.e. the Draft Law on 
Transparency in Public Life and the Draft Law on the Liability of Collective 
Entities for Criminal Offences. Their introduction into the Polish legal order 
may remedy the lack of an effective legal framework for the protection of 
whistleblowers in Poland. As I will present below, these regulations provide 
a number of valuable legal instruments for the protection of whistleblowers. 
Moreover, we should pay special attention to the Citizens’ Draft Law on 
Whistleblowers’ Protection, which contains many solutions I  support. 
Besides the above regulations, this chapter will also present a doctrine 
proposal for a model of legal protection of whistleblowers at work.
3.2  Draft Laws
3.2.1  Draft Law on Transparency in Public Life
One of the regulations mentioned in the Preliminary Remarks to this chapter 
is the Draft Law on Transparency in Public Life.494 From the very beginning, 
the Draft Law was subject to many reservations and comments from both 
private and public legal persons,495 including the Polish Ombudsman.496 In 
2018, works on the Draft Law ceased with no communication about the 
 494 The website of the Government Legislation Center since January 8, 2018, offers 
the latest version of the Draft Law on Transparency in Public Life: https://
legislacja.rcl.gov.pl/projekt/12304351.
 495 Wojciechowicz, “Sytuacja sygnalistów,” p. 13.
 496 Ombudsman of the Republic of Poland, “Opinion of the Ombudsman on the 
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Polish government’s withdrawal from work on the planned legal act.497 
According to the definition proposed in Article 2 Paragraph 1(15) of the 
Draft Law, the definition of a whistleblower is a natural person or entre-
preneur whose cooperation with the judiciary consists in reporting infor-
mation about the possibility of committing a crime by an legal person with 
which they are bound by an employment contract, business relationship, 
or other contractual relationship that may adversely affect the informant’s 
professional, material, or life situation and for which the prosecutor grants 
the status of whistleblower. The list of offences covered by this regulation 
appears in Article 61 of the Draft Law and includes bribery, paid protec-
tion, participation in an organized group or criminal association, or fraud. 
Hence, the whistleblower cooperates with the judicial system and receives 
such a status from the prosecutor who assesses e.g. the reliability of the sub-
mitted information.498 The status of the whistleblower may also be granted 
at the request of the police authorities or the President of the Supreme 
Audit Office. Once a decision on the aforementioned subject is issued, the 
whistleblower would receive special protection against potential retaliatory 
actions.499 In accordance with Article 63 Paragraph 1(1) of the Draft Law, 
in employer-employee relations such protection includes e.g. prohibition 
on the termination of an employment contract or an employment rela-
tionship with a whistleblower or on changing the terms of an employment 
contract or an employment relationship to a less favorable one.500 If – as 
a result of submitting information – the employment relationship or offi-
cial relationship is terminated without the consent of the prosecutor, the 
whistleblower will be entitled to compensation in the amount of twice the 
annual salary collected on the last position held. Moreover, the whistle-
blower may be granted reimbursement of legal representation costs. The 
proposed regulations stipulate that the protection of whistleblowers is to 
continue for a period of one year after the conclusion of proceedings.501 
 497 Hryniewicz, Krak, Sygnaliści, p. 32.
 498 Hryniewicz, Krak, Sygnaliści, p. 32.
 499 Jasiński, “Sygnalizacja o nieprawidłowościach,” p. 15.
 500 For more, see Bolesta, “Sygnalizacja,” p. 35–46.
 501 From the date of discontinuation of proceedings or termination by a final ruling 












Moreover, the possibility of awarding interest to the person who received 
whistleblower status or to an enterprise run by that person, if the offender 
has been convicted as a result of a reported crime.
According to Article 68 Paragraph 1 of the Draft Law, an entrepreneur 
who owns at least a medium-sized enterprise as defined in the Act of July 
2, 2004, on the freedom of economic activity502 must apply internal anti-
corruption procedures to prevent cases of specific crimes committed by 
persons who act in the name or on behalf of that entrepreneur. Moreover, 
Article 68 Paragraph 2 binds directors of the public finance sector units to 
develop and apply internal anti-corruption procedures in subordinate units 
to prevent cases of the commitment of above crimes. Noteworthy, the above 
regulations do not ensure the anonymity of whistleblowers.
The Draft Law envisages severe consequences for the violation of its 
regulations. These include fines of up to PLN 10,000,000 for e.g. failure 
to develop internal anti-corruption procedures, failure to apply such 
procedures, or their apparent or ineffective character.503
3.2.2  Draft Law on the Liability of Collective 
Entities for Criminal Offences
Another proposed regulation relevant to this study is the Draft Law on 
the Liability of Collective Entities for Criminal Acts.504 The Law is already 
in force in the Polish legal system since 2002. However, due to its ineffec-
tiveness, the legislature began work to modify the previously introduced 
regulations.505 The Draft Law specifies e.g. the obligation for collective 
legal persons to accept notifications of irregularities, mandatory internal 
procedures to clarify the notification, and specific measures to protect 
whistleblowers in the event of retaliatory actions by collective legal persons.506 
 502 Law of July 2, 2004, on the freedom of economic activity, Dziennik Ustaw 
2168/2017. The Law expired due to the entry into force of the Law of March 
6, 2018, the Entrepreneurs’ Law, Dziennik Ustaw 1292/2019.
 503 Hryniewicz, Krak, Sygnaliści, p. 33.
 504 h t tp : / /o rka . s e jm.gov.p l /Druk i8ka .ns f /P ro j ek ty /8 -020-1211-
2019/$file/8-020-1211-2019.pdf.
 505 Hryniewicz, Krak, Sygnaliści, p. 33.
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Reference to whistleblowers already appears in Article 1 Paragraph 1(3), 
which states that the Draft Law specifies the rules of liability of collective 
legal persons related to actions against persons who report irregularities. 
Detailed regulations on this subject appear in Chapter 4 “The Liability of 
Collective Entities in Relation to Actions Against Whistleblowers.” A col-
lective legal person is considered a legal legal person and an organizational 
unit without a legal status, whose separate provisions grant legal capacity, 
including a commercial company with the State Treasury shareholding, a 
local government unit, or a union of such units, a limited liability company 
in an organization, a liquidated legal person, and an entrepreneur who is 
not a natural person, excluding the State Treasury, local government units, 
and their unions.
According to the Draft Law regulations, the whistleblower may be an 
employee of a collective legal person, a member of a body, or a person 
acting on its behalf or in its interest on the basis of a legal act. According 
to Article 11 Paragraph 1 of the Draft Law, the authorities of the collective 
legal person and in particular the designated body of the collective legal 
person supervising compliance with the rules and regulations governing 
the activity of the legal person or persons exercising internal supervision 
(collective legal person authorities) shall take steps – within the scope of 
their power – to clarify the information reported by the whistleblower. The 
whistleblower may report:
 1) the suspicion of the preparation, attempt, or execution of a 
prohibited act;
 2) the breach of duties or misuse of powers by the authorities of the collec-
tive legal person or certain persons who act in its name or on its behalf;
 3) the failure to exercise due diligence required under the circumstances 
by the collective legal person’s authorities or certain persons who act in 
its name or on its behalf;
 4) irregularities in the organization of activities of a collective legal person 
which could lead to a criminal offence.
Upon receiving information on irregularities, collective legal person author-
ities should conduct an investigation, in which they verify the information 
and establish the circumstances of the case. If they fail to comply with this 
obligation or remove the irregularities or infringements identified in the 
Draft Laws 131
course of the investigation that facilitated or enabled the commission of the 
offence, the court may hold the collective legal person liable for the offence 
and impose a fine of up to PLN 60,000,000.507 Noteworthy, the regulations 
in question do not mention anything about ensuring anonymity or even 
confidentiality for individuals who report the information. The regulations 
merely provide, in Article 11 Paragraph 3 of the Draft Law, that the collec-
tive legal person authorities should endeavor to ensure that employees who 
report the information are protected at least from any repressive action, 
discrimination, or otherwise unfair treatment. It is doubtful whether this 
desire to provide protection against potential retaliation will be sufficiently 
encouraging for whistleblowers to report irregularities.
Further proposed regulations stipulate that, if the employee’s rights have 
been infringed or the employment relationship or mutual agreement with 
the whistleblower has been terminated as a result of the disclosure of infor-
mation, the court may decide at the whistleblower’s request:
 1) to reinstate them;
 2) to compensate them for damage;
 – should the information reported be relevant and allowed for the pre-
vention of the offence or allowed for its swifter detection.
This does not apply if the whistleblower was the perpetrator of a crim-
inal offence related to the activities of the collective legal person, unless 
the whistleblower disclosed all the relevant circumstances of the offence 
to the collective legal person and the law enforcement authority. Thus, 
whistleblowers will be entitled to a claim for reinstatement or compensa-
tion, if their information is found relevant and helpful and if, in principle, 
they are not the perpetrator of the criminal act in question. Article 13 
Paragraph 3 of the Draft Law states that – when ruling on compensation for 
breach of employee rights or termination of employment agreement – the 
court determines its amount in a manner specified in the provisions of the 
 507 In accordance with Article 17 Paragraph 1 of the Draft Law, there is a finan-
cial penalty of PLN 30,000–30,000,000. However, in the discussed situa-
tion, Article 12 Paragraph 1 stipulates that the court, recognizing a collective 




Proposal of Whistleblower’s Legal Protection Model132
Polish Labor Code. In justified cases, the court may award compensation 
for the entire period of unemployment for the person who reports the infor-
mation. Let us note that the abovementioned collective legal person liability 
does not exclude civil liability for damages caused, administrative liability, 
or individual criminal liability of the perpetrator of a prohibited act.508
3.2.3  Citizens’ Draft Law on Whistleblowers’ Protection
We should also discuss the content of the Citizens’ Draft Law on 
Whistleblowers’ Protection prepared by the Stefan Batory Foundation, 
the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, the Trade Union Forum and 
the Institute of Public Affairs.509 Public consultations on the project began 
with the discussion about the project on April 6, 2018, during the seminar 
“The Law on Whistleblowers’ Protection in Poland: Needs, Proposals, and 
Standards.”510 Furthermore, on September 22, 2018, a public opinion panel 
was held regarding the Citizens’ Draft Law with the participation of e.g. 
the Polish Ombudsman.511 The Citizens’ Draft Law specifies the rules and 
procedure for reporting information on irregularities undertaken in connec-
tion with duties, work, or contractual performance, the rights of persons 
who report them, and the scope and premises for granting protection to 
whistleblowers.
According to the project’s regulations, the whistleblower is a natural 
person who reports irregularities in good faith and public interest or who 
assists another person in such a report. Therefore, the personal scope of the 
definition does not include legal persons with the status of a legal person. 
A report can be made in the context of the performance of duties, work, or 
contract. The basis of employment or the nature of the legal relationship 
 508 Hryniewicz, Krak, Sygnaliści, p. 34.
 509 http://www.sygnalista.pl/projekt-ustawy/.
 510 Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, “Organizacje społeczne proponują 
własną ustawę o  ochronie sygnalistów,” 2018, http://www.sygnalista.pl/
organizacje-spoleczne-proponuja-wlasna-ustawe-o-ochronie-sygnalistow/, 
access: 22.08.2019.
 511 Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, “Wysłuchanie obywatelskiego projektu 













between the whistleblower and the employer concerned by the reported 
irregularity – even after the termination of the relationship – is irrelevant 
in the context of the possibility of taking such action. The reported irreg-
ularities may concern actions that threaten public interest or infringe on 
generally applicable law and internal regulations or ethical standards that 
result from employer’s acts of self-regulation. The disclosed irregularities 
may e.g. indicate that a crime was committed or that an employee’s rights 
were violated.
The draft bill assumes the whistleblower acts in good faith, which may 
be refuted in specific cases, including the concealment of the fact that the 
whistleblower contributed to the misconduct. Moreover, the whistleblower 
cannot act to obtain financial or personal benefit, as it will be considered 
to be contrary to the principles of social coexistence and will also deprive 
such a person of the protection provided in the bill. Noteworthy, it does not 
matter whether the reported irregularities turn out to be true for granting 
protection to a whistleblower.
The Citizens’ Draft Law indicates three ways of reporting irregularities:
 1) internal: notification of the employer or an appointed person;
 2) a notification of the public authority competent to take appropriate ac-
tion on disclosed information;
 3) external: notification of the public.
This regulation provides a chronology of whistleblower’s activities. Namely, 
before making an external report, the whistleblower is obligated to use the 
internal information system – if it is implemented and meets the conditions 
specified in the Citizens’ Draft Law – or the possibility to report irregulari-
ties to competent public authorities. Failure to comply with the above rules 
will deprive the whistleblower of protection. The act also provides that the 
addressee of the report should examine it without undue delay, no later 
than within twenty-one days from the date of its filing. If this deadline is 
not met, as well as if the nature of the irregularity is such that it is impos-
sible or manifestly unreasonable to take an internal route or report it to the 
aforementioned authorities, the whistleblower may disclose information to 
the public. The Citizens’ Draft Law requires that the rules of the internal 
procedure for reporting irregularities are disclosed to employees. Moreover, 
the system should meet certain conditions, such as:
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 – the guarantee of data confidentiality, including the protection of 
whistleblower’s identity and personal data of the persons concerned;
 – the specification of the mode of reporting;
 – the assurance of whistleblower’s protection against retaliation;
 – the assurance of a reliable and objective verification of the reported 
information.
The Citizens’ Draft Law provides for mandatory consultation of the above 
procedures with trade unions. This will enable shaping them with the partic-
ipation of interested parties, who may identify problems that have not been 
noticed by the employing legal person. Let us indicate that public finance 
legal persons are required to create internal procedures for whistleblowing.
Article 9 of the Citizens’ Draft Law guarantees the protection of the iden-
tity of the whistleblower. The disclosure of whistleblower’s data is possible 
only with the consent of the informant or – under certain circumstances – 
with the consent of the court.
The proposed regulations prohibit taking or threatening to take any 
retaliatory action against a whistleblower, including but not limited to 
discrimination, dissolution of the legal relationship between the whistle-
blower and the employer, or changing working conditions to less favorable. 
In the event of the deterioration of the whistleblower’s situation as a result 
of the signaling action, such a person is entitled to compensation from 
the employer in the amount proportional to the degree of such deteriora-
tion, not less than PLN 10,000. Moreover, a whistleblower may demand 
reinstatement to work under the previous conditions or compensation 
equal to the last remuneration received for the period of two years. The 
burden of proof that the deterioration of the whistleblower’s position is 
not retaliation for signaling action would lie with the employer. If the 
whistleblower bears the costs of legal representation in cases concerning 
the abovementioned protection, they are entitled to reimbursement of these 
costs by the employer.
Furthermore, Article 10 Paragraph 2 of the Citizens’ Draft Law stipulates 
that any retaliatory measures against the person who reports irregulari-
ties within three years from the date of becoming aware of them by the 
employer are null and void by virtue of law. The proposed regulations 
also provide for the exclusion of whistleblowers from legal liability for the 
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violation of legally protected secrecy and personal rights and provide for 
access to free legal assistance.
In accordance with Article 15 Paragraph 1 of the Citizens’ Draft Law, 
a Commission for the Protection of Whistleblowers is to be established to 
monitor compliance with the Law, which would consist of the Ombudsman, 
representatives of the government, employees, employers, and non-
governmental organizations. The Commission’s term of office would be six 
years, and its tasks would include: collecting information on notifications of 
irregularities received by competent authorities, monitoring their manage-
ment, and issuing opinions on draft normative acts concerning the activity 
of whistleblowers or dissemination of protection standards in this area.
The Citizens’ Draft Law also envisages a fine or a non-custodial sen-
tence in the event of retaliation against a whistleblower that would lead to 
serious or irreparable damage to his health or an underestimation of his 
professional competence. However, the following activities are punishable 
by fine alone:
 – disclosure of information allowing to establish the identity of the whis-
tleblower in a manner contrary to the Act;
 – failure to introduce an internal procedure for reporting irregularities in 
the public finance sector unit in accordance with the law or failure in its 
application;512
 – deliberate report of false information by the whistleblower.
3.3  Doctrinal Proposal
The following subchapter will propose legal solutions for the protection 
of whistleblowers that could be applied in the Polish legal system. I believe 
that the best solution would be to regulate this matter in a separate Act of 
law that will comprehensively set the legal framework for the activities of 
whistleblowers and the scope and prerequisites for granting them protec-
tion. The proposed assumptions of the regulation are as follows:
 1. The law should cover both the public and private sectors.
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 2. The scope of the Act should be determined by the definition of the whis-
tleblower. This status could apply to any natural person that discloses 
irregularities or information justifying the suspicion of irregularities, 
but also a person that provides any assistance in these activities. In this 
context, the nature of the legal relationship between the whistleblower 
and the legal person to which the reported irregularities relate is irrele-
vant. In particular, protection should be available regardless of the form 
of employment, so that its scope would cover not only employees within 
the provisions of the Labor Code but also, among others, officials in an 
employment relationship, the self-employed, volunteers, and those em-
ployed under civil law contracts or providing services to a given legal 
person on another basis. Moreover, this status should also be available 
to applicants for employment and persons who already ceased coop-
eration with the legal person concerned by the application e.g. after 
termination or expiration of the employment relationship. Protection 
should also apply to certain legal legal persons, such as those owned by 
or otherwise associated with a whistleblower.
 3. The reported irregularities or information that justifies the suspicion of 
their occurrence may concern an action or omission that will be incon-
sistent with the provisions of generally applicable law or will otherwise 
threaten the public interest. Examples of irregularities include: the cre-
ation of a threat to public security, the violation of public and legal 
obligations, including taxes, and the violation of human rights or 
corruption.
 4. Several reporting paths must be established. Moreover, we the chro-
nology of their use is equally important. As a first step, irregularities 
should be disclosed internally, i.e. within a public or private body, e.g. 
an employer or a designated person. The whistleblower should also be 
able to omit this stage and inform directly the public authority compe-
tent to receive such information, then report back, and follow up the 
reports. Such an authority may be e.g. a judicial, a supervisory body, 
or the Ombudsman. Only after the ineffective use of at least one of the 
above paths or when their use is impossible or clearly inappropriate 
for legitimate reasons, should it be permissible to disclose the infor-
mation to the public, e.g. to the media. A good reason sample clause 
applies e.g. when the whistleblower has reasonable grounds to believe 
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that the reported infringement may present a direct or obvious threat 
to the public interest, e.g. in the event of an emergency or a risk of 
irreparable harm.
 5. All public and private sector bodies with at least fifty employees should 
be required to establish internal systems for signaling irregularities. 
Other legal persons should do this on a voluntary basis. Such systems 
should be established in agreement with trade unions that operate on 
the employer’s premises, so that the demands of employees can be taken 
into account, i.e. the demands of those directly concerned by the proper 
functioning of such procedures. Moreover, these procedures should 
meet certain standards, e.g.:
 a) identify the proper person or organizational unit to follow up on the 
notification;
 b) enable a notification to be made in writing, orally, or by any other 
means of communication, e.g. online;
 c) ensure the confidentiality of whistleblower’s identity and that of the 
implicated legal person;
 d) guarantee a fair verification of reported information within a rea-
sonable period of time and take appropriate measures should 
infringements be confirmed;
 6. The Act should specify the prerequisites for granting protection to 
whistleblowers. In my opinion, they should entail:
 a) acting in good faith, i.e. having reasonable belief that the informa-
tion provided is true, even if it is not confirmed in reality;
 b) acting in public interest, i.e. activities motivated by revenge or aimed 
at personal or financial gain should be excluded from protection;
 c) reporting via routes and in accordance with the rules established in 
the Act.
 7. Legislation should provide for a legal presumption that signaling activ-
ities were undertaken in good faith. We should repeat here the premises 
for the rebuttal of the presumption from the Citizens’ Draft Law on 
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 1) the circumstances of the case do not clearly justify belief in the 
truthfulness of the information provided; or
 2) the reporting of the irregularity was made for an illegal purpose or 
for reasons of social interaction, e.g. financial or personal gain; or
 3) the whistleblower concealed in the report the fact that he contrib-
uted to the irregularities to which the report relates.
 8. The law should also specify measures to protect whistleblowers, such as:
 (a) ensuring the confidentiality of whistleblowers’ personal data and 
any information that enable their identification, i.e. disclosure 
should be possible only with the consent of the whistleblower or by 
a court decision, if the interests of the proceedings or an important 
public interest so require;
 (b) allowing for the anonymous reporting of irregularities, i.e. 
whistleblowers must still take into account that this may make it 
significantly more difficult to verify the report properly;
 (c) prohibiting direct or indirect retaliation or threat of such against 
whistleblowers. Such actions should be understood as all actions 
taken in connection with the signaling activity of an employee 
that leads to the deterioration of their situation, e.g. in damaging 
or harmful form; this may include harassment, discrimination, 
adverse change in working conditions, or termination of the legal 
relationship between the whistleblower and the legal person. In 
the case of violation of the above prohibition, the whistleblower 
has the right to claim compensation for the damage and harm 
suffered. Such liability will also be borne by the legal person, 
which violated the obligation to ensure the confidentiality of 
the whistleblower’s identity. On the other hand, the dismissed 
employee has the right to additionally demand reinstatement to 
work under previous conditions or  – if it would be impossible 
or unreasonable – to receive compensation in the amount appro-
priate to the circumstances of the case.
 (d) shifting the burden of proof that the actions taken against the whis-
tleblower were not retaliatory in nature to the legal person that 
conducted the actions;
 (e) reimbursing any costs incurred by the whistleblower in defending 
against retaliation, including legal aid costs;
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 (f) providing access to free legal assistance in obtaining information on 
signaling activities.
 9. There should be established an appropriate authority to monitor 
compliance with the provisions of the proposed regulation or confer 
powers in this regard to e.g. the Ombudsman. The tasks would focus 
on e.g. monitoring the activities of whistleblowers and the effective-
ness of granted protection.
 10. The Act should also state that false reporting or disclosure of informa-
tion is a criminal offence and will not benefit from protection.
3.4  Summary
On November 7, 2017, the world’s most important non-governmental 
organizations in the field of whistleblower protection, gathered in the 
Whistleblowing International Network,514 appealed in a letter to the 
Polish government515 to withdraw from the solution in the Draft Law on 
Transparency in Public Life, according to which it is the prosecutor who 
grants whistleblower status.516 The authors of this appeal indicate that, 
“Whistleblowing is freedom of speech where it counts the most for society, 
not prosecutorial control of witness’ testimony.” They expressed concerns 
that the adoption of such a measure will not protect whistleblowers and 
risks eroding trust in the willingness to engage tackling of corrupt conduct 
by Polish law enforcement agencies, thus reinforce the negative stereotype 
of a whistleblower as “state-informant.” The literature also offers a view 
that the discussed regulations do not exhaust any institutional elements of 
whistleblowing.517 Other criticism of the Draft Law includes the narrow 
scope of protection in relation to the type of crimes reported, concerns 
about the practice of applying protection to whistleblowers and its potential 
abuse, or the amount of compensation that can be obtained.518 Besides the 
 514 https://whistleblowingnetwork.org.
 515 Whistleblowing International Network. “Letter to the Government of Poland,” 
2017, https://legislacja.rcl.gov.pl/docs//2/12304351/12465407/12465410/
dokument319949.pdf, access: 12.08.2019.
 516 http://www.sygnalista.pl/archiwum/, access: 24.07.2019.
 517 Jasiński, “Sygnalizacja o nieprawidłowościach,” p. 15.
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above, there is no doubt that the Draft Law would constitute an important 
step in the development of legal standards in the field of whistleblowing. 
In particular the granting of special protection to whistleblowers against 
potential retaliatory measures and the obligation for certain legal persons to 
apply internal anti-corruption procedures to prevent crimes committed by 
individuals who act in the name of or on behalf of a whistleblower should 
be viewed positively.
In reference to the Draft Law on the Liability of Collective Entities for 
Criminal Offenses, we should indicate that it pays much attention to the pro-
tection of individuals who report irregularities. The proposed regulations 
concern not only combating prohibited activities but also preventing them, 
which may protect collective legal persons from negative consequences in 
the future. The above should be assessed positively in the context of whis-
tleblowing. However, one flaw here is the failure to ensure the anonymity 
and confidentiality of whistleblowers. This may prevent the proper func-
tioning of systems for signalizing irregularities in collective legal persons.519
In turn, should the above-described Citizens’ Draft Law on 
Whistleblowers’ Protection come into force, it would be the first compre-
hensive source of protection for whistleblowers in Poland. The vast majority 
of the proposed solutions deserve our approval. Above all, it is only right to 
provide protection for natural persons who report information in good faith 
and in public interest, which they acquired in connection with their duties, 
work, or contract. Therefore, the protection would extend to persons who 
have a many legal relationships with the subject of the notification. Such a 
solution would enable not only employees but also persons who obtained 
information by other means to benefit from the protection. Undoubtedly, 
this procedure increases the chances of detecting and disclosing more irreg-
ularities. A positive aspect in this context is also the extension of protection 
to those who assist in the reporting of an irregularity by another person. An 
unquestionable advantage of the project is also the broad definition of the 
types of irregularities that may be reported. Moreover, we should empha-
size that the Citizens’ Draft Law allows reporting to three different types 




of recipients and indicating the chronology of their choice, with priority 
given to the use of the internal path.
As for possible feedback on the Citizens’ Draft Law, we should consider 
extending the protection to those involved in the pre-employment process 
who may become aware of irregularities in the course of such activities. 
I believe that a positive step would also be to obligate the implementation 
of the system of reporting irregularities not only for public finance sector 
legal persons but also for private sector legal persons, which employ e.g. 
at least fifty people.
Moreover, this chapter proposes a doctrinal model of legal protection 
for persons who communicate irregularities in the workplace to persons or 
entities capable of taking effective action to stop these practices.
The presented measures are intended to enable whistleblowers to act 
without fear of negative consequences. The measures result from the 
analysis of literature, case law, and selected legal acts in the field of pro-
tection of whistleblowers, conducted by this study. The proposed legal 
solutions take into account the assumptions of the EU directive on the 
protection of whistleblowers approved in 2019. Moreover, the measures 
mostly coincide with proposals presented in the Citizen’s Draft Law on 
Whistleblowers’ Protection prepared by the Stefan Batory Foundation, the 
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, the Forum of Trade Unions, and 
the Institute of Public Affairs.

Conclusion
The studies cited in this book show that the activity of whistleblowers 
is one of the most effective instruments for detecting irregularities in the 
workplace. Moreover, the introduction and smooth functioning of internal 
reporting procedures is an indispensable element of effective risk manage-
ment in an organization. The activity of whistleblowers is sometimes the 
only chance to detect undesirable phenomena. Reporting irregularities at 
an early stage may prevent the occurrence of damage or reduce its extent.
However, signaling activities still raise doubts as to their interpretation, 
and those who decide to do so face numerous difficulties. This publication 
highlights a number of problems in the protection of whistleblowers in 
Polish labor law, such as the narrow scope of protection and the ineffective-
ness of existing legal instruments available in the course of court proceed-
ings. As a result, there is no effective protection of whistleblowers in the 
current legal status. Moreover, employees in Poland who notice irregulari-
ties in the workplace often do not know how to behave in such a situation 
and where to seek support. Moreover, we should also indicate that existing 
legal regulations do not meet the requirements resulting from international 
recommendations.520
Therefore, the activity of whistleblowers in Poland is burdened with 
personal risk. As practice shows, such people are exposed to negative 
consequences of their actions, such as discrimination, mobbing, or termi-
nation of employment, which cannot be easily challenged in court. This is 
mainly due to evidential difficulties, especially in terms of demonstrating 
by whistleblowers that the reason for their dismissal is apparent or that the 
irregularities they uncovered find confirmation in reality. The above does 
not encourage employees to undertake signaling action.
There is no possibility to improve the situation of whistleblowers in 
Poland without the introduction of appropriate legal regulations. Hence, 
 520 Recommendation CM/ Rec(2014)7 Protection of whistleblowers, Rada Europy, 








this book proposes a model of protection for such persons, which aims at 
filling this gap in the Polish legal order. This is the result of an analysis of 
the literature, case law, and selected legal acts from around the world in 
the field of whistleblower protection.
The aim of the solutions presented in Chapter III was to create real sup-
port and protection for persons who report on irregularities in the work-
place. This goal is to be achieved by, among other things:
 – including in the definition of a whistleblower the largest possible group 
of people; not only current and former employees but also candidates 
for employment and persons who provide assistance in whistleblowing 
activities; regardless of the nature of the legal relationship between the 
whistleblower and the entity to which the reported irregularities relate, 
in particular regardless of the basis of employment;
 – protecting the people employed in both public and private sectors;
 – creating several channels for reporting irregularities and indicating the 
chronology of their use; in an internal forum or directly to the compe-
tent public authority and, in cases specified by law, disclosure to the 
public;
 – imposing an obligation on certain entities to implement internal whis-
tleblowing systems;
 – conditioning the protection of whistleblowers on the fulfilment of cer-
tain premises, such as acting in good faith, in the public interest, and in 
accordance with procedures delineated in the legislation;
 – a number of protective measures:  the presumption of good faith in 
actions of whistleblowers, the confidentiality of their data, the possi-
bility of anonymous reporting, the prohibition of retaliation, or the 
transfer of the burden of proof that actions against a whistleblower 
were not retaliatory to the entity that undertook them.
The Polish legislator will have to take action in this respect due to the obli-
gation to implement the provisions of the EU Directive, discussed in the 
earlier part of the book. However, the implementation of the Directive’s 
provisions may encounter certain adaptation difficulties, which result from 
the unprecedented nature of the proposed solutions in the Polish legal 
system. Other barriers may include negative stereotypes that function in 
the Polish society in the perception of whistleblowers as informers and the 
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failure to notice the potential of whistleblowing about perceived irregu-
larities. Hence, apart from legislative work, of great importance will be 
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